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10 changes: 7 additions & 3 deletions crates/tinysecurity-module/src/adapter.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1014,11 +1014,17 @@ impl PolicyService {
.await
}
/// Authorize one browser proxy destination using its registered egress policy.
///
/// The three browser dial members answer even when audit is required. A dial
/// carries no payload and no host audit correlation (the proxy opens one per
/// connection, with no turn behind it to bind an event to), and it only ever
/// applies the destination rules of a policy the authenticated host
/// registered. Refusing them under required audit refused every page of a
/// host that runs this module as its secret authority.
async fn authorize_browser_dial(
&self,
request: tinysecurity_bus::BrowserDialRequest,
) -> BusResult<tinysecurity_bus::BrowserDialResponse> {
self.require_unbound_permission()?;
let scope = self
.egress
.lock()
Expand All @@ -1037,7 +1043,6 @@ impl PolicyService {
&self,
request: tinysecurity_bus::ConsumeBrowserDialRequest,
) -> BusResult<bool> {
self.require_unbound_permission()?;
let scope = self
.egress
.lock()
Expand All @@ -1054,7 +1059,6 @@ impl PolicyService {
&self,
request: tinysecurity_bus::ValidateBrowserDialRequest,
) -> BusResult<bool> {
self.require_unbound_permission()?;
let scope = self
.egress
.lock()
Expand Down
67 changes: 67 additions & 0 deletions crates/tinysecurity-module/src/adapter_tests.rs
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -1622,6 +1622,73 @@ async fn native_open_public_policy_and_credentials_only_redaction_dispatch()
Ok(())
}

/// A host that runs TinySecurity as its secret authority makes audit required,
/// and the browser dial members carry no audit correlation. They must still
/// authorize, consume and validate: refusing them refused every browser
/// navigation ("required audit needs bound permission", seen as Chrome's
/// ERR_TUNNEL_CONNECTION_FAILED on every page).
#[tokio::test]
async fn browser_dials_are_authorized_when_audit_is_required()
-> std::result::Result<(), Box<dyn std::error::Error>> {
let bus = MemoryBus::new();
let task = Broker::new().spawn(bus.clone());
let host = Connection::connect(bus.connect().await?).await?;
let module = Connection::connect(bus.connect().await?).await?;
let audit = crate::callbacks::AuditClient::new_for_test(
module,
crate::callbacks::PeerBinding::new(
host.unique_name().as_ref().map(tinybus::BusName::as_str),
)?,
AuditConfig2 {
scope: SubjectScope {
user: "user".into(),
workspace: "workspace".into(),
agent: "agent".into(),
},
stream_id: "a".repeat(32),
timeout_ms: 100,
required: true,
native_path: None,
max_bytes: 10000,
max_archives: 3,
journal_max_bytes: 100_000,
journal_max_events: 1000,
},
tinysecurity::Redactor::new(&RedactorConfig::default())?,
)?;
let server = Connection::connect(bus.connect().await?).await?;
let service = service_for(
Arc::new(RwLock::new(Policy::new(ModuleConfig::default())?)),
Some(Arc::new(audit)),
);
assert!(service.audit_required());
server.serve_at(names::OBJECT_PATH.try_into()?, service).await?;
server.request_name(names::INTERFACE).await?;
let client = Connection::connect(bus.connect().await?).await?;
let proxy = client.proxy(names::INTERFACE, names::OBJECT_PATH, names::INTERFACE)?;
let policy = EgressPolicy {
owner: SubjectScope {
user: "user".into(),
workspace: "workspace".into(),
agent: "agent".into(),
},
ceiling: AccessTier::Full,
privacy: PrivacyMode::Standard,
destinations: vec![],
data_categories: vec![DataCategory::OpaqueBrowserTraffic],
local_capabilities: vec![],
validity_ms: 30000,
open_public: true,
preflight_transports: vec![EgressTransport::Browser],
};
let id: EgressPolicyId = proxy
.call(names::methods::REGISTER_EGRESS_POLICY, (policy,))
.await?;
assert_browser_dial_contract(&proxy, id).await?;
task.abort();
Ok(())
}

/// Exercise existing scoped egress dispatch against a live native module fixture.
async fn assert_scoped_egress_contract(
proxy: &tinybus::Proxy,
Expand Down
8 changes: 8 additions & 0 deletions docs/specs/browser-dial-contract-1.28.md
Original file line number Diff line number Diff line change
Expand Up @@ -38,3 +38,11 @@ oversized answer sets, private or otherwise non-global candidates, expired
grants, stale generations, mismatched scope or destination, and replayed
consumption all deny. The host must call this member only through its private
authenticated adapter; JSON identity fields never authenticate themselves.

Required audit does not refuse these three members. A host that makes
TinySecurity its secret authority runs with audit required, which refuses
every permission member that carries no audit correlation. A browser dial has
none to carry: the proxy opens one per connection, with no agent turn behind
it to bind a durable event to, and the member only applies the destination
rules of a policy the authenticated host registered. Refusing them refused
every page such a host's browser opened.
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