POC: Harden OLM serving Secret validation - #3928
sebrandon1 wants to merge 1 commit into
Conversation
|
[APPROVALNOTIFIER] This PR is NOT APPROVED This pull-request has been approved by: The full list of commands accepted by this bot can be found here. DetailsNeeds approval from an approver in each of these files:Approvers can indicate their approval by writing |
|
Hi @sebrandon1. Thanks for your PR. I'm waiting for a operator-framework member to verify that this patch is reasonable to test. If it is, they should reply with Regular contributors should join the org to skip this step. Once the patch is verified, the new status will be reflected by the I understand the commands that are listed here. DetailsInstructions for interacting with me using PR comments are available here. If you have questions or suggestions related to my behavior, please file an issue against the kubernetes-sigs/prow repository. |
|
Navigate logical layers of code changes, visualize relationships, and explore their blast radius. No actionable comments were generated in the recent review. 🎉 ℹ️ Recent review info⚙️ Run configurationConfiguration used: defaults Review profile: CHILL Plan: Advanced Run ID: 📒 Files selected for processing (3)
Included review availability: Your plan provides up to 4 included reviews per hour; 3 remain after this review. 📝 WalkthroughWalkthroughThe controller now validates serving certificate and private-key pairs, stores fingerprints for all TLS material, and rotates invalid or legacy Secrets. Unit and end-to-end tests cover fingerprint changes, Secret reuse, deployment updates, and webhook CA bundle updates. ChangesServing certificate rotation
Priority: ⬇️ Low Estimated code review effort: 3 (Moderate) | ~30 minutes Change: Feature Sequence Diagram(s)sequenceDiagram
participant WebhookTest
participant ServingSecret
participant OLM
participant Deployment
participant WebhookConfiguration
WebhookTest->>ServingSecret: Replace material or remove fingerprints
OLM->>ServingSecret: Detect invalid or legacy fingerprints
OLM->>ServingSecret: Generate and store new certificate material
OLM->>Deployment: Update CA hash annotation
OLM->>WebhookConfiguration: Update CA bundle
WebhookTest->>ServingSecret: Verify stable fingerprints
Merge Risk: ⚪ Minimal · up to The change hardens serving Secret validation and rotates invalid or legacy TLS material while updating dependent resources. No concrete merge-blocking risk remains identified. 🚥 Pre-merge checks | ✅ 4 | ❌ 1❌ Failed checks (1 warning)
✅ Passed checks (4 passed)
✨ Finishing Touches🧪 Generate unit tests (beta)
Warning Some tools did not complete. Review the errors below. 🔧 golangci-lint (2.13.2)Error: can't load config: can't unmarshal config by viper (flags, file): 1 error(s) decoding:
Thanks for using CodeRabbit! It's free for OSS, and your support helps us grow. If you like it, consider giving us a shout-out. Comment |
|
/ok-to-test |
Summary
This PR is a proof of concept for hardening validation of OLM-managed serving Secrets.
POC Behavior
The serving Secret is treated as OLM-controlled after creation. OLM reuses it only when:
Otherwise, OLM generates a new serving Secret. Legacy Secrets without fingerprints rotate once to establish them.
Unit Test Coverage
E2E Validation
Test Plan
Local full e2e execution was limited by an amd64 bundle test image crashing under ARM64 emulation on macOS; the relevant serving-Secret scenarios passed locally.
Summary by CodeRabbit
Bug Fixes
Tests