Add extension-custom-scripts for supautils ownership/grant handoffs by moizpgedge · Pull Request #32 · pgEdge/postgres-images

moizpgedge · 2026-09-16T20:32:44Z

What this does

supautils' extension gate installs a gated extension by switching the session to a designated superuser for the duration of the install (supautils.privileged_extensions_superuser). That's necessary for extensions that need superuser to install at all, but it means the objects they create, schemas, tables, sequences, land owned by that superuser, not by whoever actually ran CREATE EXTENSION or by the database's own owner. Anyone using supautils' gate for extensions that create real schema objects runs into this, not something specific to one deployment.

Adds extension-custom-scripts/ for six such extensions, using supautils' own convention (before-create.sql / after-create.sql under supautils.extension_custom_scripts_path, see this directory's README):

pg_tokenizer: grants USAGE + SELECT on tokenizer_catalog to pg_database_owner and PUBLIC, but revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC on every function in the schema first and re-grants it only on tokenize(), apply_text_analyzer(), and list_preload_models(), the three the read-only use case needs (see below).
vchord_bm25: grants USAGE on bm25_catalog to pg_database_owner and PUBLIC.
postgis_tiger_geocoder: grants USAGE + SELECT on tiger to pg_database_owner and PUBLIC.
address_standardizer_data_us: grants SELECT on its reference tables to pg_database_owner and PUBLIC, looking up the schema they actually landed in at runtime rather than assuming public, since this is the one extension in the list that's relocatable.
pg_cron: grants USAGE on cron and SELECT on cron.job / cron.job_run_details to pg_database_owner, no ownership change. cron.schedule()/cron.unschedule() write to cron.job through pg_cron's own internal code, not a caller-privileged INSERT or UPDATE, so SELECT is enough for the database's owner to manage its own jobs; a raw write against the table is refused outright for a role with only this grant. A role that separately holds broader table-level write access is a different case, bounded instead by the table's own row-level security policy, not by anything this script grants.
postgis_topology: reassigns topology.topology / topology.layer ownership to pg_database_owner, covering the full create/rename/drop lifecycle (PostGIS's own install script already grants PUBLIC read access directly, this covers the write side).

Every script grants to pg_database_owner, Postgres's own predefined role that automatically tracks whoever currently owns the database, rather than a hardcoded role name, so a script here keeps working regardless of what a consumer names its own roles or reassigns ownership to later.

It also bumps the epoch to -3 for every existing image line in scripts/build_pgedge_images.py, so this PR's change is reflected in a new released version.

Worth reviewing

pg_database_owner is Postgres's own predefined role (postgresql.org/docs/current/predefined-roles.html), used throughout instead of a hardcoded name.
The read grants above go to PUBLIC as well as pg_database_owner, not just the database's owner: pg_database_owner's own grant carries no GRANT OPTION, so the owner has no way to pass access on to a role it creates itself, a reporting login or a per-service user, and the attempt is not even an error, GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA tiger TO some_role silently grants nothing, confirmed directly. Safe to open widely since all four are reference data or a type schema rather than anything a consumer writes to itself, and PostGIS's own install script already grants PUBLIC read access to its topology schema the same way. pg_cron and postgis_topology are deliberately left out of this, for the reasons already covered below.
Schema USAGE on tokenizer_catalog does more than unlock reading the tables above: it makes every function in the schema callable by any role, since Postgres grants EXECUTE on new functions to PUBLIC by default. Most of that surface manages tokenizer/model configuration and correctly refuses on table ACL when called this way, none of it SECURITY DEFINER, confirmed directly. But create_huggingface_model/create_lindera_model run real work, config parsing and an attempted model load, before any permission check fires, reachable from a live network connection. Revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC on every function in the schema, re-grants it explicitly to pg_database_owner so that access no longer depends on the default just revoked, then re-grants PUBLIC only the three functions the read-only case needs. Confirmed the legitimate configuration path is unaffected: a role with pg_write_all_data can still create a tokenizer end to end.
pg_cron's grant is SELECT-only, not ownership: confirmed directly that cron.schedule()/cron.unschedule() work for a role with just that grant, and that a raw INSERT/UPDATE against cron.job from the same role is refused, permission denied, no ownership involved at all. A role that separately holds broader table-level write access, through a predefined role like pg_write_all_data, for example, can already write to cron.job directly regardless of this script; what stops it from writing a row for a different role is the table's own row-level security policy, confirmed directly: the same insert with someone else's username fails with a row-level security violation, not a permission error.
postgis_topology keeps the ownership handoff rather than a SELECT-only grant like pg_cron: confirmed RenameTopoGeometryColumn() runs ALTER TABLE topology.layer DISABLE TRIGGER, which only an owner or superuser can do, no GRANT covers it. Its functions run as the caller through ordinary ACL-checked DML, unlike pg_cron's, which bypass ACL checks through internal C code.
postgis_topology's script reassigns ownership on exactly the two tables that need it, not the whole schema, so it doesn't also hand the owner write access to some other extension's objects that happen to live in the same schema.
address_standardizer_data_us looks its schema up via pg_extension.extnamespace rather than supautils' @extschema@ substitution: that token is populated only when the caller's CREATE EXTENSION included an explicit SCHEMA clause, and is otherwise substituted as SQL NULL, which is the common case. Every other script here hardcodes its schema name instead, since each of those extensions' own .control files mark it relocatable = false, Postgres itself refuses (or silently ignores) any attempt to install them elsewhere, checked directly against each one.
Checked this repo's approach against what Supabase's own postgres image does with the same supautils mechanism, as a gut check, not to match it: they ship the same kind of per-extension handoff, ten after-create.sql scripts, including one for pg_cron and one for postgis_tiger_geocoder, plus a separate global before-create.sql for a different purpose entirely (pre-installing TLE dependencies for a cascaded install). Their pg_cron script lands on the same call worth noting: it revokes ownership-level access back down and re-grants SELECT only on cron.job, an independent arrival at the same SELECT-only decision this PR makes, by a different team solving the same problem. Two of their other settings are worth knowing about for anyone tuning this further: supautils.privileged_role_allowed_configs (which session parameters a privileged role can adjust beyond the extension gate) and supautils.restrict_extension_versions, neither of which this PR touches.

Tested

Every one of the six scripts, verified two ways:

By hand, running each script's actual SQL in the same order and superuser context supautils would use it in, right after each extension's own CREATE EXTENSION, against a fresh container of the currently published image, then confirming the non-superuser owner's access afterward. For pg_cron and postgis_topology specifically, confirmed with a real functional call (cron.schedule(), topology.CreateTopology()), not only an ACL check.
With real, automated tests added to tests/main.go covering every script: a non-superuser role installing an allowlisted extension through the gate and refused a non-allowlisted one, address_standardizer_data_us's grant landing correctly both with and without an explicit SCHEMA clause, pg_cron's schedule/list/unschedule working with no ownership and a raw write refused, pg_tokenizer/vchord_bm25/postgis_tiger_geocoder/postgis_topology each granting the access their after-create.sql documents (postgis_topology's extends past CreateTopology(), which passes under a plain grant and proves nothing on its own, through AddTopoGeometryColumn(), RenameTopoGeometryColumn(), the one call that actually needs ownership, and DropTopology()), and a genuine third-party role (not the owner, not a member of pg_database_owner) reaching all four PUBLIC-granted extensions while the owner's own attempt to re-grant by hand is confirmed a silent no-op, refused the tokenizer_catalog config-management functions outright, and still keeping the three read-only ones. Ran the full suite (go run main.go, both minimal and standard flavors) against a local image built by layering this branch's extension-custom-scripts/ onto the real published base, all 60 standard and 10 minimal tests passing.

Also run against real package-based images, not only the layered one: the epoch -3 internal images built from this branch through the normal Dockerfile build, across all six Postgres/spock lines on both x86 and arm. Every extension-custom-scripts case passes against those.

Gated extensions install as the supautils superuser switch, so their state-bearing objects land owned by that superuser instead of a customer-facing role. Adds a before-create.sql for lolor (refuses the install outright, every consumer of this image needs spock deployed first) and after-create.sql for pg_cron, pg_tokenizer, vchord_bm25, postgis_tiger_geocoder, and address_standardizer_data_us (grant or reassign ownership to a role named app, when one exists). Each after-create.sql is a no-op when no role named app exists, so CREATE EXTENSION still succeeds unchanged for a consumer of this image with a different role model. Verified end to end against a real build: every script installs cleanly with and without an app role present, lolor is refused for every role including postgres itself, and app gets exactly the intended access for each of the other five.

Grant/ownership scripts hardcoded a role named "app" and only ran when that role existed, an assumption specific to one deployment's role model. Every one of them now grants to pg_database_owner instead, a predefined role Postgres automatically keeps in sync with whoever currently owns the database an extension installs into. Verified this tracks an ALTER DATABASE ... OWNER TO change automatically, and that every script works identically for a database owned by an arbitrary role name, not just "app". No more per-script existence check needed: pg_database_owner always exists. lolor's before-create.sql now checks whether spock is actually installed in the same database instead of refusing the install unconditionally. Confirmed both directions: blocked without spock, allowed once spock is present. Swept the remaining "drydock"/app-specific language out of the comments and README.

The previous fix only granted INSERT on topology.topology and topology.layer, enough for CreateTopology()/AddTopoGeometryColumn() but not for dropping or renaming a topology: those also need DELETE, UPDATE, and in the rename path, ALTER TABLE ... DISABLE TRIGGER on topology.layer, which only an owner can do. Reassigns ownership of both tables to pg_database_owner instead, the same approach already used for pg_cron's job tables, so the full lifecycle works in one step.

supautils only loads in admin's session, so a script under extension_custom_scripts_path never runs for a session that connects directly as app or postgres. lolor is trusted=true, so both could install it directly with no admin session in the path at all, bypassing the block entirely and breaking large-object support database-wide with no self-service recovery. The block now lives as a database-level event trigger in drydock's Cluster CR instead, which is role-independent. Updates the README to document why this directory can't cover a check like that.

…check Explains, for future script authors, why a script under extension_custom_scripts_path only runs in a session that has supautils loaded (in practice, a privileged extension install), and why a check that must hold regardless of role or session, like lolor's, needs a database-level mechanism such as an event trigger instead.

lolor ships trusted=true, so app could install it directly with no admin session or supautils involved at all, meaning the conditional before-create.sql check for it never ran on that path. Patches the control file to trusted=false in the Dockerfile instead, so every install goes through the gate and always lands in a session supautils has already loaded. The before-create.sql itself is unchanged from before: refuse the install unless spock is already there.

supautils.privileged_extensions only checks an extension's name, not who is asking, so restricting installs to admin previously depended on supautils only ever being loaded into admin's session. A connection that authenticates directly as app never loads supautils at all, so any before-create.sql under extension_custom_scripts_path never runs for it either, and any extension shipping trusted=true (lolor did) installs straight through Postgres's own trusted-extension path with no gate in the way. Every extension on the allowlist, lolor included, now carries a before-create.sql that checks session_user against supautils.privileged_role directly. session_user stays the role that actually authenticated for the whole session, unaffected by supautils switching the acting role to perform a privileged install, so the check holds regardless of which sessions have supautils loaded. This replaces the earlier fix that patched lolor's control file to trusted=false, which only worked because of the same session-scoping assumption and required changing a setting in an image other projects also use.

Handing ownership of cron.job and cron.job_run_details to pg_database_owner (so admin can manage its own jobs) also exempted that owner from cron.job's own "username = CURRENT_USER" policy, since row level security does not apply to a table's owner by default. With that ownership in place, admin could insert or update a row naming any username, postgres included, bypassing the policy entirely, confirmed on a live cluster. Once cron.use_background_workers is on, pg_cron's launcher then tries to execute that row in-process and segfaults, crashing the instance into a restart loop the bad row causes again on every restart. FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY on both tables holds the owner to the same policy as everyone else. admin can still schedule, list, and unschedule its own jobs normally; the same bypass attempt now fails cleanly with the RLS error instead of reaching the launcher at all.

Every allowlisted extension carried a before-create.sql checking session_user against supautils.privileged_role directly, built on supautils loading cluster-wide. drydock now loads supautils only into admin's own session, so a role check here is redundant: a session that never loads supautils never reaches this hook either way, and one that does only exists because it authenticated as the privileged role. Removes the check from all eleven other gated extensions entirely and from lolor, which keeps only its own spock-dependency check: lolor requires spock in the same database regardless of who installs it, an unrelated functional constraint, not part of the role gate. Qualifies lolor's pg_extension lookup with pg_catalog so a role that can reach this script cannot shadow the catalog with a decoy relation earlier in its own search_path.

coderabbitai · 2026-09-16T20:32:58Z

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📝 Walkthrough

Walkthrough

The standard image now packages extension custom scripts, adds extension-specific access grants, expands standard-image integration tests, and updates PostgreSQL/Spock image epochs from 2 to 3.

Changes

Extension custom scripts

Layer / File(s)	Summary
Package and document custom scripts `Dockerfile`, `extension-custom-scripts/README.md`, `scripts/build_pgedge_images.py`	The standard image copies custom scripts with `postgres` ownership. Documentation describes their layout and execution. PostgreSQL/Spock image epochs advance to 3.
Apply extension access grants `extension-custom-scripts/*/after-create.sql`	Scripts grant `pg_database_owner` schema, table, sequence, and ownership privileges for supported extensions.
Validate standard-image behavior `tests/main.go`	Tests configure and preload extensions, validate Supautils and custom-script behavior, cover default and relocated schemas, and strengthen pg_cron and extension access checks.

Priority: ➖ Normal

Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to 5c2da

This round adds test coverage and a version-tag bump with no outstanding review concerns; the previously flagged test-validation gap has already been addressed, so there is no material risk blocking merge.

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Docstring Coverage	⚠️ Warning	Docstring coverage is 40.00% which is insufficient. The required threshold is 80.00%. Docstring coverage is scoped to functions touched by this diff. Analyzed 5 functions across 2 files. (2 skipped: 2…	Write docstrings for the functions missing them to satisfy the coverage threshold.

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Title check	✅ Passed	The title clearly identifies the primary change: adding extension-custom-scripts for supautils ownership and privilege handoffs.
Description check	✅ Passed	The description directly explains the custom scripts, affected extensions, privilege changes, tests, and image epoch updates.

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_{A rabbit packs scripts in a snug little crate
Permissions hop neatly through every gate
New tests chase extensions over the floor
Epochs spring forward from two to three more
Supautils checks shine in the burrow tonight
The standard image rests, tidy and right}

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codacy-production · 2026-09-16T20:34:55Z

Up to standards ✅

🟢 Issues 9 medium

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Complexity 1 medium

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In `@Dockerfile`:
- Line 141: Configure the standard PostgreSQL image to set
supautils.extension_custom_scripts_path to /etc/pgedge/extension-custom-scripts
in the PostgreSQL configuration it loads, alongside the existing
extension-custom-scripts COPY. Preserve the directory path exactly so the
before-create and after-create scripts are enabled by default.

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extension-custom-scripts/pg_tokenizer/after-create.sql
extension-custom-scripts/postgis_tiger_geocoder/after-create.sql
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… schema address_standardizer_data_us is the one script in this directory where the schema its tables land in isn't fixed: it's relocatable, with no schema set in its control file, so CREATE EXTENSION address_standardizer_data_us SCHEMA gis puts us_lex/us_gaz/us_rules in gis, not public. The hardcoded public.us_lex reference failed on relations that don't exist in that case. Looks the schema up from pg_extension.extnamespace at runtime instead of relying on supautils' own @extschema@ substitution, which is only populated when the caller's CREATE EXTENSION included an explicit SCHEMA clause and is otherwise SQL NULL, the common case. Verified against both: the default (no SCHEMA clause) and an explicit one.

…list entry Confirmed directly rather than assumed: supautils runs a before-create.sql for any extension that has one, for any session with the hook active, independent of supautils.privileged_extensions. The allowlist only controls whether the install gets a superuser switch, and lolor never needed that switch since it ships trusted=true. This is the only thing standing between a role with plain CREATE privilege and lolor's destructive install, for a deployment that hasn't set up its own separate way to block it.

…upautils loads The existing supautils tests only confirmed the library preloads and registers its GUCs. Adds real exercise of the gate and this directory's scripts: a non-superuser role installing an allowlisted extension through the gate and refused a non-allowlisted one, address_standardizer_data_us's after-create.sql granting access both with and without an explicit SCHEMA clause, and lolor's before-create.sql refusing the install without spock present. Verified end to end against a local image built from this branch layered on the published base, both flavors, before and after fixing two bugs the first run caught: a case-sensitive string match against Postgres's own error text, and spock already being installed by an earlier, unrelated test in the same shared database, which made the without-spock case not actually spock-less until dropped first.

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In `@extension-custom-scripts/address_standardizer_data_us/after-create.sql`:
- Around line 31-34: Update the grant block in the after-create SQL to grant
USAGE on the formatted extension schema to pg_database_owner before granting
table SELECT privileges. Keep the existing table grants unchanged, and extend
validation to confirm schema USAGE or successfully query a granted table as the
new database owner.

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… SELECT Table-level SELECT alone doesn't let a role query a table outside a schema it can't use: Postgres checks USAGE on the schema before it will even look a table up in it. The default, unrelocated case (public) worked anyway, since public grants USAGE to PUBLIC by default, masking that a schema named on an explicit SCHEMA clause has no such default and would leave pg_database_owner with a grant it could never actually use. The existing tests didn't catch this because they checked has_table_privilege, which only covers the table-level grant and returns true regardless of schema USAGE. Switched both to running the real query as the actual database owner (gate_test_role, made owner of testdb rather than merely granted CREATE on it, so pg_database_owner resolves to a genuine non-superuser instead of postgres, which would bypass every check regardless of what's granted). Confirmed the relocated-schema case now fails against the pre-fix script and passes against the fix.

…igured Copying the scripts into the image doesn't load supautils or point supautils.extension_custom_scripts_path at them; shared_preload_libraries is empty by default, and neither this nor any other supautils.* setting is baked into the image. States that plainly next to the COPY, so activation reads as a deliberate, consistent choice rather than something missing.

Reassigned ownership of cron.job and cron.job_run_details to pg_database_owner so the database's owner could schedule and manage its own jobs, then had to force row level security on both tables to close a gap that ownership itself created: the new owner could set username on a row to any role, including postgres, and pg_cron's launcher would then execute that row in-process and crash the instance rather than raising a clean permission error. Checked directly whether the ownership was ever needed at all. It wasn't: cron.schedule() and cron.unschedule() are not SECURITY DEFINER, they run as the caller, but they write to cron.job through pg_cron's own internal C code, not a normal caller-privileged INSERT or UPDATE. A role with only GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA cron and GRANT SELECT on both tables can schedule, list, and unschedule its own jobs through those functions, while a raw INSERT or UPDATE against cron.job as that role is refused outright, permission denied, no row-level security involved at all, since the role was never granted write access in the first place. Ownership introduced a write path that had to be locked back down; the narrower grant never opens one. Adds pg_cron to the test harness's standard-flavor preload and a real end-to-end test: schedule, list, unschedule, and a raw write correctly refused.

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In `@tests/main.go`:
- Around line 1111-1112: Update the test command invoking cron.unschedule to
require output equal to “t” instead of using expectSuccess, ensuring the probe
job is confirmed removed. Preserve the existing SQL command and surrounding test
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…t coverage Removes lolor/before-create.sql: the event trigger in drydock's own Cluster CR already blocks CREATE EXTENSION lolor outright, cluster-wide, making this script's spock-presence check redundant. Drops it, its test, and the README reference to it as a pattern example. Drops stale "an earlier version of this script did X" history from the pg_cron after-create.sql comment and its matching test comment; not relevant to understanding the current behavior. Adds test coverage for pg_tokenizer, vchord_bm25, postgis_tiger_geocoder, and postgis_topology's after-create.sql scripts, each installing through the gate as the database's own non-superuser owner and then exercising a real query or action the grant actually enables, not just an ACL check. pg_tokenizer needs shared_preload_libraries to install at all, so the test runner's standard-flavor library list picks it up too. Tightens the pg_cron unschedule test: it previously accepted any successful exit code, which would pass even if the job was never actually removed, since cron.unschedule() returns a boolean rather than erroring on a no-op. Now requires the result to be true. Bumps the epoch to -3 for every existing image line in build_pgedge_images.py, so this branch's changes land in a freshly rebuilt internal image tag.

pg_database_owner's grants only reach the database's owner and roles that inherit from it. A role a customer creates directly, a reporting login or a per-service user, has no path to any of it: the grant carries no GRANT OPTION, so the owner can't pass it on either, and the attempt isn't even an error, GRANT USAGE ON SCHEMA tiger TO some_role silently grants nothing, confirmed directly. Adds PUBLIC alongside pg_database_owner on the read side of address_standardizer_data_us, pg_tokenizer, postgis_tiger_geocoder, and vchord_bm25. pg_cron is deliberately left out, cron.job is already scoped per username by its own row-level security policy. tokenizer_catalog's write side stays restricted either way. Schema USAGE on tokenizer_catalog does more than unlock reading the tables above: it makes every function in the schema callable, since Postgres grants EXECUTE on new functions to PUBLIC by default. Most of that surface manages tokenizer/model configuration and safely refuses on table ACL when called this way, none of it is SECURITY DEFINER, confirmed directly. But create_huggingface_model and create_lindera_model run real work, config parsing and an attempted model load, before any permission check fires, and this is reachable from a live network. Revokes EXECUTE from PUBLIC on every function in the schema, keeps it explicit for pg_database_owner rather than leaving that dependent on the PUBLIC default just revoked, then re-grants PUBLIC only the three functions the read-only use case needs: tokenize(), apply_text_analyzer(), and list_preload_models(). Confirmed the legitimate configuration path survives this unchanged: a role with pg_write_all_data can still create a tokenizer end to end. Also fixes postgis_topology's after-create.sql comment, which claimed its ownership reassignment was "the same approach used for pg_cron's job tables." That stopped being true once pg_cron's script dropped ownership entirely. Replaces it with the actual reason ownership stays necessary here: postgis_topology's functions run as the caller through ordinary ACL-checked DML, unlike pg_cron's, which bypass ACL checks through internal C code, so RenameTopoGeometryColumn()'s ALTER TABLE ... DISABLE TRIGGER call has no GRANT that covers it, confirmed directly against a grant-only setup with full DML and even TRIGGER privilege on both tables. Adds real test coverage throughout: a genuine third-party role, not the owner and not a member of pg_database_owner, reaching all four PUBLIC-granted extensions while an owner's own attempt to re-grant by hand is confirmed a silent no-op; that same role refused the tokenizer_catalog config-management functions but keeping the three read-only ones; and postgis_topology's test extended past CreateTopology(), which passes under a plain grant and proves nothing on its own, through AddTopoGeometryColumn(), RenameTopoGeometryColumn() (the one call that actually requires ownership), and DropTopology().

The REVOKE in after-create.sql only reaches functions that exist when the script runs, so a function a later extension upgrade adds to tokenizer_catalog keeps Postgres' default of EXECUTE to PUBLIC. That default cannot be changed with ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES: for functions it is a built-in that default privileges only add to, never remove from, so a REVOKE there records nothing and has no effect, confirmed against a real install. A ddl_command_end event trigger scoped to the schema closes it instead, revoking PUBLIC and re-granting pg_database_owner on any function created there afterward. This also re-locks the three functions granted to PUBLIC above if a future version replaces them, so reopening those after an upgrade is deliberate rather than automatic. supautils skips an event trigger for a superuser that does not own its function, so it does not fire for a function added by a superuser other than the one that ran the script. Tests cover a function added after install being refused to a third-party role and kept for the database owner, plus a function in another schema keeping the PUBLIC default, which is what guards the schema check against stripping EXECUTE database-wide.

Reverts the ddl_command_end trigger that locked down functions created in tokenizer_catalog after this script runs, and its tests. The gap it covered is real: the REVOKE above only reaches functions that exist when the script runs, so a function an extension upgrade adds later keeps Postgres' default of EXECUTE to PUBLIC. What is not workable is either available fix. ALTER DEFAULT PRIVILEGES scoped with IN SCHEMA cannot express it, because a per-schema default privilege can only add to the global default and never remove from it, which is why a revoke there records nothing. The same statement without IN SCHEMA does work, but applies to every function the installing role creates anywhere in the database, so an extension installed afterward through the gate loses PUBLIC execute on all of its functions. That leaves an event trigger, and a trigger is a heavier mechanism than this warrants while extension upgrades do not work at all. The gap only opens on an upgrade, so it is tracked with the upgrade work instead, where a supautils hook that runs on ALTER EXTENSION is the likelier answer.

moizpgedge added 9 commits September 8, 2026 13:07

coderabbitai Bot reviewed Sep 16, 2026

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Comment thread Dockerfile

moizpgedge added 3 commits September 17, 2026 01:55

moizpgedge changed the title ~~Add extension-custom-scripts for ownership/grant handoffs on gated extensions~~ Add extension-custom-scripts for supautils ownership/grant handoffs Sep 16, 2026

coderabbitai Bot reviewed Sep 16, 2026

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Comment thread extension-custom-scripts/address_standardizer_data_us/after-create.sql

moizpgedge added 3 commits September 17, 2026 02:28

coderabbitai Bot reviewed Sep 16, 2026

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Comment thread tests/main.go Outdated

mmols reviewed Sep 17, 2026

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Comment thread extension-custom-scripts/lolor/before-create.sql Outdated

Comment thread extension-custom-scripts/postgis_topology/after-create.sql Outdated

Comment thread extension-custom-scripts/pg_cron/after-create.sql Outdated

Comment thread tests/main.go

moizpgedge requested a review from mmols September 17, 2026 14:19

moizpgedge force-pushed the fix/pg-cron-ownership-handoff branch from 71cbf5f to 5352166 Compare September 18, 2026 10:30

moizpgedge added 2 commits September 21, 2026 16:18

mmols approved these changes Sep 21, 2026

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mmols merged commit f932401 into main Sep 21, 2026
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mmols deleted the fix/pg-cron-ownership-handoff branch September 21, 2026 16:06

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Add extension-custom-scripts for supautils ownership/grant handoffs - #32

Add extension-custom-scripts for supautils ownership/grant handoffs#32
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fix/pg-cron-ownership-handoff

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moizpgedge commented Sep 16, 2026 •

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