fix(cli): route the runtime launches through the attested launch (cli#363) - #474
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…#363)
`agent start --runtime claude-code|codex|gemini` branched in the CLI before
`runAgent({action:"start"})`, spawned the runtime directly, and so never reached
the attested launch — it was not confined by nono and `--sandbox-required`
asserted an isolation that path could not deliver. Route those runtimes through
the same attested launch as every other agent start: the runtime is carried into
the nono re-exec and runs inside the launcher's session, so a `--sandbox-required`
launch is confined (or refused before anything is spawned when confinement is
unavailable). Retire the slice-A refusal (rule 2b and `attestationExemptRuntime`).
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📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe CLI now routes Claude Code, Codex, and Gemini launches through runtime-specific attested sandbox profiles. Launch flags are parsed and enforced from shared definitions. Interactive TTY launches can opt out with ChangesRuntime Attested Launch
Priority: ➖ Normal Estimated code review effort: 4 (Complex) | ~45 minutes Change: Bug fix · Severity of issue fixed: Medium Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant tpsCLI as tps CLI
participant launchControl as evaluateLaunchControl
participant runAgent
participant nono
participant runtime as Selected runtime
tpsCLI->>launchControl: Validate parsed launch flags
tpsCLI->>runAgent: Start with selected runtime
runAgent->>nono: Re-exec with runtime profile and grants
nono->>runtime: Start selected runtime in attested launch
Suggested reviewers: Merge Risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Selected runtimes have an undocumented interactive sandbox opt-out, and the CLI tests can fail on numeric sandbox flags. Correct the opt-out handling and test expectations before merging. Security Architecture ReviewSecurity architecture risk: 🟡 Moderate · up to Default launch isolation improves, and unattended launches previously refused can now proceed. However, custom runtime directories can broaden access beyond the selected runtime’s credentials. Validation does not establish credential separation for those configurations. Retained concerns
Security review detailsSecurity Blast Radius
Security Findings and Attack Paths
Trust Boundaries and Controls
Resilience and Maintainability Implications
Hardening Proposals
🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
Full details: Docstring CoverageExplanation Docstring coverage is 50.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 18 functions across 9 files. (4 skipped: 4 unsupported.) ✨ Finishing Touches 💡 1📝 Generate docstrings 💡
🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
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cli#363 slice B — sentence sweep (measured on cd74cbb, main 561853f)Every sentence this PR adds or changes ( Changelog fragment (
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…l grants; tests observe each runner start (#474 review) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Files that need a loopback or Unix-socket bind (not runnable in the fix round's sandbox; CI covers them) at bf58049: Loopback binds: Unix socket binds: |
… runner home) (#474 CI)
…-job pin matches the reverted test step (#363) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…ctive --no-sandbox opt-out is given (#363) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
…s the parser does; --runtime openclaw stays the default runtime (#363) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Verdict: APPROVE — head 676bf84c. Repo visibility checked: repos/tpsdev-ai/cli .visibility = public. Author tps-anvil is a tps-* agent, so I built and ran the suite. No unpatched exposure found, so nothing is held back from this review.
The single launch path (Kern). runCodexRuntime / runGeminiRuntime / runClaudeCodeRuntime have exactly one caller each — bin/tps.ts:535/557/573 — inside if (attestedRuntime && (sandboxed || noSandbox)) (bin/tps.ts:475). sandboxed is process.argv.includes("--sandboxed"); noSandbox is launchFlags.noSandbox. Both spellings are settled by the gate that runs first (await enforceLaunchControlOrExit() at bin/tps.ts:260, before the switch): rule 1b refuses an un-released --sandboxed, rule 1 refuses --no-sandbox outside a TTY. So the runtime runners are reachable only (a) on the execution side of a released attested launch, or (b) under the interactive-TTY opt-out. There is no third caller.
--sandboxed cannot be supplied by a caller (Kern + Sherlock). nono.ts:797: if (argv.includes(SANDBOXED_FLAG) && !(input.confinement?.released ?? false)) deny(...); confinement is only populated when LAUNCH_SOCK_ENV is present and attestConfinement() succeeds (bin/tps.ts:207-215). Probe on the built CLI, with fake claude/codex/gemini binaries that touch a marker if spawned:
agent start --id probe --runtime codex --sandboxed→ exit 78, "‑‑sandboxed is refused: no launcher released this process … no launcher socket is in reach", marker absent.… --sandboxed=true→ exit 78 (rule 2), marker absent — note--sandboxed=trueis not treated as the marker by either the gate or the branch, so it cannot smuggle execution.… --runtime codex --no-sandbox(non-TTY) → exit 78, marker absent.… --runtime codex(no flags, non-TTY) → exit 78, marker absent.… --sandbox-required --no-sandbox→ exit 78 ("conflicts with"), marker absent.… --runtime bogus --sandbox-required→ exit 78 ("refusing to launch runtime 'bogus': unsupported runtime"), marker absent.- Positive control so the negatives are not vacuous: TTY
--no-sandbox --runtime codexreaches the runner ("Codex runtime started. Polling the probe mailbox"); TTY with no--runtimestays on the default runtime.
Pre-existing refusals still fire (Sherlock). Missing nono on the runtime path now says "refusing to launch runtime 'codex': no nono at the pinned absolute path … runtime 'codex' requires isolation; use --no-sandbox in an interactive TTY to opt out" (agent.ts nono-absent branch). TPS_FORCE_NO_NONO is gone (only mentioned in a comment saying so). Deleting rule 2b opens nothing that slice A closed: the PR's own test asserts the launcher's fake nono is invoked as run --profile … agent start … --runtime <rt> --sandboxed, i.e. the runtime is now behind the attested launch.
Flag-spelling parity. readLaunchFlags (nono.ts:712) makes the gate read the sandbox flags exactly as the parser does, and it fails closed: any --x=<non-bool> in the sandbox key set, or an uninterpretable parsed value, returns a refusal that evaluateLaunchControl turns into a deny. I ran the full suite.
Tests. runtime-attested-launch.test.ts + sandbox-launch-control.test.ts + nono-profiles-install.test.ts: 119 pass, 0 fail (via node scripts/test-suite.mjs cli …). I ran no CI lane.
Non-blocking observations
- The claim "the runtimes get the same
tps-agent-runprofile as every agent launch" is not literally true:nono-profiles/tps-agent-run-{claude-code,codex,gemini}.json:8-12extends: tps-agent-runbut additionallygroups.exclude: ["system_read_macos"]. The exclusion is subtractive — it removes an inherited read group, so it cannot weaken the denies, and it is a tightening — but it makes the runtimes read less than the shared profile. Sufficiency is the open question (see 2). scripts/check-runtime-nono-paths.tsis the test that backs "each runtime's credential/state paths are grantable and unrelated credentials stayed denied" — but it needs a real pinned nono (NONO_BIN) and is only wired intocheck-nono-profiles.sh; I could not run it here (no real nono on this host). It probes credential/state paths only, so thesystem_read_macosexclusion above is not exercised by any test: "the runtime profile is sufficient for each runtime's real needs" is only partially backed. My positive control shows codex starts, not that it completes an authenticated run.readLaunchFlagsalso reads--sandbox=falseas the opt-out (flags.sandbox === false,nono.ts:~735), a second, undocumented spelling of--no-sandbox. It is still TTY-gated, so it is not a privilege change, but it is not in the help text.readLaunchFlagsnow parses withmeowand mutates/restoresprocess.title, yet it is called fromevaluateLaunchControl. The removed "Pure decision function" comment was the right call; just confirm no caller assumes purity (none does today).- By design the interactive-TTY
--no-sandboxopt-out runs the runtime with no isolation — the one reachable unconfined path, gated onisInteractiveTty()(stdin AND stdout). Same-uid, so not a boundary crossing, but it is the escape hatch's blast radius.
Could not see: I read the launch-control functions, readLaunchFlags, launchesAgent, the agent start branch, the three profile JSONs, the changelog and scripts diff; I did not read all 552 lines of runtime-attested-launch.test.ts nor the whole of nono.ts — I ran the tests instead. All probes used a sandbox HOME; no real file was touched; I started no Harper processes.
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Verdict: APPROVE — head 676bf84c. Repo visibility checked before writing via the GitHub REST API (repos/tpsdev-ai/cli → public). Findings below are consistency/cosmetic level; every security-relevant claim is backed by a named test or probe.
Focus verification
1. Exactly one launch path per runtime. Grep across bin/, src/, scripts/: runCodexRuntime / runClaudeCodeRuntime / runGeminiRuntime have exactly one call site each — the runner block in bin/tps.ts (535/557/573) — and the runtime modules are imported nowhere else (only a pure-helper test import of extractFinalAnswer). That block is reachable only via attestedRuntime && (sandboxed || noSandbox), i.e. exactly the two sanctioned routes: sandboxed (honoured only when rule 1b sees the launcher's release) or noSandbox (interactive-TTY-only, rule 1, loud warning). The runners spawn the runtime binaries directly (e.g. codex-runtime.ts:193 spawn("codex", …)) with no self-re-confinement, so the enclosing nono session is the isolation — guaranteed by the gate. Unknown --runtime values are refused at dispatch (exit 78); non-interactive starts without --sandbox-required are refused pre-dispatch (rule 2, probe-verified).
2. --sandboxed cannot be forged (probed). Rule 1b in evaluateLaunchControl refuses --sandboxed everywhere unless confinement.released; release is attested over the launcher's socket (locator env TPS_LAUNCH_SOCK, set only by the launcher) with behavioural canary verification. Black-box probes against the built CLI (stub runtimes + stub nono on PATH, throwaway HOME):
agent start --runtime codex --sandboxed --sandbox-required(non-interactive) → exit 78, "no launcher released this process", codex never spawned;- same + forged
TPS_LAUNCH_SOCKat a bogus socket → exit 78, refused with the attestation failure as the reason — argv forgery and locator forgery both fail closed; - plain non-interactive runtime start → the pre-existing rule-2 refusal still fires.
readLaunchFlagsalso refuses uninterpretable--flag=valuespellings and the new--sandbox-required+--no-sandboxconflict; the suite exercises every spelling (--noSandbox,--no-sandbox=1, …).
3. Profiles sufficient structurally, verified mechanically by the PR's own checker. tps-agent-run-{claude-code,codex,gemini} extend tps-agent-run (excluding system_read_macos — tighter, not looser). runtimeNonoOptions grants: claude-code ~/.claude (+CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR) + ~/.claude.json/~/.claude.lock; codex ~/.codex (+CODEX_HOME) + ~/.config/codex + the provisioned ~/.tps/auth/openai.json; gemini ~/.gemini + ~/.config/gemini; wired via allowFiles → --allow-file (buildNonoArgs) and merged into the launch-time allow set alongside mail/TMPDIR/workspace/agentDir. scripts/check-runtime-nono-paths.ts verifies these grants against the real pinned nono (run by check-nono-profiles.sh:170), including credentials paths. Still unverified by anyone: service-level needs (see finding 2).
Rule 2b deletion is safe. Slice A refused --sandbox-required on runtime paths because they could not deliver isolation; those paths now run through launchAttested and can, so 2b is obsolete — and an interactive plain runtime start is now confined where it previously ran the runner unconfined-direct: strictly tighter, no path opened. Slice A's changelog and test are deleted consistently with the refusal's removal.
Findings (non-blocking)
- [packages/cli/src/utils/nono.ts,
runtimeNonoOptions()] The grants helpermkdirSyncs the runtime config dirs (mode 0700) in the real HOME at launch-decision time — including on invocations that are subsequently refused. Intentional-looking pre-creation for the sandboxed runtime; no data written; noting the side effect. - [packages/cli/nono-profiles/*, open question] Real-runtime sufficiency beyond filesystem grants is untested by design (tests fake the runtimes): claude-code macOS OAuth (Keychain via XPC) under a nono session, env passthrough, and the effect of the
system_read_macosexclusion. Suggest one disposable-VM smoke per runtime as follow-up. - [packages/cli/bin/tps.ts start block, nit] Bare
--runtimewith no value silently resolves to theopenclawdefault (meow default) rather than a missing-value error. Harmless (allowlist), but a missing-value error would be clearer.
What was run
Worktree ~/work/review-474-kern at 676bf84c, built (bun install --frozen-lockfile && bun run build, exit 0); all runs through the suite's HOME-isolation guard (isolated test root, sandboxed HOME, TMPDIR outside $HOME):
runtime-attested-launch.test.ts+sandbox-launch-control.test.ts+nono-profiles-install.test.ts: 119 pass / 0 fail — includes simulated-launcher re-exec, canary denial, and every sandbox-flag spelling.- Four black-box probes against
dist/bin/tps.js: forged--sandboxed(± forged locator) refused with no runtime spawn; pre-existing rule-2 refusal intact. My legit-shaped probe case stopped at the missing-agent-config refusal beforelaunchAttested(no agent fixture in my probe) — the re-exec/canary chain is covered by the suite's simulated-launcher tests, not by my probe.
Not verified: CI lanes (not characterized); the deleted slice-A test's former content beyond its deletion.
…476's help intercept ahead of this PR's launch gate Conflicts in packages/cli/bin/tps.ts resolved so main's shared FLAGS and help-aware argv survive with this PR's launch-flag definitions; --help still returns before the launch gate; runtime routing, the openclaw default, facts errors and launcher exit status all kept. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Actionable comments posted: 3
- 🪄 Fix CodeRabbit comments on this PR
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Inline comments:
Review comments at @packages/cli/src/utils/nono.ts:
- Around line 706-742: Update readLaunchFlags so noSandbox is derived only from
the existing noSandbox flag; remove the flags.sandbox alias so --sandbox=false
cannot opt out of nono.
Review comments at @packages/cli/test/runtime-attested-launch.test.ts:
- Around line 466-500: Update the TTY refusal cases in the test loop over
RUNTIMES to include --sandbox-required=1 with --no-sandbox, and remove "1" from
the values expected to allow opt-out; keep the false and 0 cases unchanged.
Review comments at @packages/cli/test/sandbox-launch-control.test.ts:
- Around line 244-257: Update the expectation in the `launch gate matches
parser` test so `flags.sandboxRequired` is expected to be true for both `"true"`
and `"1"`, matching the boolean parser’s behavior.
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.changelog/unreleased/fixed-363-runtime-sandbox-required-refuses.md.changelog/unreleased/fixed-363-runtimes-attested-launch.mdpackages/cli/bin/tps.tspackages/cli/nono-profiles/tps-agent-run-claude-code.jsonpackages/cli/nono-profiles/tps-agent-run-codex.jsonpackages/cli/nono-profiles/tps-agent-run-gemini.jsonpackages/cli/src/commands/agent.tspackages/cli/src/utils/launch-attestation.tspackages/cli/src/utils/nono.tspackages/cli/test/nono-profiles-install.test.tspackages/cli/test/runtime-attested-launch.test.tspackages/cli/test/runtime-sandbox-required-refuses.test.tspackages/cli/test/sandbox-launch-control.test.tsscripts/check-nono-profiles.shscripts/check-runtime-nono-paths.ts
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- packages/cli/test/runtime-sandbox-required-refuses.test.ts
- .changelog/unreleased/fixed-363-runtime-sandbox-required-refuses.md
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… value is refused by name (#363) Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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Sherlock (security) verdict: APPROVE — no runtime spawn is reachable unconfined, and deleting rule 2b reopens nothing
Repo visibility checked: gh api repos/tpsdev-ai/cli → public. Author is tps-anvil (a tps-* agent), so this is an internal-author PR and I built and ran the touched suites in my own worktree ~/work/rev474sh at head 82e1f62a.
My lane — "no way to reach a runtime spawn unconfined (flag spelling, env, direct invocation of the execution side); the pre-existing refusals still fire; deleting rule 2b opens no path slice A closed". All four hold; I could not build a path that breaks any of them.
1. The runtime spawn is reachable only after the gate, only on the released/opt-out side
packages/cli/bin/tps.ts:657 is the only place a runtime actually spawns:
const sandboxed = process.argv.includes("--sandboxed");
const noSandbox = launchFlags.noSandbox;
if (attestedRuntime && (sandboxed || noSandbox)) { // ← runCodex/ClaudeCode/Gemini runnersand every non-test caller of runCodexRuntime/runClaudeCodeRuntime/runGeminiRuntime is inside it (bin/tps.ts:717, :739, :756; grep shows no other non-test caller). Every other shape (bin/tps.ts:781+) goes to runAgent({ …, runtime: attestedRuntime ? runtimeArg : undefined }), which re-execs through launchAttested carrying --sandboxed and --runtime <rt> (commands/agent.ts:842, :883, :891). Crucially sandboxed and noSandbox here are the same values the gate reads (readLaunchFlags), so the branch that spawns and the gate that authorizes cannot disagree about a flag spelling.
2. The execution side cannot be invoked directly
--sandboxed without a launcher release is refused everywhere (nono.ts rule 1b):
if (argv.includes(SANDBOXED_FLAG) && !(input.confinement?.released ?? false)) { … deny … }confinement is only populated from attestConfinement() over the launcher's own socket, which itself requires TPS_LAUNCH_SOCK (bin/tps.ts:237–:241; launch-attestation.ts:66–:68). A human or script typing tps agent start --runtime codex --sandboxed carries no locator → confinement undefined → refused. This is exercised by test/launch-attestation.test.ts ("no launcher released this process"); I ran that suite plus sandbox-launch-control at this head: 175 pass / 0 fail.
3. The unconfined runtime spawn needs all three at once
Confined unless: (a) an interactive TTY (stdin and stdout), (b) an explicit --no-sandbox (or --sandbox=false, which does not opt out — --no-sandbox=false likewise), and (c) no --sandbox-required (the pair is a refused conflict). The gate fires at bin/tps.ts:443, before dispatch. --sandboxed=true is validated as a boolean but read nowhere (both rule 1b and the branch use the literal --sandboxed), so it is inert and fail-safe; malformed values (1/0/yes/TRUE/"") are refused by name before any spawn.
4. Pre-existing refusals still fire, and 2b's deletion is safe
Missing nono now refuses even for a selected runtime (the refusal condition gained selectedRuntime, commands/agent.ts:844), and the three canonical refusals — no nono, --no-sandbox outside a TTY, non-TTY without --sandbox-required — all exit 78 with no fake-nono run line (nothing spawned). Rule 2b existed because the direct-spawn path could not honour --sandbox-required; that path is now behind the gate above, so the flag can no longer assert an isolation the path cannot deliver. Nothing slice A closed is reopened.
Mutation evidence: changing the branch to if (attestedRuntime) (always spawn the runner directly) fails 21 tests, including all three "is released and starts its runner" and "confinement unavailable is refused before any spawn" cases — the security property is genuinely bound, not merely asserted. Clean head: 305 pass / 0 fail (runtime-attested-launch + sandbox-launch-control + nono-profiles-install).
Non-blocking observations (no change requested)
- The one environment vector is
TPS_LAUNCH_SOCK: a caller who sets it to a socket they control and answersCONFINED <s> <pid>makesconfinement.releasedtrue and the runtime then spawns. That is not an escalation — a caller able to plant a cooperating socket and run the CLI can already execclaude/codex/geminidirectly — and the handshake is explicitly "the launcher's view from outside is the proof". Stated so the next reader knows what the boundary is not. commands/agent.ts:879adds--sandbox-requiredto the re-exec only whensandboxRequiredis already true. So an interactive TTYtps agent start --runtime codexwith nono present and no--sandbox-requiredre-execs, and the released child — non-TTY,--sandboxed, no--sandbox-required— is then refused by gate rule (2). That fails closed and matches the changelog ("require launcher release or an interactive TTY--no-sandboxopt-out"), but it means the only interactive way to run a selected runtime without--no-sandboxis to also pass--sandbox-required. Kern's lane; I did not find a test for that exact combination (the success test passes--sandbox-required), so flagging it rather than asserting it.
What I could not see
Only the touched suites plus launch-attestation/sandbox-launch-control (skipped only if uid 0 — not the case here). I did not run the whole cli suite, did not exercise a real nono, and did not run codex-presence-444. Separately, the isolated test launcher's post-run guard flagged ~/.tps/connections/*.json and ~/.tps/mail/flint/cur/.chase-watermark as changed during my run — clearly live-agent activity on this host (tps-anvil/kern/sherlock/dtrt-pulse connections, flint's mail watermark), not the throwaway-HOME test; reported per protocol. No CI status is characterized.
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Verdict: APPROVE — reviewed on head 82e1f62a by tps-kern.
Repo visibility checked before writing: repos/tpsdev-ai/cli → public (API, today). Author internal (tps-anvil); I built the monorepo and ran the changed and adjacent suites in a worktree at this head through the repo's isolated launcher.
Kern focus, verified:
-
Exactly one launch path. The only non-test callers of
runCodexRuntime/runGeminiRuntime/runClaudeCodeRuntimeinbin/,src/andscripts/are the three calls inside the single execution branch (bin/tps.ts:718,:742,:756), gated onattestedRuntime && (sandboxed || noSandbox); theagent-lifecycle.tsmention is a doc comment. That branch is reachable only through a launcher-released--sandboxed(rule 1b) or an interactive-TTY--no-sandbox(rule 1) — everything else falls through torunAgent({action:"start"}), which re-execs throughlaunchAttestedcarrying--runtime(src/commands/agent.ts:877-890), so the sandboxed child re-enters and takes the execution branch. Slice A's rule 2b and its helpers are fully deleted (src/utils/nono.ts), with its test and changelog entry removed consistently. The unsupported-runtime refusal (exit 78) prevents any other--runtimevalue from sneaking into the branch, and--runtime=openclawkeeps the default path (pinned by the suite). -
The execution-side marker cannot be supplied by a caller. Verified behaviourally on the clean built CLI:
tps agent start --id <fixture> --runtime codex --sandboxed --sandbox-requiredfrom a non-TTY with no launcher socket exits 78 with--sandboxed is refused: no launcher released this process— the gate fires before dispatch, before any spawn. The release verdict comes only fromattestConfinement()under the launcher-only socket env (bin/tps.ts:225-243), and rule 1b refuses an un-released--sandboxedeverywhere, TTY included. The gate and the branch both read the marker as an exact argv element, so variant spellings (--sandboxed=true) simply don't take the branch and fall to the attested re-exec — no spelling wedge between the two readers. -
Profile sufficiency. The three runtime profiles extend
tps-agent-runand subtract only nono's broadsystem_read_macosgroup; the launch grants are the same explicit set every agent launch gets (read: harnessReadPaths(),readFiles: harnessReadFiles(launchId),allow: mail/TMPDIR//tmp/workspace/agentDir) plus each runtime's own credential and state roots viaruntimeNonoOptions(src/utils/nono.ts:289-310), including env-overridden custom dirs (CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIR,CODEX_HOME,XDG_CONFIG_HOME) and the file-shaped credentials (.claude.json,.claude.lock,~/.tps/auth/openai.json). The newscripts/check-runtime-nono-paths.tsprobe encodes exactly the sufficiency + isolation property (each runtime's paths read-write including the custom-env cases; unrelated credentials — other runtimes' auth,.aws— denied) and runs inside the CInono-profile-gate. I could not execute that probe on this host: the gate's kernel-backend positive control fails closed here ("a write to a granted path was blocked"), so real-nono verification remains the CI lane's — stated plainly, not assumed.
Mutations I ran: disabling the execution branch's --sandboxed term fails exactly the three "is released and starts its runner" tests (158 pass / 3 fail); relaxing the valued-flag check to accept 1 fails the invalid-value refusals by name; disabling rule 1b makes the attestation suite's refusal tests burn their full timeouts rather than fail fast — I could not collect clean failure lines for that one in practical time, which is why the behavioural probe above carries the marker property, alongside the clean 4e-fixture pins (36/36 in test/launch-attestation.test.ts).
Findings (non-blocking):
src/utils/nono.ts:289— the per-runtime profile name is asserted nowhere. The released test checks that the fake nono saw--profilebut not its value, and the CI probe would pass equally with the base profile because its assertions ride on the explicit grants, not the profile difference. A regression inruntimeNonoProfile()returningtps-agent-runfor the three runtimes would pass every suite while silently re-adding the broad system-read group these profiles deliberately exclude. Pin it by asserting the profile name the fake nono already extracts into itsnono psJSON, or a one-line unit test.- The custom runtime directories are honored from the environment by design (
CLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRpointing at or above~/.tps/authwidens the grant) — already named in the PR body and tracked as cli#483; recorded here so the pin lands with the profile work.
What I ran: root bun install --frozen-lockfile && bun run build (exit 0); through the isolated launcher — runtime-attested-launch + sandbox-launch-control + nono-profiles-install → 305 pass / 0 fail, launch-attestation → 36 pass / 0 fail; the mutation matrix above with the tree restored clean afterwards; the clean-build marker probe. scripts/check-nono-profiles.sh against the real nono fails closed on this host (kernel-backend positive control), so I make no claim about that lane. No CI claim. Every probe process I started was killed by PID before this review; no real file was touched (the marker probe wrote only inside a throwaway HOME).
Sherlock's lanes (unconfined spawn reachability, the surviving refusals, rule-2b deletion risk) are structurally covered by the same gates plus the new suite's refusal matrix, but the deep pass is his.
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Closes #363.
Claude Code, Codex and Gemini launch only after launcher release or an interactive TTY
--no-sandboxopt-out. Conflicting sandbox flags and values other thantrueorfalseare refused by name.--runtimeinto the attested re-exec.~/.tps/auth/openai.json; custom runtime directories (for exampleCLAUDE_CONFIG_DIRset to~/.tps/author an ancestor of it) and inherited launch grants may also cover that file — bounding those is cli#483. Use runtime profiles, leaving the shared profile unchanged. Exclude the broad macOS system-read group from these profiles.nono-profile-gateinvokes a real-nono credential/state access and unrelated-credential denial probe.Verification (
676bf84c; comparison:origin/mainat8e05e22ccdfa040f56ed7b2b9e9c5c1c65f8c3da), run through isolated launchers (per file;localityandverify-strictper test name, withverify-strictusing--timeout 5000):676bf84c53 pass / 0 fail. The new refusal and OpenClaw compatibility cases fail onadf3af4771d0f4681aa42d6836bbcc20c5268aa3: 0 pass / 26 fail.a98ca1342e8c05fc60ba6a807414aba9d1b01251: 18 pass / 3 fail in the existing runtime suite. Unix socket binds are denied; real-nono runtime execution remains unverified.Summary by CodeRabbit
--no-sandboxin an interactive terminal.--sandbox-requiredand--no-sandboxoptions are refused.