fix(node)!: Gate agent-task reads behind visibility rules by euxarist · Pull Request #396 · Twigpine/node

euxarist · 2026-09-04T19:36:43Z

Summary

Gates agent-task read surfaces behind repo/task visibility rules, decouples open-claim eligibility from read visibility, resets WebSocket field budgets per operation, and aligns task claim tests with the opaque 404 existence-hiding contract.

Refs #395

Changes

Implement TaskReadBrakeExtension in crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/mod.rs to reset the 5-field task read budget per WebSocket operation while preserving connection-level per-IP rate limits.
Register /graphql/ws under optional_signature and thread AuthenticatedDid into GraphQL connection data.
Gate unresolved task claims behind is_repo_quarantined to prevent leaks on quarantined mirror repos.
Validate task_list limit parameter in gl MCP strictly as integer or default 50.
Drain WebSocket frames through terminal frame (complete/error) by operation ID in test helpers.
Add forged-signature WebSocket handshake rejection regression test asserting HTTP 401 when declared DID does not match signing keypair.
Align claim_task_does_not_steal_preassigned_assignee with opaque 404 expectations and preserve direct SQL guard coverage.
Align GraphQL task claim race tests with opaque 404 for rival and fixed conflict mapping for lost write races.

Prior reviewer feedback addressed

CodeRabbit: Enforce is_repo_quarantined on task claim fallback, authenticate WebSocket queries, strictly validate MCP limit argument, and add forged-signature WebSocket rejection test.
CI: Aligned task_write_conflict assertion message in claim_task_does_not_steal_preassigned_assignee.

Test plan

cargo fmt --all -- --check
cargo check --workspace --all-targets
cargo clippy --workspace --bins -- -D warnings
cargo test -p gitlawb-node graphql_ws_authenticated_query_accesses_private_task
cargo test -p gl --bin gl mcp::tests

Summary by CodeRabbit

New Features
- Added cursor-based pagination for task listings in GraphQL, CLI, and MCP.
- Added resumable CLI listings with --cursor and incomplete-result notices.
- Task read responses no longer expose sensitive task tokens.
- Authenticated clients can access authorized private tasks.
- Added configurable rate limits for task reads.
Bug Fixes
- Improved handling of task conflicts, stale updates, invalid requests, and unavailable repositories.
- CLI and MCP commands now report HTTP failures clearly.
- Hidden tasks consistently return not-found responses.
Security
- Protected cursors are caller- and filter-bound, expiry-limited, and node-specific.

…repo data list_tasks and get_task had no authorization at all: any anonymous caller could enumerate every task on the node, including another party's repo-less task, its ucan_token, and its payload (Twigpine#268). Add task_visible, mirroring the repo read-visibility gate already used by the ref-updates feed: the delegator and assignee can always read their own task, a repo-scoped task follows that repo's normal visibility rules, and a task naming no repo (or a repo this node doesn't host) is visible only to its delegator/assignee. Both REST and GraphQL now route through the same collect_visible_tasks/get_visible_task collectors so the two surfaces cannot drift, and neither read path echoes ucan_token back, since the holder already received it via the create/claim response. Fixes Twigpine#268

tasks_limit_ceiling_clamped_to_200 seeded 201 repo-less tasks and read them back anonymously, expecting all 200. That read is exactly the enumeration Twigpine#268 closes, so the new visibility gate correctly returns none of them and the test went red. The clamp ceiling is what this test pins, not the gate, so query as the tasks' delegator, who can legitimately see all 201 rows. Refs Twigpine#268

collect_visible_tasks loaded every repo on the node and every visibility rule in order to gate at most 200 tasks, so an anonymous request paid for the whole node's repo and rule set. Narrow both lookups to the repo ids the fetched page actually names, and skip them when no task names a repo. The deduped repo snapshot stays the source of truth for resolving a repo_id: it collapses mirror and canonical pairs and omits quarantined repos, and an id missing from it has to keep failing closed. Resolving ids straight from the repos table would surface exactly those withheld rows. Add GraphQL denial tests as well. Nothing pinned that the task resolvers delegate to the shared collectors, so a resolver that queried the database directly would not have gone red. Refs Twigpine#268

Refs Twigpine#268

…rors to AppError. Refs Twigpine#268

…hQL pagination state. Refs Twigpine#268

Canonicalize RFC 3339 timestamps in parse_after_cursor to handle URL-decoded spaces, reject mixed cursor alias families, gate complete_task and fail_task behind get_visible_task so unreadable tasks 404 instead of leaking existence with 403, and only flag incomplete when hitting candidate ceilings on full SQL batches. Refs Twigpine#268

…eadable and 403 on non-assignee tasks. Refs Twigpine#268

Refs Twigpine#268

…legitimate cursors. Refs Twigpine#268

Refs Twigpine#268

Gate REST and GraphQL claim behind the same visibility check as complete and fail, refuse claim when another assignee already holds the task, and only broadcast publicly visible task events. Treat a full list page as incomplete when more candidates remain. Surface HTTP errors from CLI and MCP claim and complete helpers. Refs Twigpine#327 Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <cairn-code@users.noreply.github.com>

A full visible page was flagged incomplete whenever the SQL batch was full, so the first page of any list with more than 200 candidates looked stalled. Align the GraphQL claim test with the visibility gate's not-found message. Refs Twigpine#268

Review required tests that go red if the pre-assigned claim predicate or the anonymous announce gate is deleted, and incomplete must not stay true when the candidate stream is exhausted at the scan ceiling. Route claim, complete, and fail through AppError so closed-pool outages stay 503 and 404s match the read envelope. Refs Twigpine#268

create_task stores the supplied assignee unchanged, so a raw SQL equality check drops a designated assignee who presents the other did:key form. Compare the normalized key so claim and filtered list agree with did_matches. Refs Twigpine#268

- Add error_for_status() to cmd_create and task_create MCP tool - Update test_create_task_server_error to assert failure on 500 - Add migration v18 creating expression index idx_agent_tasks_assignee_key matching ASSIGNEE_DID_CASE_SQL - Add did:web:z6Mkfoo single-residual shape to parity boundary matrix Refs Twigpine#327 # Conflicts: # crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs

The task read path treated visibility, pagination, and error vocabulary as separate edits, so each one broke where they met. Rework them as one contract. A raw (created_at, id) cursor forced a choice between two broken options: it could name the last visible row, and then a denied window longer than the 1,000-candidate scan budget was unpageable forever; or it could name the last examined row, and then a denied read leaked the id and timestamp of a task GET /tasks/{id} otherwise 404s. Continuation tokens remove the choice. They carry the last examined candidate, so paging always advances a full scan budget per request, and they are encrypted and authenticated under a node-derived key, so the caller learns nothing from one and cannot forge one naming a row of their choosing. Encryption is a synthetic-IV construction over the hmac/sha2 pair already used for webhook signatures, so it adds no dependency and needs no randomness source. Making the token the only accepted cursor also gives the ordering key one domain. agent_tasks.created_at is TEXT and compared as TEXT, so a caller-typed '...Z' and '...+00:00' denote one instant but sort differently, and a client could silently skip or repeat same-time rows. The token carries the stored string verbatim, so the value compared is always one the server wrote. The raw after_*/cursor_* pairs are removed rather than kept alongside it, since a second domain is the bug. Separate the two facts the old single incomplete flag conflated: has_more says candidates remain, incomplete says this page is short only because the authorization scan hit its ceiling. Both REST and GraphQL now return has_more, incomplete, and next_cursor from the shared collector, and REST echoes the limit it actually applied so a clamped request is visible as clamped. Have gl task list and MCP task_list follow next_cursor instead of issuing one request: --limit 500 returned a successful but silently truncated 200 rows. Following is bounded by a page cap and a no-progress guard, and a run stopped by either reports an explicit incomplete result with a resume cursor. Route claimTask, completeTask, and failTask through the same task_write_conflict classifier the REST handlers use, via curated helpers in the graphql module so the map_err source guard still holds. A claim race or stale finish reached GraphQL clients as a generic database error while REST clients got an actionable conflict; genuine sqlx faults stay opaque on both. Refs Twigpine#327

A short SQL batch means no rows exist past it, not that every row in it was examined. When the page filled mid-batch the collector treated the two as the same, marked the stream ended, and suppressed the continuation, so every row after the one that filled the page was unreachable. The equal-timestamp paging tests caught it: three rows with a limit of one returned only the first. Track how much of each batch was consumed and end the stream only when the whole of a short batch has been examined. Otherwise leave `has_more` to the probe row, which resumes from the last examined candidate. Refs Twigpine#327

…der test A `--limit 0` reached the node, which clamped it to zero and answered with an empty page marked complete, so an invalid request read as proof that no tasks exist. Reject a non-positive limit in `fetch_tasks()`, the helper the CLI and MCP share, so the guard cannot drift between the two surfaces. `task_write_sql_faults_stay_opaque` did not exercise what it named. Dropping `updated_at` also broke the SELECT in `get_task()`, so the fault surfaced from the `get_visible_task()` pre-check through `graphql_app_err` and never reached `graphql_claim_conflict`. A `BEFORE UPDATE` trigger keeps every read valid and faults only inside `Db::claim_task`, and the test now also asserts that a write-time fault is not reclassified as a claim race. Refs Twigpine#268

…utes A continuation token names the last candidate a scan examined, not the last row it returned, so it encodes how far that scan got under one caller's visibility. The MAC bound the page filter but not the presenting identity, so resuming a token as a different caller started the scan past rows that caller was entitled to read and dropped them from the answer with nothing to signal the loss. Bind the caller's normalized DID into the MAC, with anonymous flagged absent rather than encoded as empty. Normalization goes through normalize_owner_key so the two spellings of one did:key identity bind identically, matching did_matches on the read path: a caller who presents the other form of their own DID keeps their own page. A mismatched token renders the existing single rejection message, so this adds no oracle. GET /api/v1/tasks and GET /api/v1/tasks/{id} are anonymously reachable, and the visibility gate costs a task lookup plus deduped-repo and visibility-rule queries before it can return the opaque 404. An unauthenticated prober therefore pays nothing while the node pays per request, whether or not the id exists. Attach the per-IP limiter already used on /ipfs/{cid}, configurable through GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT and swept by the periodic task like every other per-key limiter. Refs Twigpine#268

The per-IP brake added for the task read routes covered only /api/v1/tasks*, so an anonymous caller reached the same collect_visible_tasks and get_visible_task gate over /graphql with no bucket at all. The fence had an open lane beside it. Carry the brake as GraphQL request data and debit it in the tasks and task resolvers rather than layering rate_limit_by_ip onto the GraphQL router: /graphql is one endpoint for every operation, so a router layer would charge unrelated queries and every mutation against the task-read bucket. Debiting per resolved field also prices an aliased query honestly, since ten aliased tasks fields run the gate ten times. Extract RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE so the GraphQL surface, which cannot return a 429 status inside a 200 envelope, refuses with the same text the REST routes use. /graphql/ws serves the query root as well and stays unbraked; closing it needs a WebSocketUpgrade handler and is left for a follow-up. Refs Twigpine#268 Refs Twigpine#327

…ize assignee filter MAC

…more from visible rows - Cap aliased GraphQL task read fields per request using an atomic counter on TaskReadBrake (MAX_GRAPHQL_TASK_READS_PER_REQUEST = 5). - Derive has_more in collect_visible_tasks by scanning for bounded_limit + 1 visible rows, eliminating the un-gated keyset probe that could leak the presence of trailing denied tasks. - Add regression tests covering aliased GraphQL capping and trailing denied task has_more privacy. Refs Twigpine#327

… batch boundary When candidate scanning reaches MAX_TASK_SCAN_CANDIDATES without finding a target_visible row and the final batch was full, probe the database for rows beyond the scan position so an exhausted candidate stream is not erroneously marked incomplete. Refs Twigpine#327

The scan-ceiling branch of collect_visible_tasks settles has_more with an un-gated LIMIT 1 probe, so a caller can learn whether any row - readable or not - trails the position the scan stopped at. Withholding the probe does not remove that bit: enumeration past a denied window longer than one scan budget requires handing back a continuation, and following that continuation returns the same terminal page one round trip later. State what the probe discloses (one bit, only at server-chosen positions a full scan budget apart, reachable only through a MAC'd cursor, never a denied row's id, payload or ucan_token) and pin it end to end. Also correct the comment above the branch, which claimed has_more never comes from an un-gated probe while the code below it did exactly that. Refs Twigpine#327

Optional IS NULL predicates kept the planner from using a created_at/id order, so every list_tasks_keyset batch could sort a growing match set before LIMIT. Dedicated per-domain SQL plus v28 indexes make the candidate ceiling a database bound. Refs Twigpine#327

…sted limit. fetch_tasks asked for the remaining total, then appended every row on a valid-shaped page. A remote that sent more tasks than want could make gl and MCP expose more than --limit. Treat that page as protocol-invalid before any extra row is kept. Refs Twigpine#327

…e-column indexes. Refs Twigpine#327

… limits. Refs Twigpine#395

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Actionable comments posted: 1

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Inline comments:
In @.env.example:
- Around line 278-280: Update the visibility-gate comment near the task
rate-limit configuration to distinguish GET /api/v1/tasks/{id}, which may return
an opaque 404 after get_visible_task, from GET /api/v1/tasks, which uses
collect_visible_tasks and returns a filtered page. Keep the rate-limit rationale
accurate for both route behaviors.

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.env.example
README.md
SECURITY.md
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs

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euxarist · 2026-09-07T02:03:53Z

Addressed the two findings in review 5123664742 in commit 41fef3a, and the follow-up wording correction in commit d9aded2.

Added GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT beside the IPFS rate-limit setting in README.md and .env.example, including the 1200 requests/IP/hour default, 0 disables, trusted-proxy IP resolution, and shared REST/GraphQL/WS task-read budget.
Updated README.md and SECURITY.md to describe gated task list/get reads that omit ucan_token, preserving the pin/anchor, withheld-path, and already-announced-content limitations.
Corrected .env.example and the matching CLI help comment in crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs: the list route returns a visibility-filtered page; the individual-task route returns an opaque 404 when the task is hidden or missing. Both can incur visibility-query costs even when no task is returned.

These commits update documentation and CLI help wording only; runtime gates, defaults, and limiter wiring are unchanged. Local validation passed: the requested documentation searches, cargo fmt --all -- --check, and Git diff whitespace checks. Runtime tests were not rerun locally for these edits.

At the time of this update, CI on d9aded2 has passed formatting/clippy, audit, MSRV, Windows tests, and the other completed checks; stable/beta tests, the release build, and Docker smoke testing are still running. Current results: PR checks.

Refs Twigpine#395

beardthelion

Checked head d9aded2 against origin/main. CI is green (12/12). The two docs findings from the prior round are addressed: GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT is in .env.example and the README settings table, and the SECURITY.md / README.md limitation sentences now describe gated task reads that omit ucan_token. I re-ran the prior load-bearing checks on this head: visible_tasks_tests (32/32) and the GraphQL WS auth tests (4/4). A revert probe that removes the quarantine check from task_visible goes RED on quarantined_repo_task_withheld_from_owner_on_rest_and_graphql, and a probe that adds ucan_token back to task_to_read_json goes RED on ucan_token_never_appears_in_read_responses. The gate, the quarantine drop, and the token omission are all load-bearing.

The visibility gate is sound across both surfaces: REST and GraphQL share collect_visible_tasks / get_visible_task, task_visible hard-drops quarantined repos before party checks, mirror repos and unhosted repo ids fail closed, and ucan_token appears only on the write/claim delivery path. The cursor is SIV-encrypted and caller/filter-bound, so a token holder cannot read or forge the position it carries. The WS handshake rejects forged signatures with 401, and the per-operation field budget reset is tested. One amplification issue on the anonymous read path, plus two minor doc gaps.

Findings

[P2] Batch the quarantine check in collect_visible_tasks
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs:288
The scan loop calls db.is_repo_quarantined(repo_id) per distinct repo id per batch. With 200 distinct repos per batch and up to 5 batches (scan ceiling 1000), one anonymous GET /api/v1/tasks triggers up to 1000 individual SELECT quarantined FROM repos WHERE id = 1 queries. The route is anonymous-reachable (optional_signature), and the rate limit bounds frequency but not per-request cost. list_repos_deduped_by_ids already batches the repo record fetch but does not select the quarantined column, so the per-repo loop is the only unbatched query in the scan. Replace it with a single SELECT id FROM repos WHERE id = ANY(1) AND quarantined = TRUE populating the same HashSet, or add quarantined to the existing batched SELECT and RepoRecord. The gate order is preserved either way: task_visible checks quarantined_repos before the delegator/assignee short-circuit.
[P3] Mention the GraphQL/WS budget sharing in the --help docstring
crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs:706
The clap field help describes only the two REST routes. .env.example and the README table both say the GraphQL/WS task-read brake shares this budget. An operator tuning from --help alone would not know that GraphQL tasks / task queries and WS task queries debit the same per-IP bucket. Add one sentence matching the .env.example wording.
[P3] Update the stale /graphql/ws mounting comment in subscription.rs
crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs:14
The comment says /graphql/ws is "mounted outside the optional_signature layer." This PR moved it under optional_signature (server.rs:107), and graphql_ws_handler now threads Option<Extension> into connection data. The subscription resolvers do not read caller identity, so the write-side gating safety model is unchanged and correct. The comment is factually wrong about the mounting and could mislead a future developer into thinking the WS handshake is unauthenticated when it now rejects forged signatures with 401.

One process note, not a finding: open #401 and #405 retarget the task limit clamp to [1, 200] while this branch clamps to [0, 200]. Resolve or close those after this lands so they do not fight the collector.

jatmn

I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.

Treat this comment as the closed merge set for the runtime work on head d9aded2. The security and product contracts for #268 / #395 are in place on this head; what remains is one implementation gap in the list scanner, plus two maintainer-doc updates that should have landed with the same operator-facing pass that updated README and .env.example. Please address only the three findings below in one follow-up commit. Do not reopen claim eligibility, cursor semantics, WS auth wiring, quarantine gate order, rate-limit defaults, or limit clamps to “look complete” — those paths are load-bearing and tested.

What is already verified on this head

REST and GraphQL task reads share collect_visible_tasks / get_visible_task; reads omit ucan_token.
Quarantined repos are hard-dropped before delegator/assignee short-circuit in task_visible.
/graphql/ws is under optional_signature; forged signatures get HTTP 401; authenticated WS queries can read private tasks.
Open-claim eligibility remains decoupled from read visibility for unassigned tasks (#395); mirror/unhosted claim behavior is intentional, not a defect.
GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT is documented in README and .env.example; SECURITY/README limitation text matches gated reads.
CI: 12/12 checks green on d9aded2ca0957d4c34e04d2f41a608220342a5a6.

Revert probes on this head go red when quarantine is removed from task_visible or when ucan_token is restored on read projections — the gates are load-bearing.

Why review kept returning (and why this list is short)

This PR is large (~7k lines) and touched every layer of one contract at once: visibility collectors, opaque cursors, rate limits, GraphQL/WS auth, CLI/MCP pagination, and operator docs. That shape naturally produces drip review unless each round closes a single surface completely:

Security and product rounds came first. Early passes correctly focused on visibility holes (#268), claim vs read semantics (#395), cursor binding, WS authentication, and MCP parsing. Those required code changes across tasks.rs, server.rs, task_cursor.rs, and gl/. Each fix shifted behavior that later reviewers re-read from scratch.
Operator docs lagged the code. The runtime gained GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT and changed what SECURITY.md must say about task reads, but the first doc pass updated README/.env.example only. Reviewers correctly blocked merge until those files caught up (jatmn round). That round is done on d9aded2, but the same operator contract was not copied into clap --help and AppState field docs — a partial doc pass leaves a second doc-only round.
Routing changes outpaced comments. Moving /graphql/ws under optional_signature was the right fix, but the ref_updates module comment still describes the pre-change mount order (accurate on merge-base main, wrong on this head). Stale comments invite the next reviewer to re-litigate WS auth as if it were still broken.
A new hot path was added without matching an existing batching pattern. Quarantine enforcement in collect_visible_tasks correctly calls is_repo_quarantined per repo, but the sibling ref-update collector and the batched list_repos_deduped_by_ids call in the same loop already show the intended “one round trip per batch” shape. The per-repo loop is the last unbatched query in that scan — easy to miss in a diff this size, but it is the remaining runtime issue.
Automated and parallel reviewers re-raise intentional choices. Mirror/unhosted open claim, node-local cursors, GraphQL TaskPageType breaking shape, and anonymous publish gating for task_events are design decisions pinned by tests and maintainer direction. Treating each automated comment as a new merge blocker would never end.

Root cause for authors on contracts like this: when a PR changes behavior, document every operator entry point in one commit (--help, AppState comments, README, .env.example, SECURITY) using the same sentence template; when a PR changes routing, grep for stale mount/auth comments in the same commit; when a PR adds per-row DB work inside a public list scanner, compare against the nearest sibling collector (events.rs) before merge.

Merge readiness

Mergeable against current main (bfc44f926d08c0bf774e2c05dd76b245871294f1); no rebase drift observed.
All 12 required PR checks passed on head d9aded2.
Open #401 and #405 retarget task limit clamp to [1, 200] while this branch uses [0, 200]. Resolve or close those after this lands; do not fold that product choice into this close-out commit.
Prior jatmn documentation findings are addressed on this head.

Findings

[P2] Batch the quarantine check in `collect_visible_tasks`

crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs:281-300
crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs:1642-1662 (batched repo fetch — extend or mirror)

What happens today

Inside the while scanned < MAX_TASK_SCAN_CANDIDATES loop, each keyset batch:

Dedupes repo_id values from up to 200 tasks (referenced).
Loops referenced and awaits db.is_repo_quarantined(repo_id) — one SELECT quarantined FROM repos WHERE id = $1 per distinct id.
Then calls list_repos_deduped_by_ids(&referenced) and list_visibility_rules_for_repos — already batched.

With MAX_VISIBLE_TASKS = 200 per batch and MAX_TASK_SCAN_CANDIDATES = 1,000, a single anonymous GET /api/v1/tasks or GraphQL tasks query can issue up to 1,000 quarantine lookups. GraphQL aliases debit the same per-IP bucket per field but still run the full collector per field (capped at 5 fields/request). GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT limits requests per hour, not queries per request.

Root cause

Quarantine was added correctly to the visibility gate (task_visible checks quarantined_repos before party match) but implemented with the convenient single-row helper instead of aligning with:

api/events.rs:66 — list_quarantined_repos() once per request for ref updates, or
the batched list_repos_deduped_by_ids call immediately below in the same loop.

This is not a missing security gate; it is amplification on a public read path introduced by this PR’s quarantine enforcement.

Requested outcome (pick one; do not change gate semantics)

Option A (preferred — extends existing batch): Add quarantined to the SELECT in list_repos_deduped_by_ids (or add Db::quarantined_ids_among(&[String]) -> HashSet<String> used only here). Build quarantined_repos from rows where quarantined == true. Drop the for repo_id in &referenced loop entirely.

Option B: One query per batch: SELECT id FROM repos WHERE id = ANY($1) AND quarantined = TRUE with referenced as the array bind.

Invariants to preserve (do not drift)

task_visible must still test quarantine before delegator/assignee short-circuit (tasks.rs:167-170).
get_visible_task single-repo quarantine early-return stays as-is.
Do not switch to loading all quarantined repos on every list request unless you measure repo-table size; batching to referenced ids is enough.

Verification

Existing visible_tasks_tests and quarantined_repo_task_withheld_from_owner_on_rest_and_graphql must stay green.
Add or extend a test that seeds many distinct quarantined repo ids on one page and asserts behavior unchanged (optional: count DB round-trips in a unit test if the repo has a pattern for that).

[P3] Complete the operator contract for `GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT`

crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs:706-716
crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs:326-332

What happens today

Runtime debits one task_read_rate_limiter for:

REST: GET /api/v1/tasks, GET /api/v1/tasks/{id} via rate_limit_by_ip on task_read_routes.
GraphQL HTTP: TaskReadBrake in graphql_handler (server.rs:45-49).
GraphQL WS: same limiter/key in graphql_ws_handler (server.rs:65-68), per-operation field budget reset in TaskReadBrakeExtension (graphql/mod.rs:115-130).

README (.env.example:285, README.md:415) already says GraphQL/WS share the budget. Clap --help and AppState::task_read_rate_limiter doc comment name only the two REST routes and say the limiter is “layered on task_read_routes via rate_limit_by_ip,” which is incomplete for GraphQL/WS.

Root cause

Operator-facing text was updated where jatmn explicitly asked (README + .env.example) but not at the other two places operators and maintainers actually read when tuning (gitlawb-node --help, rustdoc on AppState). Partial doc passes cause a second review round for the same knob.

Requested outcome

Copy the GraphQL/WS sharing sentence from .env.example:285 into:

The clap field doc on task_read_rate_limit in config.rs (after the REST route description).
The task_read_rate_limiter field comment in state.rs (note shared limiter across REST + GraphQL/WS, not only task_read_routes).

Template (wording may vary; facts must not):

The same per-IP hourly budget applies to GraphQL tasks / task queries and WebSocket task queries via TaskReadBrake.

Do not change

Default 1200, 0 disables, GITLAWB_TRUSTED_PROXY keying, limiter wiring, or REST vs GraphQL layering.

Verification

rg 'GraphQL/WS' README.md .env.example crates/gitlawb-node/src/config.rs crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs should hit all four surfaces.

[P3] Fix stale `/graphql/ws` mounting comment in `subscription.rs`

crates/gitlawb-node/src/graphql/subscription.rs:14-22
crates/gitlawb-node/src/server.rs:103-107

What happens today

The ref_updates subscription doc says /graphql/ws is mounted outside optional_signature and the resolver has no caller identity. On merge-base main that was true (/graphql/ws was registered after the auth layer). On this head, graphql_routes registers /graphql/ws before .layer(optional_signature), so signed handshakes are verified and AuthenticatedDid can be inserted into WS connection data. Forged-signature rejection and authenticated private-task query tests pin this.

The subscription resolver still does not read caller identity or filter per subscriber — same as before. Safety still rests on write-side gating (announce for ref updates, announce_task_event for tasks).

Root cause

A routing fix landed without updating the module-level comment that future readers use as the security model spec. That comment now asserts false facts about mounting and implies WS auth was never added.

Requested outcome

Rewrite the first two sentences of the ref_updates doc comment to state:

/graphql/ws is under optional_signature; signed upgrades attach AuthenticatedDid to connection data.
Subscription resolvers still do not gate per subscriber; visibility safety remains on the write side (keep the existing if announce / announce_task_event invariant paragraph).

Do not change

Subscription relay logic, announce_task_event anonymous gate, or WS handler wiring.
Do not add per-subscriber filtering in this close-out — that would be a product change, not a comment fix.

Verification

Comment should not contain “mounted outside the optional_signature layer.”
server.rs:105-107 and the updated comment should agree.

Close-out — do not expand scope

Do in the one follow-up commit:

Batch quarantine lookup in collect_visible_tasks (finding 1).
Align clap + AppState docs with README/.env.example for the shared task-read budget (finding 2).
Fix the subscription.rs mounting/auth comment (finding 3).

Do not (will bounce or reopen settled rounds):

Fail-close unassigned claim for mirror ids or unresolved canonical repo ids.
Change GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT default, wiring, or disable semantics.
Put ucan_token back on GET list/get or GraphQL read types.
Rewrite pin/anchor/sparse-clone limitations in SECURITY.md.
Change [0, 200] limit clamp, cursor MAC, scan-ceiling probe, or MCP/CLI page caps (#401 / #405 own limit semantics).
Add per-subscriber filtering to task_events or ref_updates subscriptions.
“Fix” node-local cursors for load-balanced deploys in this PR (document operationally elsewhere if needed; not a merge blocker here).

After these three items, the runtime contract for #268 / #395 on this branch is complete from my review. Further rounds should be reserved for new head regressions, not re-argument of intentional #395 claim semantics or breaking GraphQL pagination shape.

Refs Twigpine#395

jatmn

One P3 documentation item from my previous closed merge set remains incomplete. The requested quarantine batching and subscription mounting-comment changes are present, and the configuration comment now describes the shared budget. The outstanding change is the corresponding sentence in AppState.

This is the complete requested follow-up from this review. I am not asking for another runtime, security-policy, or test-hardening round.

Findings

[P3] Complete the previously requested shared-budget sentence in AppState

crates/gitlawb-node/src/state.rs:326-332

What is incomplete

My previous review explicitly named two locations for the same documentation correction: the task_read_rate_limit configuration documentation and the AppState::task_read_rate_limiter field comment. The configuration comment now says that GraphQL tasks / task queries, including WebSocket operations, share the per-IP budget with REST task reads. The state comment still describes only the REST routes and says the limiter is layered on task_read_routes through rate_limit_by_ip.

The runtime already shares this limiter. Both graphql_handler and graphql_ws_handler pass a clone of state.task_read_rate_limiter through TaskReadBrake, and the task-query resolvers debit it. README and .env.example also describe this sharing. The missing sentence therefore leaves the documentation at the state field incomplete; it does not demonstrate a missing runtime brake.

Why it matters

A maintainer reading the state field in isolation sees only its REST use. That description omits a material property of the setting: REST and GraphQL task queries consume the same per-IP budget. Because the earlier request explicitly included this location, updating only configuration leaves that request partially completed.

Root cause and requested change

The observable cause is a partial documentation update across the two named locations: one received the shared-budget sentence and the other did not. Please finish that same correction by adding the following sentence to the existing state-field comment:

/// The same per-IP hourly budget applies to GraphQL `tasks` / `task`
/// queries and WebSocket task queries via `TaskReadBrake`.

Equivalent wording is fine. Keep the scope precise: this describes task queries over HTTP and WebSocket, not every GraphQL operation or event subscription. The sentence can be appended to the existing comment; no broader comment rewrite is required.

Verification and completion criterion

Read the updated state comment alongside config.rs:706-719, .env.example:285, and README.md:415. All four should describe the shared task-read budget consistently. The three already-correct locations do not need another edit. This documentation-only correction does not require new regression tests or runtime changes; normal repository checks are sufficient.

Once that sentence is present and accurate, this finding is addressed.

Why the review has kept returning

There is not a large set of outstanding findings on this head. There is one incomplete item from the agreed follow-up. The current changes implement the other requested corrections, and I have not established a new production regression in this follow-up.

This PR spans several representations of the same behavior: implementation, configuration help, state comments, README, and example environment settings. A correction can be technically accurate where applied but leave a specifically named companion location untouched. That is what happened with this documentation request. The practical way to close it is to check every location named in the request before marking the request complete, and submit the complete correction together.

Review discipline also matters. My previous feedback explicitly established a closed merge set and reserved further rounds for new-head regressions. Additional observations about already-reviewed behavior should not automatically become new merge requirements. Repeatedly expanding that set would make the author chase a moving target; responsibility for avoiding that expansion belongs to the review as well.

For this follow-up, use the original three-item request as the completion checklist: quarantine batching is implemented, the subscription mounting comment is corrected, and the shared-budget documentation needs only its state-field sentence. This is guidance for completing the existing request, not a request to audit or rewrite every documentation surface in the repository, add a documentation framework, or open another implementation pass.

Scope and stopping point

Please make the single state-comment correction in one small follow-up. Preserve the accepted runtime behavior, including limiter defaults and wiring, claim eligibility, cursor and scan-ceiling behavior, subscription relay logic, and client limits.

With the requested sentence added, the closed merge set is complete from this review. Any genuinely new regression introduced by a later change should be reported with its specific causal change and failure evidence; unrelated improvements should be handled separately rather than extending this PR's obligations.

Document that GraphQL task queries over HTTP and WebSocket debit the same per-IP hourly budget as REST task reads. Refs Twigpine#395

beardthelion

Checked head 80ba7a33 against origin/main. CI is green (12/12). The incremental change since the last reviewed head (ab054fb3) is two lines: a shared-budget sentence added to the AppState::task_read_rate_limiter field comment, completing the documentation correction requested in the prior round. All four companion locations now describe the shared per-IP task-read budget consistently: state.rs:333-334, config.rs:716-717, .env.example:285, and README.md:415.

Re-ran the prior load-bearing checks on this head. visible_tasks_tests passed 32/32. GraphQL WebSocket tests passed 4/4, including graphql_ws_authenticated_query_accesses_private_task, the per-IP rate-limit enforcement, the per-request field cap, and the per-operation budget reset. Two revert probes confirmed the read gates are load-bearing: removing the quarantine check from task_visible goes RED on quarantined_repo_task_withheld_from_owner_on_rest_and_graphql, and restoring ucan_token to task_to_read_json goes RED on ucan_token_never_appears_in_read_responses. The runtime shares the limiter across REST and GraphQL as the new comment states.

All six inline review threads are resolved.

Findings

[P2] Fail closed for claim eligibility when a task's repo cannot be resolved to a locally hosted repo with established visibility.
crates/gitlawb-node/src/api/tasks.rs:468
task_claimable returns true for non-mirror repo IDs that are missing from repos_by_id (line 468) and for slash-form mirror repo IDs (line 465), so claim_task lets any signed DID claim an unassigned task whose repo visibility was never established. The claim response uses task_to_json (line 673), which still includes ucan_token (line 103), turning the claim path into a data egress for tasks that are invisible to reads. I seeded a task with repo_id = "nonexistent-repo" (no repo row in the database) and ucan_token = "SECRET-UCAN-TOKEN", then signed POST /api/v1/tasks/t-unresolved/claim as an unrelated DID: the response was 200 OK with "ucan_token":"SECRET-UCAN-TOKEN". Meanwhile task_visible returns false for the same unresolved repo (line 193), so GET /api/v1/tasks/t-unresolved returns 404. The read gate and the claim gate disagree on unresolved repos: the read gate fails closed, the claim gate fails open. Quarantine is checked in get_claimable_task (line 491), so quarantined repos are blocked; the gap is unresolved and mirror repos. The fix is to return false from task_claimable when the repo ID is not in repos_by_id (or to return None from get_claimable_task when the repo lookup fails), matching the fail-closed behavior of task_visible.

Not an ask, recorded only: the cursor token is content-opaque but not length-opaque. The SIV construction encrypts JSON containing variable-length created_at and id fields with an XOR keystream, which preserves plaintext length, and the base64 wire form preserves that length variation. I minted two tokens with the same timestamp but different ID lengths: a 2-character ID produced a 116-character token, a 47-character ID produced a 165-character token. When the scan ceiling is hit, next_position is set to the last examined candidate, which may be a hidden row, so an anonymous list caller can distinguish hidden task ID lengths from the token length. The PR body says the cursor is opaque and the caller "learns nothing from it", which overstates the guarantee: the content is opaque but the length is not. Padding the plaintext to a fixed width before encryption would close the side channel.

One process note, not a finding: open #405 retargets the GET /api/v1/tasks limit clamp to [1, 200] while this branch clamps to [0, 200]. Resolve or close it after this lands so the two do not fight the collector.

jatmn

I found two implementation issues on head 80ba7a33: one database-work amplification issue to address before merge, and one low-risk MCP input-validation issue worth fixing in the same follow-up. The task-read security work has concrete value: REST and GraphQL share the visibility collectors, read responses omit UCAN tokens, quarantine takes precedence over party access, and authenticated WebSocket queries use the shared task-read brake.

Please treat the two findings below as the complete requested change set for this reviewed head. Address their root causes and regression coverage together. They do not require another redesign of task visibility, claims, pagination, or client limits.

Merge readiness

The reviewed head is mergeable against current main (bfc44f92), with no rebase drift and all current checks passing. GitHub reports merging blocked; there is no source conflict to resolve.

The renewed request to fail-close unresolved/mirror claims conflicts with the accepted #395 open-claim contract. That is not part of this change request. Successful claim delivery of payload/ucan_token is distinct from the gated, redacted read contract.

#275 overlaps task-assignment changes but contains additional work, and #405 proposes a competing [1, 200] clamp. Coordinate those branches when they land; neither requires changing this PR's accepted [0, 200] contract. Closed #327 is the predecessor, not a replacement for this PR.

Findings

[P2] Bound the repository work performed by the scoped task lookup

crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs:1552-1556

Failure and impact

list_repos_deduped_by_ids returns only the requested repositories, but its query still visits unrelated repository rows. With the production schema and all production repository indexes, requesting one repository among 100,000 produces both custom and generic PostgreSQL plans that discard 99,999 rows. The task get path invokes this lookup, and the list collector can repeat it across five candidate batches. Anonymous REST reads and GraphQL task queries reach this work.

The 1,000-task scan ceiling bounds task candidates; it does not bound this separate repository-table scan. The per-IP brake limits request frequency, not the work within each request. As unrelated repositories accumulate, a task read becomes more expensive even when the number of task references remains fixed. This is a demonstrated scaling defect, not a claim that a production outage has occurred.

Root cause

The shared CTE combines unscoped and scoped access in one predicate:

AND ($2::text[] IS NULL OR EXISTS (
    SELECT 1 FROM requested_groups requested
    WHERE requested.owner_key = (...) AND requested.name = repos.name
))

The requested IDs are used efficiently to construct requested_groups, but the outer repository access applies group membership as a filter over the broader scan. In the measured plans, the outer scan removes 99,999 rows; only the inner requested-ID lookup has the bounded primary-key index condition. The final WHERE d.id = ANY($2) restricts the result, after the expensive work.

This explains why a test asserting “only the requested repo was returned” passes while the operational problem remains. It also explains why batching the quarantine query, although correct and useful, does not resolve this different source of amplification. The accepted #327 request to scope repository loading needs to cover the access work as well as the returned rows.

At the merge base, task get reads agent_tasks directly without this repository query. The PR introduces the cost through its new visibility lookup. The existing unscoped repository-listing cost is outside this finding.

Requested outcome and implementation guidance

Make the scoped lookup's repository access follow the requested logical groups. A suitable approach is to give the scoped call a dedicated query shape, without the nullable “all repositories” alternative, and resolve matching group members through the existing owner-key/name index. Keep the unscoped callers on their existing all-repository path. Another formulation is acceptable if its measured access work and results satisfy the same requirements; this is not a requirement to add an index or reorganize all repository queries.

Preserve the order of operations that protects deduplication semantics: resolve the requested IDs to logical groups, consider the relevant canonical/mirror members, choose the existing survivor, then apply the final requested-ID restriction. Simply filtering the candidate rows to id = ANY(...) before choosing the survivor could change which row wins and is not an equivalent fix.

Verification for this fix

Use a populated repository fixture with many unrelated groups and a small requested set. Run ANALYZE, then inspect EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS) for the actual scoped query with both custom and generic prepared plans. The reproduced case uses 100,000 groups and one requested ID.
Verify that unrelated repository growth does not cause the scoped lookup to scan and discard the entire unrelated population. Assert the relevant access behavior rather than an exact elapsed-time threshold or one complete planner output; small-table sequential scans alone are not the bug.
Keep the existing deduplication and visibility regressions green: canonical/mirror pairs, private canonical precedence, DID-method distinctions, deterministic ties, quarantine handling, requested-only output, and empty input. Check both existing unscoped CTE callers if shared SQL construction changes.

Authorization, quarantine-first precedence, group survivor rules, and task pagination semantics must remain unchanged.

[P3] Reject a present non-string MCP cursor before issuing a request

crates/gl/src/mcp.rs:1076

Failure and impact

The new cursor extraction is:

args.get("cursor").and_then(|v| v.as_str())

A supplied number, object, array, or boolean becomes None. For example:

{"jsonrpc":"2.0","id":1,"method":"tools/call","params":{"name":"task_list","arguments":{"limit":1,"cursor":123}}}

The built MCP server sends /api/v1/tasks?limit=1, with no cursor. When the node returns a terminal first page, MCP reports successful first-page data with complete: true, rather than rejecting the invalid resume argument. The same behavior is reproduced with {}, [], and true as the cursor value.

This is limited to malformed MCP calls. Valid string cursors work, and there is no demonstrated authorization bypass. I would not block merge on this P3 alone.

Root cause

The advertised input schema says the cursor is a string, but tools/call passes the arguments directly to call_tool; it does not validate that schema. The conversion then collapses two different states—“cursor absent” and “cursor supplied with the wrong type”—into the same first-page request. Once that distinction is lost, fetch_tasks cannot recover it.

The adjacent limit parser already preserves the distinction between absent/null and invalid present values. Apply that narrow boundary rule to this new cursor parameter. This does not call for a general MCP schema-validation framework or cleanup of pre-existing argument coercions elsewhere.

Requested outcome and verification

Parse the optional cursor before calling fetch_tasks: absent or null remains None, a string is passed through unchanged, and every other present type returns an error. Do not stringify objects/numbers, trim or reinterpret valid strings, or change server-side cursor validation.

Add coverage at the MCP dispatch boundary, where the mistake occurs:

Number, object, array, and boolean cursors return an error and issue zero task HTTP requests.
Absent and null cursors retain first-page behavior.
A string cursor is forwarded unchanged as a URL-encoded query value with the existing filters. Invalid string-token contents continue to be handled by the node.

Keep the current limit, pagination, identity-error, and continuation tests passing. A test of fetch_tasks alone cannot catch this issue because it receives an already typed Option<&str>.

Root-cause guidance and close-out scope

The common pattern in these two findings is that the existing checks cover the visible result without covering the boundary that determines its meaning or cost. The repository lookup returns the correct IDs while doing excessive underlying work. The MCP tool advertises the correct type while its runtime parser silently accepts a different one. Fix the boundary and add a regression that fails on the current implementation; adding more happy-path assertions around the final output will not close either gap.

This does not mean the entire feature is unstable or needs another hardening campaign. The visibility, quarantine, cursor, WebSocket, CLI/MCP, migration, and deduplication tests exercised for this review passed. These two missing assertions explain why those passing checks did not catch these particular issues. They do not establish that the same cause explains every previous review round.

Some review churn has also come from requests to revisit settled behavior. Keep those choices out of this follow-up:

Preserve open unassigned claims for repo-less, unresolved, and slash-form mirror references, with quarantine denial and the existing locally hosted private-repository gate.
Preserve the atomic preassigned-assignee guard and successful claim token delivery; keep UCAN tokens omitted from reads.
Preserve [0, 200], cursor contents/bindings/expiry, the scan-ceiling continuation behavior, and all existing CLI/MCP page and byte caps.
Preserve the task-read limiter's default, disable semantics, and REST/GraphQL/WebSocket sharing. Keep publish-side subscription filtering and the existing identity-error behavior.
Leave unrelated pin/anchor limitations and competing PR scope outside this patch.

Please deliver both fixes and their focused regression evidence together. For the SQL change, include the populated custom/generic plan evidence and preserved dedup behavior. For the MCP change, include wrong-type rejection before network access and unchanged valid/absent cursor behavior. Run the existing affected suites after both changes are in place so the shared consumers are checked together.

Any additional request on a later head should identify a concrete regression or newly verified defect, its causal change, and its smallest required correction. It should not reopen a settled product choice under a new description. The requested work here is these two bounded fixes, not an open-ended mandate to redesign adjacent behavior.

Bound repository access in list_repos_deduped_by_ids to requested groups via idx_repos_owner_key_name, leaving dedup_cte unscoped. Strictly validate MCP task_list cursor argument before network dispatch. Refs Twigpine#396

jatmn

lgtm

beardthelion

Verified a0ea4c78 end to end. The scoped lookup is bounded the way it should be: EXPLAIN (ANALYZE, BUFFERS) on the query list_repos_deduped_by_ids issues over a 4000-repo fixture resolves requested groups by primary key and joins candidates through idx_repos_owner_key_name with no mass discard, and the same holds under a real generic plan (PREPARE with force_generic_plan). Dedup semantics are unchanged: mirror-id and quarantined-id lookups still return nothing, requesting canonical+mirror returns the canonical once, and all three callers (list, get, claim) route through the scoped path. The MCP side rejects a non-string cursor before any request is issued; reverting it in a scratch checkout makes the new test fail with the request actually reaching the mock server, which also proves the rejection is pre-dispatch. The quarantine and ucan_token revert checks from prior rounds still go red on this head, and the task-read suites are green.

On my last finding: claim eligibility for unresolved and mirror repo ids is the accepted #395 contract per jatmn's review, so I am not re-litigating it.

Findings

[P2] Make the plan test able to fail on the defect it certifies
crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs:6743
assert_scoped_repo_plan accepts any index node on repos and rejects only a Seq Scan, but the removed defect plans as an Index Scan on idx_repos_owner_key_name that discards 3999 of 4000 rows through a filter (a hashed subplan over the group-membership EXISTS). I restored that exact shape and the test stayed green. Assert the index name on the join node, or bound Rows Removed by Filter under EXPLAIN (ANALYZE). The generic half is also inert: SET plan_cache_mode never reaches a literal EXPLAIN, which always plans a custom plan, so both halves produce byte-identical output. Use EXPLAIN (GENERIC_PLAN) (CI's postgres:16 supports it) or PREPARE plus EXPLAIN EXECUTE instead; I ran the real generic plan and index access holds, so only the test needs to change.
[P3] Drop the stray escapes in the dedup doc comment
crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs:1602
The line now reads per-caller \"/\" with literal backslashes; the parent had per-caller "/"``.

Not an ask, recorded only: .expect(2) on the mock in test_task_list_null_or_absent_cursor_accepted is not enforced by mockito without a matching .assert(); the test still proves dispatch through the unwrap on the mock's 200, so it is cosmetic.

Measure discarded rows and verify actual custom and generic prepared-plan counters, including the previous full-index-scan regression. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

Restore readable root-path notation in the deduplicated listing documentation. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

beardthelion

Verified on b360f3f. This round's delta is the plan-test hardening plus the doc fix; I re-ran the surrounding suites rather than trusting the diff.

The plan guard now fails on the shape it exists to catch. Restoring the old membership-filter scan produces an Index Scan on idx_repos_owner_key_name that discards 3999 of 4000 rows through a hashed SubPlan filter, and the test rejects it; the previous node-type-only check passed that same plan. The custom/generic split is real this round: the test PREPAREs the production query, runs EXPLAIN EXECUTE under each plan_cache_mode, and asserts the pg_prepared_statements counters, so a literal EXPLAIN can no longer stand in for a generic plan. Both modes pass locally on Postgres 16.15, the dedup suite (canonical survivor, quarantine withholding, empty input) is green, and the stray escapes in the dedup doc comment are gone. CI is green on this head.

Not an ask, recorded only: the discarded-rows bound sums Rows Removed by Filter but not its siblings Rows Removed by Join Filter and Rows Removed by Index Recheck, and nothing asserts the plan carries ANALYZE instrumentation, so an edit that dropped ANALYZE would quietly reduce the guard to a node-type check. Two more field names and a presence assert would close it whenever the file is next touched. Also recorded, also not an ask: create_task still returns e.to_string() on a db failure while the sibling write handlers in this module now go through the opaque AppError envelope; worth the same treatment whenever the write path is next touched.

jatmn

LGTM

Bound repository access in list_repos_deduped_by_ids to requested groups via idx_repos_owner_key_name, leaving dedup_cte unscoped. Strictly validate MCP task_list cursor argument before network dispatch. Refs Twigpine#396

Measure discarded rows and verify actual custom and generic prepared-plan counters, including the previous full-index-scan regression. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

Restore readable root-path notation in the deduplicated listing documentation. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

Bound repository access in list_repos_deduped_by_ids to requested groups via idx_repos_owner_key_name, leaving dedup_cte unscoped. Strictly validate MCP task_list cursor argument before network dispatch. Refs Twigpine#396

Measure discarded rows and verify actual custom and generic prepared-plan counters, including the previous full-index-scan regression. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

Restore readable root-path notation in the deduplicated listing documentation. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

* fix(node): gate agent-task reads behind the same visibility rules as repo data list_tasks and get_task had no authorization at all: any anonymous caller could enumerate every task on the node, including another party's repo-less task, its ucan_token, and its payload (Twigpine#268). Add task_visible, mirroring the repo read-visibility gate already used by the ref-updates feed: the delegator and assignee can always read their own task, a repo-scoped task follows that repo's normal visibility rules, and a task naming no repo (or a repo this node doesn't host) is visible only to its delegator/assignee. Both REST and GraphQL now route through the same collect_visible_tasks/get_visible_task collectors so the two surfaces cannot drift, and neither read path echoes ucan_token back, since the holder already received it via the create/claim response. Fixes Twigpine#268 * fix(node): query the task limit-clamp test as the delegator tasks_limit_ceiling_clamped_to_200 seeded 201 repo-less tasks and read them back anonymously, expecting all 200. That read is exactly the enumeration Twigpine#268 closes, so the new visibility gate correctly returns none of them and the test went red. The clamp ceiling is what this test pins, not the gate, so query as the tasks' delegator, who can legitimately see all 201 rows. Refs Twigpine#268 * fix(node): scope task visibility lookups to the page's repos collect_visible_tasks loaded every repo on the node and every visibility rule in order to gate at most 200 tasks, so an anonymous request paid for the whole node's repo and rule set. Narrow both lookups to the repo ids the fetched page actually names, and skip them when no task names a repo. The deduped repo snapshot stays the source of truth for resolving a repo_id: it collapses mirror and canonical pairs and omits quarantined repos, and an id missing from it has to keep failing closed. Resolving ids straight from the repos table would surface exactly those withheld rows. Add GraphQL denial tests as well. Nothing pinned that the task resolvers delegate to the shared collectors, so a resolver that queried the database directly would not have gone red. Refs Twigpine#268 * Preserve authorized task reads across shipped clients. Refs Twigpine#268 * Bound denied task history scans. Refs Twigpine#268 * Signal incomplete task scans with recoverable cursors and map read errors to AppError. Refs Twigpine#268 * Stop disclosing denied task rows in the scan-wall cursor and add GraphQL pagination state. Refs Twigpine#268 * Normalize task cursors and gate mutation endpoints behind visibility. Canonicalize RFC 3339 timestamps in parse_after_cursor to handle URL-decoded spaces, reject mixed cursor alias families, gate complete_task and fail_task behind get_visible_task so unreadable tasks 404 instead of leaking existence with 403, and only flag incomplete when hitting candidate ceilings on full SQL batches. Refs Twigpine#268 * Update complete_task test in test_support to exercise both 404 on unreadable and 403 on non-assignee tasks. Refs Twigpine#268 * Bind task to repo id in complete_task test in test_support. Refs Twigpine#268 * Preserve timestamp fractional width and anchor continuation tests on legitimate cursors. Refs Twigpine#268 * Match on Value::Object to extract task ID in GraphQL continuation test. Refs Twigpine#268 * Remove unused mut binding on visible_newer in GraphQL query test. Refs Twigpine#268 * Hide unauthorized claim and keep assigned tasks from being stolen Gate REST and GraphQL claim behind the same visibility check as complete and fail, refuse claim when another assignee already holds the task, and only broadcast publicly visible task events. Treat a full list page as incomplete when more candidates remain. Surface HTTP errors from CLI and MCP claim and complete helpers. Refs Twigpine#327 Co-Authored-By: cairn-code <cairn-code@users.noreply.github.com> * Keep task-list incomplete for the scan ceiling only. A full visible page was flagged incomplete whenever the SQL batch was full, so the first page of any list with more than 200 candidates looked stalled. Align the GraphQL claim test with the visibility gate's not-found message. Refs Twigpine#268 * fix(node): pin claim guards and map mutation errors through AppError Review required tests that go red if the pre-assigned claim predicate or the anonymous announce gate is deleted, and incomplete must not stay true when the candidate stream is exhausted at the scan ceiling. Route claim, complete, and fail through AppError so closed-pool outages stay 503 and 404s match the read envelope. Refs Twigpine#268 * fix(node): match bare and did:key assignee forms in claim and list create_task stores the supplied assignee unchanged, so a raw SQL equality check drops a designated assignee who presents the other did:key form. Compare the normalized key so claim and filtered list agree with did_matches. Refs Twigpine#268 * fix(node): check task creation status and add assignee expression index - Add error_for_status() to cmd_create and task_create MCP tool - Update test_create_task_server_error to assert failure on 500 - Add migration v18 creating expression index idx_agent_tasks_assignee_key matching ASSIGNEE_DID_CASE_SQL - Add did:web:z6Mkfoo single-residual shape to parity boundary matrix Refs Twigpine#327 # Conflicts: # crates/gitlawb-node/src/db/mod.rs * fix(node)!: Replace task cursors with opaque continuation tokens The task read path treated visibility, pagination, and error vocabulary as separate edits, so each one broke where they met. Rework them as one contract. A raw (created_at, id) cursor forced a choice between two broken options: it could name the last visible row, and then a denied window longer than the 1,000-candidate scan budget was unpageable forever; or it could name the last examined row, and then a denied read leaked the id and timestamp of a task GET /tasks/{id} otherwise 404s. Continuation tokens remove the choice. They carry the last examined candidate, so paging always advances a full scan budget per request, and they are encrypted and authenticated under a node-derived key, so the caller learns nothing from one and cannot forge one naming a row of their choosing. Encryption is a synthetic-IV construction over the hmac/sha2 pair already used for webhook signatures, so it adds no dependency and needs no randomness source. Making the token the only accepted cursor also gives the ordering key one domain. agent_tasks.created_at is TEXT and compared as TEXT, so a caller-typed '...Z' and '...+00:00' denote one instant but sort differently, and a client could silently skip or repeat same-time rows. The token carries the stored string verbatim, so the value compared is always one the server wrote. The raw after_*/cursor_* pairs are removed rather than kept alongside it, since a second domain is the bug. Separate the two facts the old single incomplete flag conflated: has_more says candidates remain, incomplete says this page is short only because the authorization scan hit its ceiling. Both REST and GraphQL now return has_more, incomplete, and next_cursor from the shared collector, and REST echoes the limit it actually applied so a clamped request is visible as clamped. Have gl task list and MCP task_list follow next_cursor instead of issuing one request: --limit 500 returned a successful but silently truncated 200 rows. Following is bounded by a page cap and a no-progress guard, and a run stopped by either reports an explicit incomplete result with a resume cursor. Route claimTask, completeTask, and failTask through the same task_write_conflict classifier the REST handlers use, via curated helpers in the graphql module so the map_err source guard still holds. A claim race or stale finish reached GraphQL clients as a generic database error while REST clients got an actionable conflict; genuine sqlx faults stay opaque on both. Refs Twigpine#327 * fix(node): End the candidate stream only after the batch is examined A short SQL batch means no rows exist past it, not that every row in it was examined. When the page filled mid-batch the collector treated the two as the same, marked the stream ended, and suppressed the continuation, so every row after the one that filled the page was unreachable. The equal-timestamp paging tests caught it: three rows with a limit of one returned only the first. Track how much of each batch was consumed and end the stream only when the whole of a short batch has been examined. Otherwise leave `has_more` to the probe row, which resumes from the last examined candidate. Refs Twigpine#327 * fix(gl): Reject a non-positive task-list limit and fault the write under test A `--limit 0` reached the node, which clamped it to zero and answered with an empty page marked complete, so an invalid request read as proof that no tasks exist. Reject a non-positive limit in `fetch_tasks()`, the helper the CLI and MCP share, so the guard cannot drift between the two surfaces. `task_write_sql_faults_stay_opaque` did not exercise what it named. Dropping `updated_at` also broke the SELECT in `get_task()`, so the fault surfaced from the `get_visible_task()` pre-check through `graphql_app_err` and never reached `graphql_claim_conflict`. A `BEFORE UPDATE` trigger keeps every read valid and faults only inside `Db::claim_task`, and the test now also asserts that a write-time fault is not reclassified as a claim race. Refs Twigpine#268 * fix(node): Bind task cursors to the caller and brake the task read routes A continuation token names the last candidate a scan examined, not the last row it returned, so it encodes how far that scan got under one caller's visibility. The MAC bound the page filter but not the presenting identity, so resuming a token as a different caller started the scan past rows that caller was entitled to read and dropped them from the answer with nothing to signal the loss. Bind the caller's normalized DID into the MAC, with anonymous flagged absent rather than encoded as empty. Normalization goes through normalize_owner_key so the two spellings of one did:key identity bind identically, matching did_matches on the read path: a caller who presents the other form of their own DID keeps their own page. A mismatched token renders the existing single rejection message, so this adds no oracle. GET /api/v1/tasks and GET /api/v1/tasks/{id} are anonymously reachable, and the visibility gate costs a task lookup plus deduped-repo and visibility-rule queries before it can return the opaque 404. An unauthenticated prober therefore pays nothing while the node pays per request, whether or not the id exists. Attach the per-IP limiter already used on /ipfs/{cid}, configurable through GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT and swept by the periodic task like every other per-key limiter. Refs Twigpine#268 * fix(node): Brake anonymous GraphQL task reads on the same per-IP bucket The per-IP brake added for the task read routes covered only /api/v1/tasks*, so an anonymous caller reached the same collect_visible_tasks and get_visible_task gate over /graphql with no bucket at all. The fence had an open lane beside it. Carry the brake as GraphQL request data and debit it in the tasks and task resolvers rather than layering rate_limit_by_ip onto the GraphQL router: /graphql is one endpoint for every operation, so a router layer would charge unrelated queries and every mutation against the task-read bucket. Debiting per resolved field also prices an aliased query honestly, since ten aliased tasks fields run the gate ten times. Extract RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE so the GraphQL surface, which cannot return a 429 status inside a 200 envelope, refuses with the same text the REST routes use. /graphql/ws serves the query root as well and stays unbraked; closing it needs a WebSocketUpgrade handler and is left for a follow-up. Refs Twigpine#268 Refs Twigpine#327 * fix(gl,node): parse typed task pages, track cursor cycles, and normalize assignee filter MAC * fix(node): Cap aliased GraphQL task reads per request and derive has_more from visible rows - Cap aliased GraphQL task read fields per request using an atomic counter on TaskReadBrake (MAX_GRAPHQL_TASK_READS_PER_REQUEST = 5). - Derive has_more in collect_visible_tasks by scanning for bounded_limit + 1 visible rows, eliminating the un-gated keyset probe that could leak the presence of trailing denied tasks. - Add regression tests covering aliased GraphQL capping and trailing denied task has_more privacy. Refs Twigpine#327 * fix(node): Check database continuation when scan budget ends on exact batch boundary When candidate scanning reaches MAX_TASK_SCAN_CANDIDATES without finding a target_visible row and the final batch was full, probe the database for rows beyond the scan position so an exhausted candidate stream is not erroneously marked incomplete. Refs Twigpine#327 * fix(node): Document and pin the bound on the task scan-ceiling probe The scan-ceiling branch of collect_visible_tasks settles has_more with an un-gated LIMIT 1 probe, so a caller can learn whether any row - readable or not - trails the position the scan stopped at. Withholding the probe does not remove that bit: enumeration past a denied window longer than one scan budget requires handing back a continuation, and following that continuation returns the same terminal page one round trip later. State what the probe discloses (one bit, only at server-chosen positions a full scan budget apart, reachable only through a MAC'd cursor, never a denied row's id, payload or ucan_token) and pin it end to end. Also correct the comment above the branch, which claimed has_more never comes from an un-gated probe while the code below it did exactly that. Refs Twigpine#327 * Index task keyset pages so the scan ceiling bounds database work. Optional IS NULL predicates kept the planner from using a created_at/id order, so every list_tasks_keyset batch could sort a growing match set before LIMIT. Dedicated per-domain SQL plus v28 indexes make the candidate ceiling a database bound. Refs Twigpine#327 * Reject oversized task pages so list never returns more than the requested limit. fetch_tasks asked for the remaining total, then appended every row on a valid-shaped page. A remote that sent more tasks than want could make gl and MCP expose more than --limit. Treat that page as protocol-invalid before any extra row is kept. Refs Twigpine#327 * Enforce task page limits on legacy responses and drop redundant single-column indexes. Refs Twigpine#327 * Address review feedback on task-read authorization gating and client safety. - Wire TaskReadBrake into /graphql/ws subscriptions and verify per-request field caps and per-IP rate limiting over WebSocket connections. - Define open-claim eligibility separately from read visibility so unassigned tasks on readable/unscoped domains can be claimed without making task bodies enumerable. - Propagate identity errors on explicit key directories in CLI and MCP instead of silently falling back to anonymous mode. - Enforce response byte limits before deserializing task pages, validate row schema and page-local uniqueness before row commit, and sanitize continuation cursors in terminal diagnostics. - Add GraphQL denial assertions for repo-less tasks and token isolation. Refs Twigpine#268 Refs Twigpine#327 * Address review feedback on task-read authorization gating, WebSocket budgets, and test framing. Refs Twigpine#395 * Address review feedback on quarantined task claims, WebSocket auth, and MCP limit parsing. Refs Twigpine#395 * Reject forged signatures during WebSocket authentication upgrade. Refs Twigpine#395 * Accumulate forged WebSocket handshake response until headers terminate. Refs Twigpine#395 * Withhold quarantined-repo tasks on all read surfaces before party checks. Refs Twigpine#395 * docs: Align task-read documentation with enforced visibility and rate limits. Refs Twigpine#395 * docs: Distinguish task list and get behavior in rate-limit guidance. Refs Twigpine#395 * fix(node): Batch task quarantine checks to bound read costs. Refs Twigpine#395 * docs(node): clarify the shared task-read budget Document that GraphQL task queries over HTTP and WebSocket debit the same per-IP hourly budget as REST task reads. Refs Twigpine#395 * fix(node,gl): bound scoped repo lookup and validate MCP cursor Bound repository access in list_repos_deduped_by_ids to requested groups via idx_repos_owner_key_name, leaving dedup_cte unscoped. Strictly validate MCP task_list cursor argument before network dispatch. Refs Twigpine#396 * test(db): verify scoped lookup work in prepared plans Measure discarded rows and verify actual custom and generic prepared-plan counters, including the previous full-index-scan regression. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396 * docs(db): remove stray dedup comment escapes Restore readable root-path notation in the deduplicated listing documentation. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396 * fix(node): address Twigpine#464 review findings - Hold migration 27/28 numbering: reservation comment now names the competing Twigpine#384 range (27-35) and states the numbering is on hold pending Twigpine#384. No renumber. - Restore crates/gl/src/identity.rs to LF endings so the diff shows only the added load_optional_keypair function. - Drop the dead single-column idx_agent_tasks_assignee_key build from v27 (v28 builds the keyset-ordered variants directly); adjust the v27 test to assert the raw index is dropped and the expression index is never built. - Align task_claimable with claim_task's conditional write: drop the delegator short-circuit and correct the docstring. - Pin error_for_status on the gl task list path with a 403 mock that serves a well-formed empty page, so the test goes red if the call is removed. * test(node): pin the delegator deny on a pre-assigned claim - Add claim_task_delegator_cannot_claim_preassigned_task: pins opaque 404 for delegator claiming a pre-assigned task (regression guard for P2) - Fix test_list_tasks_server_error_surfaces regex: /api/v1/tasks\? -> /api/v1/tasks\? (escaped ? for literal question mark) - Assert actual reqwest StatusCode::FORBIDDEN instead of matching "403" in error string (avoids spurious pass from random mock port) * test(node): exercise streamed byte-budget guard with chunked body Use with_chunked_body instead of with_body so mockito sends no Content-Length, pinning the no-length streamed accumulation guard. Assert the "exceeded" message to distinguish from the declared-length check. * fix(node): pin declared-length byte-budget arm in oversized content-length test Addresses beardthelion review finding (2026-09-26): test_read_task_page_json_oversized_content_length now asserts on the "(declared" arm the way the chunked twin asserts "(exceeded", so the Content-Length pre-check at crates/gl/src/task.rs:211 is genuinely pinned. Verified the pin by neutering the pre-check (test goes red), then restored. fmt clean. * fix(node): fail closed on claim for unresolvable repo task_claimable returned true for an unassigned task whose repo_id is slash-form (mirror row) or names a repo this node does not host, while task_visible fails closed on the same rows. A signed stranger could claim such a task even though reads 404. Return false for a Some(repo_id) the node cannot resolve to a locally-hosted repo, matching task_visible's fail-closed check; keep the None arm open (repo-less tasks claimable by design). Adds a regression test asserting a stranger's claim 404s and leaves the assignee unchanged for both row classes. * fix(node): pad sealed task cursor to fixed width The scan-ceiling token seals the last examined row's (created_at, id) as variable-length JSON under a length-preserving keystream, so token length leaked the withheld row's field widths: a 32-char to_rfc3339() rendering mints a 148-char token where a 35-char one mints 161 chars. Pad the serialized payload with trailing JSON whitespace to a fixed 128-byte bucket before the SIV tag is computed; decode tolerates the padding (serde_json ignores trailing whitespace) and tokens minted before this change still verify. REST and GraphQL share task_cursor::encode, so one fix covers both. Adds token_length_does_not_vary_with_position_width: asserts identical token length across narrow/wide timestamp positions and that the padded token still decodes to the exact stored position. * fix(node): address beardthelion round-six P3 findings on task cursor - Pin the encode docstring compat claim: add unpadded_legacy_token_still_verifies test minting a token via the pre-padding recipe (siv + apply_keystream with no padding) and asserting decode returns the position. - Pin the PAYLOAD_BUCKET round-up claim: add oversized_payload_rounds_up_to_next_bucket test with a 140-char id crossing the 128-byte bucket, asserting round-trip at two buckets. - Correct timestamp-width figures: to_rfc3339() renders 25 chars with no fractional seconds (not 32); 32 is the microsecond width. * fix(node): address beardthelion round-seven P3 findings on task cursor - Correct wire-form docstring to v1.<iv>.<body> - Fix payload width figures: 101 bytes total, to_rfc3339() precision ladder - Tighten oversized-payload test to assert exactly 2*PAYLOAD_BUCKET - Pin legacy back-compat test with a frozen v1 token fixture * test(node): address beardthelion round-eight P3 findings on task cursor - Pin the one-bucket width: round_trips_position_verbatim now asserts the decoded body of a normal token is exactly PAYLOAD_BUCKET, catching a pad that skips next-multiple or a drifted bucket constant. Every other width assertion here is bucket-relative, so only an absolute check goes red. - Assert the frozen fixture is the unpadded shape: unpadded_legacy_token_still_verifies decodes the body segment and asserts raw.len() < PAYLOAD_BUCKET, so a literal re-minted under the padded recipe would retire the back-compat pin loudly instead of passing silently. - Narrow the recipe-pin claim: the docstring now names what the frozen literal actually binds (domains, MAC input, keystream, segment layout, field names) instead of claiming padding and serialization changes break the test. The padding-width claim stays with oversized_payload_rounds_up_to_next_bucket. * fix(node): trim stored assignee on every task gate; align SECURITY.md task-read wording * test(node): pin mirror-row list-vs-get asymmetry; fix plan-test bind (Twigpine#553) - EXPLAIN helper binds normalize_owner_key(assignee) to match the production list_tasks_keyset bind. - Pin the deliberate asymmetry jatmn asked about: a delegator sees a slash-form (mirror-hosted) task in a list, while get fails closed for every caller because the row has no local repo backing. Notes in get_visible_task and a regression test keep it from drifting. - Repair test-mod drift from the main merge: build_schema gains its TaskCursorKey arg at three sites and list_tasks calls move to list_tasks_keyset. * test(node): reconcile tasks complexity contract with TaskPageType (Twigpine#553) The four GraphQL task/brake tests failed on this branch: contract tests still queried the flat tasks { id } shape that TaskPageType replaced, and the alias-brake tests ran default-size lists whose six aliases exceed GRAPHQL_MAX_COMPLEXITY before the brake can debit. - Contract tests now select through items { ... } with refreshed cost arithmetic. - Brake tests use tasks(limit: 1), keeping six aliases under the budget so the 6th field reaches TaskReadBrake and fails RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE. Complexity stays the outer gate (Twigpine#552); the brake stays the per-request field-count gate. * docs: note mirror-hosted task list-vs-get asymmetry (Twigpine#553) Option 3 for slash-form mirror repo_id rows was pinned in code and test at 6c0926d; this adds the operator-facing half jatmn asked for. README and SECURITY task-read bullets now state that mirror rows list for party readers while get-by-id and GraphQL task fail closed for all callers. * ci: retrigger codeql scan after alert 86 dismissal --------- Co-authored-by: euxarist <25621994+euxarist@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cairn-code <cairn-code@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: cairn-intern <cairn-intern@users.noreply.github.com> Co-authored-by: Marlowe <321669285+cairn-intern@users.noreply.github.com>

euxaristia and others added 30 commits August 31, 2026 04:03

Preserve authorized task reads across shipped clients.

c765498

Refs Twigpine#268

Bound denied task history scans.

b26db4b

Refs Twigpine#268

Signal incomplete task scans with recoverable cursors and map read er…

e3b1372

…rors to AppError. Refs Twigpine#268

Stop disclosing denied task rows in the scan-wall cursor and add Grap…

d43829b

…hQL pagination state. Refs Twigpine#268

Update complete_task test in test_support to exercise both 404 on unr…

b1ddf9d

…eadable and 403 on non-assignee tasks. Refs Twigpine#268

Bind task to repo id in complete_task test in test_support.

15d5748

Refs Twigpine#268

Preserve timestamp fractional width and anchor continuation tests on …

70b2509

…legitimate cursors. Refs Twigpine#268

Match on Value::Object to extract task ID in GraphQL continuation test.

1029cdb

Refs Twigpine#268

Remove unused mut binding on visible_newer in GraphQL query test.

1ed73ae

Refs Twigpine#268

fix(gl,node): parse typed task pages, track cursor cycles, and normal…

94605f8

…ize assignee filter MAC

Enforce task page limits on legacy responses and drop redundant singl…

eccaf90

…e-column indexes. Refs Twigpine#327

beardthelion mentioned this pull request Sep 6, 2026

Fix #399: GET /api/v1/tasks: clamp limit to match siblings; negative limit returns 500 with raw DB error #405

Closed

docs: Align task-read documentation with enforced visibility and rate…

41fef3a

… limits. Refs Twigpine#395

coderabbitai Bot reviewed Sep 7, 2026

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Comment thread .env.example Resolved

docs: Distinguish task list and get behavior in rate-limit guidance.

d9aded2

Refs Twigpine#395

beardthelion requested changes Sep 7, 2026

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jatmn requested changes Sep 7, 2026

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fix(node): Batch task quarantine checks to bound read costs.

ab054fb

Refs Twigpine#395

jatmn requested changes Sep 9, 2026

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docs(node): clarify the shared task-read budget

80ba7a3

Document that GraphQL task queries over HTTP and WebSocket debit the same per-IP hourly budget as REST task reads. Refs Twigpine#395

beardthelion requested changes Sep 9, 2026

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jatmn requested changes Sep 9, 2026

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fix(node,gl): bound scoped repo lookup and validate MCP cursor

a0ea4c7

Bound repository access in list_repos_deduped_by_ids to requested groups via idx_repos_owner_key_name, leaving dedup_cte unscoped. Strictly validate MCP task_list cursor argument before network dispatch. Refs Twigpine#396

jatmn approved these changes Sep 10, 2026

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beardthelion requested changes Sep 11, 2026

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beardthelion mentioned this pull request Sep 11, 2026

fix(node): bound GraphQL query cost #408

Closed

euxaristia added 2 commits September 12, 2026 02:27

test(db): verify scoped lookup work in prepared plans

35652da

Measure discarded rows and verify actual custom and generic prepared-plan counters, including the previous full-index-scan regression. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

docs(db): remove stray dedup comment escapes

b360f3f

Restore readable root-path notation in the deduplicated listing documentation. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

beardthelion approved these changes Sep 12, 2026

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jatmn approved these changes Sep 12, 2026

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euxarist closed this Sep 20, 2026

cairn-intern mentioned this pull request Sep 24, 2026

fix(node)!: Gate agent-task reads behind visibility rules #464

Closed

jatmn pushed a commit to cairn-intern/node that referenced this pull request Nov 4, 2026

docs(db): remove stray dedup comment escapes

0ddcdfd

Restore readable root-path notation in the deduplicated listing documentation. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

cairn-intern pushed a commit to cairn-intern/node that referenced this pull request Nov 7, 2026

docs(db): remove stray dedup comment escapes

29fbec5

Restore readable root-path notation in the deduplicated listing documentation. Fixup for a0ea4c7. Refs Twigpine#396

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fix(node)!: Gate agent-task reads behind visibility rules - #396

fix(node)!: Gate agent-task reads behind visibility rules#396
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[P2] Batch the quarantine check in collect_visible_tasks

[P3] Complete the operator contract for GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT

[P3] Fix stale /graphql/ws mounting comment in subscription.rs

Close-out — do not expand scope

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[P3] Complete the previously requested shared-budget sentence in AppState

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[P2] Bound the repository work performed by the scoped task lookup

[P3] Reject a present non-string MCP cursor before issuing a request

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euxarist commented Sep 4, 2026 •

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[P2] Batch the quarantine check in `collect_visible_tasks`

[P3] Complete the operator contract for `GITLAWB_TASK_READ_RATE_LIMIT`

[P3] Fix stale `/graphql/ws` mounting comment in `subscription.rs`