test(node): invariant deny-prober (driven registry + completeness cross-check) by beardthelion · Pull Request #195 · Twigpine/node

beardthelion · 2026-07-13T01:34:30Z

Stacks on #194 (base feat/real-node-deny-harness), reusing its real-node spawn rig and RFC-9421 signing client. Review after #194.

This turns the hand-written deny cases into a driven registry: one declarative table of every route that carries a runtime deny, and a sweep that boots a real node and drives each one hostile-then-authorized.

What's here

Registry (tests/support/routes.rs): every deny-bearing route as a row (owner-gate 403, read-gate 404, signature 401), each classified by reading its handler, not the route name. 12 owner-gate + 1 signature + 14 repo-scoped read rows.
Probe generator (tests/support/probe.rs): a two-repo fixture (public owner-gate substrate, private read-gate substrate, plus a seeded PR and issue so the author-or-owner close gates are reached rather than 404'd on an absent entity) and probes_for, which expands each row into the hostile request plus a positive twin so a deny for the wrong reason cannot false-pass.
Runtime sweep (deny_bearing_registry_...): walks the registry against a real node. Hostile probe must return the exact deny and leak nothing; owner-gate twins must reach the handler (not 403); read twins must return a non-empty 2xx (an empty 2xx is a denial rendered as success). A terminal invariant asserts one hostile probe per row was actually driven, so the sweep can't pass by testing nothing.
Completeness cross-check (completeness::..., no DB): a source scrape of server.rs (multiline .route parser, floor 90) that keeps the registry honest: no row points at a route that no longer mounts, and no handler carrying an owner-gate marker escapes the registry. Complements the in-crate authz_guard egress guard (which proves handlers are gated) by proving the deny-bearing ones are actually driven, and reaches the non-API git mounts it never sees.

Verification

Every deny class was mutation-verified load-bearing, RED-then-GREEN by execution: breaking did_matches drove the owner-gate hostile to 500 and, inverted, drove the owner twin to 403; neutering authorize_repo_read drove the read hostile to 200 and, as always-deny, the read twin to 404; the signature assertion was isolated at git-receive-pack; both completeness floors and both drift guards were tripped and named their target. All reverted. 22 harness tests green.

CI already runs this file on every PR (the --features test-harness --test deny_harness step added in #194), so U3 and U4 run there with no config change.

…anches) Foundation for the invariant deny-prober (plan 002): a declarative registry of ONLY the routes that carry a runtime deny (owner-gate 403 / read-gate 404 / signature 401), each classified by reading its handler and recording the fn name. Owner-gate (12 rows: merge/close_pr, close_issue, webhooks, labels, protect, visibility set/remove/list incl the GET-is-403 correction) and signature-required (git-receive-pack) tranches are verified; read-gate tranche stubbed with a TODO (per-handler 404-vs-filter verification pending). A consistency self-test asserts no dup method+path, every row names its handler, and every read-gate row carries a positive-twin Reach. Decoupled from the #194 primitives (U1 uses none), so classification is not hostage to harness churn.

Two-repo fixture (public owner-gate substrate + private read-gate substrate) plus probes_for(): each deny-bearing row expands to a hostile probe asserting the exact deny status and a positive twin (owner-reachability for owner-gate, authorized read for read-gate) so a deny for the wrong reason cannot false-pass. Three self-checks cover the owner-gate, read-gate, and signature classes.

Each row's handler was read to confirm it gates on "/" via authorize_repo_read / visibility_check and returns RepoNotFound (404) to a non-reader of a private repo, with the owner re-read as the ReaderReads positive twin. Sub-entity gets (get_issue/get_pr/get_cert/get_bounty and the comment/review lists) are deferred to the fixture expansion that seeds them; global list-filter surfaces and the KNOWN_UNGATED reads are excluded with reasons. Runtime behavior is asserted by U3.

Boots a real node, seeds the two-repo fixture (plus a PR and an issue so the author-or-owner close gates are reached, not 404'd on an absent entity), then walks every deny-bearing route: the hostile probe must return the exact deny status and leak nothing, and the positive twin must reach the handler (owner: not 403; read: 2xx). A terminal invariant asserts one hostile probe per row was driven and the count equals the registry, so a row that produced no probe fails loud rather than passing vacuously. Adds seed_pr/seed_issue to TestNode. Mutation-verified load-bearing: breaking did_matches drove the merge_pr owner-gate hostile to 500 (RED, named); neutering authorize_repo_read's deny drove the get_repo read-gate hostile to 200 (RED, named); both reverted green.

A pure source scrape of server.rs (multiline .route parser, floor 90) that the runtime sweep cannot give: no deny-bearing row points at a route that no longer mounts (anti-stale), and no handler carrying an unambiguous owner-gate marker (require_repo_owner / require_owner) escapes the registry (orphan). The api dir is read at test time so a new module is covered. Complements authz_guard (which proves handlers are gated) by proving the deny-bearing ones are actually driven, and reaches the non-API git mounts authz_guard never sees. Mutation-verified: a bogus row path tripped anti-stale (named the row); removing the merge_pr row tripped the orphan guard (named merge_pr); both reverted green.

Vetting the harness against itself surfaced branches that ran green but were never exercised adversarially: - Ok2xx twin dropped its unused token Option; the arm now asserts the authorized read returns a NON-EMPTY 2xx, so an empty-200 denial-rendered-as-success is caught (executed by every read twin). - U4 orphan guard gains a floor on the owner-marker scan (>=6), so a marker-scan regression to zero fails loud instead of passing by checking nothing. - Added probe unit tests that execute the previously-uncovered probes_for arms: the SiblingPublic path-scoped twin, and the Reach::None fail-loud panic. All 22 harness tests green. Every send_probe/probes_for branch is now executed; the Deny(401), Not403, and Ok2xx-status arms were additionally mutation-verified RED (signature-expect flip; did_matches->false; authorize_repo_read->deny) and both U4 floors RED via threshold flips, all reverted.

coderabbitai · 2026-07-13T01:34:37Z

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jatmn

I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.

Findings

[P2] Cover the deferred read-gate routes in the completeness invariant
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/support/routes.rs:351
The registry explicitly leaves out get_issue, get_pr, PR diff/review/comment reads, get_cert, get_bounty, get_encrypted_blob, and path-scoped get_tree, although these handlers return the same 404 authorization denial before looking up their entities. U3 only drives registry rows, and U4 checks mounted rows plus owner-gate markers only, so removing or bypassing authorize_repo_read on any of these endpoints leaves the new real-node sweep green. Seed the required entities and include the routes (with positive twins), or make the completeness check derive and require every mounted read-denying handler.
[P2] Assert that hostile registry responses do not expose the private fixture data
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/deny_harness.rs:507
Every hostile probe calls assert_denied with an empty withheld-token list. That verifies only the status: a 403/404 body containing the private blob content, object ID, or repository metadata would pass even though this sweep claims the denial "leak[s] nothing." Carry the relevant private fixture tokens on the probes/rows and pass them to assert_denied for the affected read routes.
[P2] Do not let inline owner gates bypass the registry drift check
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/deny_harness.rs:788
The orphan scan deliberately looks only for require_repo_owner(/require_owner( and excludes did_matches, but existing owner-only handlers such as protect_branch and unprotect_branch use the latter idiom. A future mounted owner-only handler using that established pattern can be omitted from deny_bearing_routes() while U4 still passes, so the advertised completeness guard does not keep the owner-gate registry complete. Extend the classifier to recognize the owner-specific inline pattern (or otherwise tie mounted owner routes to the registry) rather than excluding that gate class.

…#195) jatmn's review flagged three ways the prober's self-guards stay green when the protection they check is removed: - F1: the U4 completeness check enforced owner-gate orphans but not read-gate ones, so dropping authorize_repo_read on get_issue/get_cert/ get_bounty/etc. left the sweep green. Add a symmetric read-gate orphan guard that scans src/api for authorize_repo_read/visibility_check handlers and requires each to be a driven ReadGate row or an enumerated READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN entry with a reason, replacing the free-text prose. A staleness check keeps the allowlist from carrying dead exemptions. - F2: the U3 registry sweep called assert_denied with an empty withheld list, proving status only. Seed the private fixture with a distinctive secret and its blob OID, carry them on the read-gate hostile probes, and pass them through so a denial body echoing withheld data fails. - F3: the owner-gate orphan scan matched only require_owner/require_repo_owner and missed the inline did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) idiom that protect_branch/unprotect_branch use. Fold in a has_owner_did_matches discriminator that catches the owner form without false-matching the signer-self (register_replica) or author (close_pr) did_matches forms, pinned by unit tests on the exact bodies.

beardthelion · 2026-07-13T12:51:13Z

All three fixed; each guard now goes red when the protection it checks is removed.

Read-gate orphans — added a read-gate orphan guard symmetric to the owner one: it scans src/api for every authorize_repo_read / visibility_check handler and requires each to be either a driven ReadGate row or an enumerated READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN entry with a reason, replacing the free-text DEFERRED/EXCLUDED prose as the single source of truth. Deleting a driven row (get_repo) or an allowlist entry (get_cert) both fail it, and a staleness check rejects a dead exemption. The scan surfaced three repo-root reads the prose had missed (get_star_status, get_icaptcha_proof, replicate_encrypted_blobs), now allowlisted with a reason rather than silently dropped.

Sweep leak assertion — the private fixture now seeds a distinctive secret and captures its blob OID; the read-gate hostile probes carry those tokens into assert_denied (was &[]), so a 404/403 body echoing withheld content or the OID fails. Owner-gate (403) and signature (401) probes fire on NO_ENTITY repos before any entity lookup, so they keep an honest empty list.

Owner did_matches idiom — the owner-orphan scan now folds in has_owner_did_matches, matching the inline did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) form protect_branch / unprotect_branch use, without matching the signer-self (register_replica) or author (close_pr) forms — pinned by unit tests on the exact bodies. Removing the protect_branch row now fails where it passed before.

jatmn

I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.

Findings

[P2] Exercise read denial for a signed non-reader
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/support/probe.rs:185
Every ReadGate hostile probe is anonymous, although the fixture also creates a signed stranger. This leaves the signed-non-reader branch of every private read untested: a regression that keeps anonymous callers at 404 but treats any valid HTTP signature as authorized exposes private repositories while the registry sweep remains green. Generate a Signer::Stranger 404/no-leak hostile probe for each read row (and adjust the hostile-count invariant accordingly).
[P2] Do not exempt probeable private root reads from the runtime sweep
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/deny_harness.rs:1082
get_star_status, get_icaptcha_proof, and replicate_encrypted_blobs are allowlisted despite needing no additional fixture entity. The new guard only proves that their functions retain an authorize_repo_read(/visibility_check( marker; it never drives a request. Consequently an early return or conditional bypass that leaves the marker in the body can leak private-repo metadata while every new test passes. Add these as ReadGate rows with hostile and authorized probes rather than treating them as a source-only exemption.
[P2] Keep the protected-push owner gate under a real probe
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/deny_harness.rs:929
The owner-marker scan recognizes the did_matches(&auth.0, &record.owner_did) check in git_receive_pack, then removes that handler because its registry row only tests the unsigned 401 path. A signed stranger pushing to a protected branch therefore never reaches a test; deleting or inverting the 403 at src/api/repos.rs:897-923 leaves both the sweep and completeness checks green. Add a signed-stranger protected-branch push probe with an owner control, or keep this gate in the completeness invariant until it is driven.
[P2] Withhold private repository metadata in the denial-body assertion
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/support/probe.rs:199
The leak assertion carries only the private blob content and its object ID. Fixture::seed discards the private repository record/ID, so a 404 that serializes the private record's internal UUID or visibility metadata still passes assert_denied. That leaves the repository-metadata portion of the earlier no-leak request unverified. Preserve distinctive private repository metadata in the fixture, include it in the hostile probes' withheld tokens, and add the corresponding synthetic leaking-body check.

Resolves jatmn's four INV-21 completeness findings — guards that were green but not load-bearing: F1: every ReadGate hostile probe was anonymous, so the signed-non-reader branch of each private read was untested — a regression treating any valid signature as authorized would leak while the sweep stayed green. Add a Signer::Stranger 404/ no-leak probe per read row, with a dedicated readgate_stranger counter so a dropped probe fails loudly. RED: authorize any signed caller -> the stranger probe leaks (200) while the anon probe stays green. F2: get_star_status, get_icaptcha_proof, and replicate_encrypted_blobs were source-only exemptions (a marker scan, never driven). Drive them as real ReadGate rows and remove the allowlist entries. RED: a runtime bypass that keeps the authorize_repo_read marker leaks -> the driven probe RED, the source scan green. F3: git_receive_pack's protected-branch owner 403 was never driven (its registry row is the unsigned-401 path). Add signed_stranger_protected_branch_push_is_forbidden (a signed non-owner push to a protected branch -> 403, owner control -> not-403), plus a seed_protected_branch harness helper. RED: invert the gate -> the probe RED. F4: the read-gate no-leak assertion omitted the private repo id (seed discarded it). Preserve it on the Fixture and withhold it; a synthetic 404 body carrying the UUID must fail check_denied. RED: a UUID-bearing body passed before the token was added. Each guard proven load-bearing by reverting the exact production auth-line (reverts not shipped). deny_harness suite 30 passed, fmt + clippy clean.

beardthelion · 2026-07-14T01:07:43Z

All four addressed on a5fa334, each guard proven load-bearing by reverting the exact production auth-line it protects.

Signed non-reader (F1). Every ReadGate row now drives a Signer::Stranger 404/no-leak probe alongside the anon one, and a dedicated readgate_stranger_driven counter asserts one per read row so a dropped probe fails loudly rather than being absorbed into the total. Reverting authorize_repo_read to authorize any signed caller makes the stranger probe leak (200) while the anon probe stays 404; dropping the stranger probe fails the counter.

Driven, not source-only (F2). get_star_status, get_icaptcha_proof, and replicate_encrypted_blobs are now real ReadGate rows and out of READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN. For each, a runtime bypass that keeps the authorize_repo_read/visibility_check marker but ignores the denial makes the driven probe leak (200) while the source scan stays green — the exact bypass a marker check cant see.

Protected-push 403 under a real probe (F3). Added signed_stranger_protected_branch_push_is_forbidden: a signed non-owner push to a protected branch expects 403, with an owner control that must not be 403 (plus a seed_protected_branch harness helper). Inverting the gate drops the stranger 403; denying all on a protected branch makes the owner control fire. git_receive_pack stays out of the owner-orphan scan because that gate is now driven here, not because it is unchecked.

Repo metadata withheld (F4). The fixture preserves the private repo id and the read-gate no-leak assertion withholds it; a synthetic 404 body carrying the UUID fails check_denied (it passed before the token was added). No live denial path leaks it today, so this is regression-hardening.

No production behavior ships — the auth-line reverts were RED-proof scaffolding, all restored.

jatmn

I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.

Findings

[P1] Restore the configured shutdown-grace deadline
crates/gitlawb-node/src/lib.rs:539
This replaces the base branch's drive_serve_with_grace race with a plain with_graceful_shutdown(...).await, then explicitly discards grace at line 571. Axum will now wait indefinitely for a stalled in-flight request after SIGTERM, so teardown and a deployment restart can hang forever despite GITLAWB_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_SECS documenting that the server exits after that duration. Rebase onto the target (or restore the deadline race and its tests) rather than rolling this behavior back.
[P1] Do not revert the atomic identity-key creation path
crates/gitlawb-node/src/lib.rs:1007
The target branch's create_new(...).mode(0o600)/AlreadyExists handling is replaced by exists() followed by fs::write() and a later chmod. Concurrent first starts can both generate and overwrite the same PEM, leaving running nodes with divergent DIDs; on Unix the PEM is also created with umask-derived permissions before line 1027 narrows it, exposing the private signing key during that window. Keep the atomic create, winner-load retry, and existing-key permission tightening from the base branch.
[P2] Exercise both sides of the owner-or-author close rule
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/support/probe.rs:65
The fixture seeds each close target with author_did == owner_did, and the generated positive probe only signs as that same key. Consequently the new sweep passes if either close handler loses its is_author branch: a real contributor can no longer close their own PR/issue, but the owner-as-author control still reaches the handler and the stranger still receives 403. Seed these resources with a distinct author and add an author-signed positive probe (with the owner control retained) so the declared owner-or-author contract is actually load-bearing.
[P2] Drive the remaining deferred private read endpoints
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/deny_harness.rs:1073
get_issue, get_pr, the PR/comment/review reads, get_cert, get_bounty, get_encrypted_blob, and path-scoped get_tree are still source-only allowlist entries. The new guard only checks that their bodies contain an authorization-marker call, so an early return or ignored authorization result that leaves that call present keeps the guard green while exposing private data. This leaves the earlier request to cover the deferred 404-denying reads unresolved; seed the necessary entities and run their anonymous/signed-stranger denial and authorized positive probes.

close_pr, close_issue (owner-or-author) and dispute_bounty (creator-or-claimant) were each driven with a single owner/creator twin, so reverting the untested arm stayed green. Model gates by their authorizing-principal set (MultiPrincipalGate + Principal), seed distinct author/creator/claimant identities, and emit one Not403 twin per arm plus the stranger 403. registry_internal_consistency now invokes probes_for and asserts a twin per declared arm, so a future multi-arm handler cannot register with an untested arm. Each arm proven load-bearing: reverting is_owner/is_author on close_pr/close_issue and is_creator/is_claimant on dispute_bounty turns that arm's twin RED.

…tions The deferred reads (get_issue, get_pr, get_pr_diff, list_issue_comments, list_reviews, list_comments, get_cert, get_bounty, path-scoped get_tree) sat in READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN, checked only for an authorize_repo_read marker, so an ignored result or early return stayed green. Seed each sub-entity in the private repo (issues/PRs via the real create handlers, a cert via a signed owner push, a private-repo bounty), thread id-keyed paths through IdSource, and drive each as a ReadGate row: anon/signed-stranger 404, owner 2xx. Each seeded entity carries a distinctive marker added to the read-gate withheld set, so a 404 that leaks the entity's own content fails (not just a status check). get_pr_diff exercises both its repo-root gate and its per-path visibility_check loop. get_encrypted_blob stays deferred (owner twin needs live IPFS; reclassified structurally next). Load-bearing: an ignored-result bypass on each read turns its hostile probe RED; a 404 leaking a seeded marker fails the body assertion.

…eness gate READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN allowed a free-text reason to park a read-gated handler out of the runtime sweep. Replace the reasons with a closed NotDrivenReason enum (ReadGatingMutation, GitSmartHttpRead, ContentAddressedRead, GlobalListFilter, ExternalDependencyUnavailable); get_encrypted_blob moves to the last. A drivable 404-deny GET no longer type-checks a reason and is caught by a driven-not- relabeled assertion. Add a completeness gate that derives the required read-gate set from the mounted route table (scrape_mounts, INV-21b), not only the source-marker scan: every mounted repo-scoped GET must be a driven ReadGate row, a deny-bearing GET, structurally excused, or a declared public GET — else it fails. Catches a read that gates via a helper the marker scan does not recognize. Load-bearing: re-parking a driven read trips the relabel assert; removing a driven ReadGate row trips the mounts cross-check.

Add a distinct-signer assertion to multi_principal_rows_emit_one_twin_per_arm: the per-arm any() check is satisfied by a single twin when two Principals map to the same Signer, so a signer_for_principal collision would leave one arm silently untested. Assert the emitted twins carry principals.len() distinct signers (proven RED by colliding Author->Owner). Also correct the get_cert / priv_markers comments, which claimed a withheld cert-content marker that is not seeded — no cert marker is needed because get_cert 404s at the repo-root gate before the cert is fetched, so cert fields cannot reach the deny body.

beardthelion · 2026-07-14T21:49:17Z

Both P2s are fixed, and the same pass turned up a third instance of the class, so I generalized the invariant rather than patch the two.

Owner-or-author (probe.rs). The close rows were driven with only an owner twin while the fixture seeded author == owner, so the author arm was dead. Reworked into a general MultiPrincipalGate that carries its authorizing-principal set and drives a Not403 twin per arm plus the stranger 403. close_pr/close_issue now drive owner+author; reverting either is_owner or is_author on either handler turns that arm's twin red. The same rework surfaced dispute_bounty (creator-or-claimant) as the third untested-arm gate, so it's driven too. registry_internal_consistency now derives the required twin set from each row's declared arms, so a future multi-arm handler can't register with an arm untested.

Deferred reads (deny_harness). The ten READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN entries were source-scanned for a marker, never driven. Nine are now real ReadGate rows (anon/signed-stranger 404, owner 2xx), each carrying its own seeded marker in the withheld set, so a 404 that leaks that read's own content fails, not just a status check. get_encrypted_blob stays deferred under a closed structural reason (its owner twin needs a live IPFS backend the harness doesn't have), and the free-text reason list is now a closed enum. Added a completeness gate that derives the required read-gate set from the mounted route table, so a read that gates via an unrecognized helper can't slip past.

Every guard proven load-bearing by reverting the exact production line and observing red.

The two lib.rs findings (shutdown-grace, atomic-key) aren't in this PR's own diff, which is test-only. They're inherited from the base branch at 30672cf, a point before #194 landed its own grace and atomic-key fixes (both present on #194's head). They clear when this branch rebases onto #194's current tip.

Separately, I hit a pre-existing gap while generalizing the invariant: submit_bounty's claimant gate is vacuous under the existing every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate substring check. Out of scope here; filed as #FOLLOWUP.

jatmn

I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.

Findings

[P2] Pin the object format in the temporary Git repositories
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/support/probe.rs:506
The new fixture initializes its worktree without an object-format argument, then compares its blob ID with the SHA-1 ID produced by seed_bare_repo(..., "sha1"). On a machine with init.defaultObjectFormat=sha256, this produces 64-character IDs and the assertion at line 517 fails before the registry sweep runs. The analogous helper in tests/deny_harness.rs:407 has the same assumption and will construct incompatible ref updates. Initialize both worktrees explicitly with --object-format=sha1, matching their served fixture repositories.
[P2] Include the remaining identity-gated bounty mutations in the invariant sweep
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/support/routes.rs:172
submit_bounty, approve_bounty, and cancel_bounty each return a runtime 403 for a non-claimant or non-creator, but none is a registry row or has a real-node hostile/control probe. The source guard in api/mod.rs only checks that their function text still contains did_matches(, so an ignored result or conditional bypass can expose these mutations while every new registry and completeness check stays green. Seed status-appropriate bounty fixtures and drive stranger denials plus claimant/creator controls for these routes, or make an explicit, enforced exclusion that does not claim the registry covers every runtime deny.

…rmat (#195) - submit/approve/cancel_bounty become MultiPrincipalGate registry rows with status-appropriate bounty fixtures (claimed/submitted/open): their status check fires before the auth gate, so each row seeds its own bounty through the real API and the arm twins consume the status - pin --object-format=sha1 in both fixture worktrees so a sha256 default object format cannot break the OID equality with the served sha1 repos

beardthelion · 2026-07-16T01:39:04Z

Both addressed on 07abcc6.

Object format (P2).

On a machine with init.defaultObjectFormat=sha256, this produces 64-character IDs and the assertion at line 517 fails before the registry sweep runs.

Both worktree inits now pass --object-format=sha1, with a comment tying the pin to the served sha1 fixture repos. One precision on the repro: git here is 2.43.0, which predates the init.defaultObjectFormat key (git 2.47), so that config alone is silently ignored; the same hazard reproduces via GIT_DEFAULT_HASH=sha256 (git 2.29+), and the pin closes both spellings. Observed before the fix: the registry sweep panics at probe.rs:518 with a 64-character blob OID against the fixture's sha1 OID, and with only the probe site pinned, get_pr_diff_withheld_path_is_denied independently fails from the second site's incompatible ref update (owner push 400 vs 200). After the fix, both tests pass under GIT_DEFAULT_HASH=sha256 and under the default config.

Bounty mutation gates (P2).

submit_bounty, approve_bounty, and cancel_bounty each return a runtime 403 for a non-claimant or non-creator, but none is a registry row or has a real-node hostile/control probe.

All three are now registry rows driven by execution. Each is a MultiPrincipalGate row (claimant arm for submit, creator arm for approve and cancel) with a signed-stranger hostile asserting exactly 403 and a Not403 twin per declared arm; the gate-class doc now covers one-or-more named principals, since the prober only ever required non-empty arms. These handlers check bounty status before the auth gate, so each row seeds its own bounty through the real API in the gate-reaching status (seed_bounty_at_stage: create for open, +claim for claimed, +submit for submitted); the twins then consume that status, which is why the rows cannot share a bounty. The hostile-count invariant recomputed from 66 to 69 and the multi-principal structural floor went from 3 to 6.

Load-bearing, by execution rather than inspection: disabling each handler's enforcement while keeping its did_matches( text makes the sweep fail with "must deny with 403, got 200 OK" naming exactly that row, for all three handlers. Under the submit mutation the api/mod.rs text guard stayed green while the sweep was red, which is precisely the #203 scenario; these gates no longer depend on that guard. Two more executed negatives: pointing the submit row at the wrong-status (open) bounty fails the sweep with "got 400", proving the status wiring is load-bearing and not decorative, and all three arm twins were observed reaching 200 on first execution. This covers the enforcement half of #203 for these three routes; the guard-hardening half of #203 stays open.

Full run: 488 unit plus 33 integration tests green, fmt and clippy clean.

jatmn

I found issues that need to be addressed before this is ready.

Findings

[P2] Keep every real-node probe on a bounded client
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/deny_harness.rs:145
The new protected-branch probe (and the new PR-diff probe at line 488) uses reqwest::Client::new() instead of the suite's bounded client, so a wedged router, Git subprocess, or stalled response makes .send().await wait indefinitely until the CI job kills it. That hides precisely the route failure this harness is meant to report; use the shared timeout-bearing client for these real-node requests.
[P2] Actually withhold the pushed PR-diff object's ID
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/deny_harness.rs:541
oids is captured before secret/x.txt is created, so this lookup is always empty and the conditional never supplies an object ID to assert_denied. The test therefore checks the secret text but not the full or short SHA it promises to protect; a 404 path that exposes the withheld blob ID still passes. Have build_branch_push_body retain the new blob ID and assert that neither representation is present in the denial body.
[P2] Do not describe the registry as covering every runtime denial while excluding signer-self gates
crates/gitlawb-node/tests/support/routes.rs:1
The PR describes a driven table of every route with a runtime deny, but this file deliberately omits signer-self 403 routes and the completeness checks only cover owner/read gates. For example, tasks::create_task rejects a signer who supplies somebody else's delegator_did; bypassing that did_matches result would let callers impersonate a delegator while the new sweep and completeness checks stay green. The same class exists in the task claim/complete/fail paths. Drive those gates in the real-node invariant, or narrow the registry and PR claims so they do not promise coverage they do not provide.

…ber (#195) Resolve the three review findings on head 07abcc6. Bound the two new real-node probes (protected-branch push, PR-diff) on a timeout-bearing client, so a wedged git subprocess fails the suite rather than hanging it until CI kills the job. Withhold the pushed secret blob's OID (full and [..12] short form) in the PR-diff denial. The old branch was dead code: the OID was never in the fixture seed map, so build_branch_push_body now returns the pushed blob OIDs. Drive every caller-self runtime deny the registry claimed but only source-marker checked. create_task, claim_task, and register are a new SignerSelfGate class (a body DID field bound to the authenticated signer); complete_task and fail_task are a MultiPrincipalGate assignee arm (the caller must equal the task's stored assignee). Each runs hostile-then-authorized against a real node. A completeness guard, derived from a scan of src/api, now requires every did_matches(caller, X) handler to be a driven registry row, and the module doc is reconciled to the REST surface (the parallel GraphQL mutation gates are fenced separately, #219). Every gate is mutation-verified load-bearing: reverting a production did_matches line drives its hostile probe RED, and the completeness guard goes RED when a driven row is dropped or the classifier is starved. No production code changed.

beardthelion · 2026-07-19T05:13:06Z

All three fixed on 35577d3, each guard proven load-bearing by reverting the exact production line it protects.

Bounded client (F1). Both new real-node probes (signed_stranger_protected_branch_push_is_forbidden, get_pr_diff_withheld_path_is_denied) now use a shared bounded_client() (30s timeout, the pattern already inline at the upload-pack and registry-sweep sites), so a wedged git subprocess fails the suite instead of hanging it until CI kills the job.

Pushed OID withhold (F2). You were right that the branch was dead: oids came from seed_bare_repo, which never seeds the pushed paths, so the lookup was always empty. build_branch_push_body now returns each pushed file's blob OID, and the PR-diff denial withholds the secret blob's full sha1 plus its [..12] short form (matching the private_blob_oid_short convention). Load-bearing: a 404 body carrying either OID form is rejected, and dropping the OID tokens lets the same body pass.

Registry coverage (F3). Drove the class rather than narrowing the claim. Every caller-self runtime deny now has a real-node hostile-then-authorized probe:

create_task / claim_task / register as a new SignerSelfGate (a body DID field bound to the authenticated signer),
complete_task / fail_task as a MultiPrincipalGate assignee arm (the caller must equal the task's stored assignee, driven against a seeded claimed task).

register is driven, not excused: the harness never initializes iCaptcha, so verify_request is inert and a signed stranger reaches the did_matches 403 exactly like create_task. A completeness guard derives the required set from a scan of src/api and requires every did_matches(caller, X) handler (X not the repo owner) to be a driven registry row; its non-vacuous floor is pinned to the exact caller-self count. The module doc is reconciled to the REST surface only, and states the scan's two limits (a check hidden behind a helper, and a gate in a new subdirectory module, same limits the owner/read sibling guards carry). The parallel GraphQL mutation caller-self gates stay fenced separately in #219, not claimed here.

Each of the five gates is mutation-verified: reverting its production did_matches line drives the sweep RED at that gate's hostile, and the completeness guard goes RED when a driven row is dropped or the classifier is starved. Harness green, no production change (git diff src/ is empty).

jatmn

LGTM

beardthelion · 2026-07-20T19:31:04Z

@kevincodex1 #195 is ready for merge. jatmn approved the current head, CI is green, and it's mergeable (clean, up to date with main). Yours when you have a moment.

kevincodex1

LGTM

…ss-check) (#195) * test(node): U1 deny-bearing route registry (owner-gate + signature tranches) Foundation for the invariant deny-prober (plan 002): a declarative registry of ONLY the routes that carry a runtime deny (owner-gate 403 / read-gate 404 / signature 401), each classified by reading its handler and recording the fn name. Owner-gate (12 rows: merge/close_pr, close_issue, webhooks, labels, protect, visibility set/remove/list incl the GET-is-403 correction) and signature-required (git-receive-pack) tranches are verified; read-gate tranche stubbed with a TODO (per-handler 404-vs-filter verification pending). A consistency self-test asserts no dup method+path, every row names its handler, and every read-gate row carries a positive-twin Reach. Decoupled from the #194 primitives (U1 uses none), so classification is not hostage to harness churn. * test(node): U2 fixture state matrix + per-gate-class probe generators Two-repo fixture (public owner-gate substrate + private read-gate substrate) plus probes_for(): each deny-bearing row expands to a hostile probe asserting the exact deny status and a positive twin (owner-reachability for owner-gate, authorized read for read-gate) so a deny for the wrong reason cannot false-pass. Three self-checks cover the owner-gate, read-gate, and signature classes. * test(node): U1 read-gate tranche (14 repo-scoped 404-deny reads) Each row's handler was read to confirm it gates on "/" via authorize_repo_read / visibility_check and returns RepoNotFound (404) to a non-reader of a private repo, with the owner re-read as the ReaderReads positive twin. Sub-entity gets (get_issue/get_pr/get_cert/get_bounty and the comment/review lists) are deferred to the fixture expansion that seeds them; global list-filter surfaces and the KNOWN_UNGATED reads are excluded with reasons. Runtime behavior is asserted by U3. * test(node): U3 drive the deny-bearing registry over a real node Boots a real node, seeds the two-repo fixture (plus a PR and an issue so the author-or-owner close gates are reached, not 404'd on an absent entity), then walks every deny-bearing route: the hostile probe must return the exact deny status and leak nothing, and the positive twin must reach the handler (owner: not 403; read: 2xx). A terminal invariant asserts one hostile probe per row was driven and the count equals the registry, so a row that produced no probe fails loud rather than passing vacuously. Adds seed_pr/seed_issue to TestNode. Mutation-verified load-bearing: breaking did_matches drove the merge_pr owner-gate hostile to 500 (RED, named); neutering authorize_repo_read's deny drove the get_repo read-gate hostile to 200 (RED, named); both reverted green. * test(node): U4 completeness cross-check keeps the registry from drifting A pure source scrape of server.rs (multiline .route parser, floor 90) that the runtime sweep cannot give: no deny-bearing row points at a route that no longer mounts (anti-stale), and no handler carrying an unambiguous owner-gate marker (require_repo_owner / require_owner) escapes the registry (orphan). The api dir is read at test time so a new module is covered. Complements authz_guard (which proves handlers are gated) by proving the deny-bearing ones are actually driven, and reaches the non-API git mounts authz_guard never sees. Mutation-verified: a bogus row path tripped anti-stale (named the row); removing the merge_pr row tripped the orphan guard (named merge_pr); both reverted green. * test(node): close vacuous-green gaps in the deny prober's own assertions Vetting the harness against itself surfaced branches that ran green but were never exercised adversarially: - Ok2xx twin dropped its unused token Option; the arm now asserts the authorized read returns a NON-EMPTY 2xx, so an empty-200 denial-rendered-as-success is caught (executed by every read twin). - U4 orphan guard gains a floor on the owner-marker scan (>=6), so a marker-scan regression to zero fails loud instead of passing by checking nothing. - Added probe unit tests that execute the previously-uncovered probes_for arms: the SiblingPublic path-scoped twin, and the Reach::None fail-loud panic. All 22 harness tests green. Every send_probe/probes_for branch is now executed; the Deny(401), Not403, and Ok2xx-status arms were additionally mutation-verified RED (signature-expect flip; did_matches->false; authorize_repo_read->deny) and both U4 floors RED via threshold flips, all reverted. * test(node): close 3 completeness gaps in the deny prober's own guards (#195) jatmn's review flagged three ways the prober's self-guards stay green when the protection they check is removed: - F1: the U4 completeness check enforced owner-gate orphans but not read-gate ones, so dropping authorize_repo_read on get_issue/get_cert/ get_bounty/etc. left the sweep green. Add a symmetric read-gate orphan guard that scans src/api for authorize_repo_read/visibility_check handlers and requires each to be a driven ReadGate row or an enumerated READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN entry with a reason, replacing the free-text prose. A staleness check keeps the allowlist from carrying dead exemptions. - F2: the U3 registry sweep called assert_denied with an empty withheld list, proving status only. Seed the private fixture with a distinctive secret and its blob OID, carry them on the read-gate hostile probes, and pass them through so a denial body echoing withheld data fails. - F3: the owner-gate orphan scan matched only require_owner/require_repo_owner and missed the inline did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) idiom that protect_branch/unprotect_branch use. Fold in a has_owner_did_matches discriminator that catches the owner form without false-matching the signer-self (register_replica) or author (close_pr) did_matches forms, pinned by unit tests on the exact bodies. * test(node): make the deny-prober guards load-bearing (#195, F1-F4) Resolves jatmn's four INV-21 completeness findings — guards that were green but not load-bearing: F1: every ReadGate hostile probe was anonymous, so the signed-non-reader branch of each private read was untested — a regression treating any valid signature as authorized would leak while the sweep stayed green. Add a Signer::Stranger 404/ no-leak probe per read row, with a dedicated readgate_stranger counter so a dropped probe fails loudly. RED: authorize any signed caller -> the stranger probe leaks (200) while the anon probe stays green. F2: get_star_status, get_icaptcha_proof, and replicate_encrypted_blobs were source-only exemptions (a marker scan, never driven). Drive them as real ReadGate rows and remove the allowlist entries. RED: a runtime bypass that keeps the authorize_repo_read marker leaks -> the driven probe RED, the source scan green. F3: git_receive_pack's protected-branch owner 403 was never driven (its registry row is the unsigned-401 path). Add signed_stranger_protected_branch_push_is_forbidden (a signed non-owner push to a protected branch -> 403, owner control -> not-403), plus a seed_protected_branch harness helper. RED: invert the gate -> the probe RED. F4: the read-gate no-leak assertion omitted the private repo id (seed discarded it). Preserve it on the Fixture and withhold it; a synthetic 404 body carrying the UUID must fail check_denied. RED: a UUID-bearing body passed before the token was added. Each guard proven load-bearing by reverting the exact production auth-line (reverts not shipped). deny_harness suite 30 passed, fmt + clippy clean. * test(node): drive every arm of the multi-principal close/dispute gates close_pr, close_issue (owner-or-author) and dispute_bounty (creator-or-claimant) were each driven with a single owner/creator twin, so reverting the untested arm stayed green. Model gates by their authorizing-principal set (MultiPrincipalGate + Principal), seed distinct author/creator/claimant identities, and emit one Not403 twin per arm plus the stranger 403. registry_internal_consistency now invokes probes_for and asserts a twin per declared arm, so a future multi-arm handler cannot register with an untested arm. Each arm proven load-bearing: reverting is_owner/is_author on close_pr/close_issue and is_creator/is_claimant on dispute_bounty turns that arm's twin RED. * test(node): drive the deferred private reads with per-read leak assertions The deferred reads (get_issue, get_pr, get_pr_diff, list_issue_comments, list_reviews, list_comments, get_cert, get_bounty, path-scoped get_tree) sat in READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN, checked only for an authorize_repo_read marker, so an ignored result or early return stayed green. Seed each sub-entity in the private repo (issues/PRs via the real create handlers, a cert via a signed owner push, a private-repo bounty), thread id-keyed paths through IdSource, and drive each as a ReadGate row: anon/signed-stranger 404, owner 2xx. Each seeded entity carries a distinctive marker added to the read-gate withheld set, so a 404 that leaks the entity's own content fails (not just a status check). get_pr_diff exercises both its repo-root gate and its per-path visibility_check loop. get_encrypted_blob stays deferred (owner twin needs live IPFS; reclassified structurally next). Load-bearing: an ignored-result bypass on each read turns its hostile probe RED; a 404 leaking a seeded marker fails the body assertion. * test(node): close the prose-excuse hatch with a mounted-route completeness gate READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN allowed a free-text reason to park a read-gated handler out of the runtime sweep. Replace the reasons with a closed NotDrivenReason enum (ReadGatingMutation, GitSmartHttpRead, ContentAddressedRead, GlobalListFilter, ExternalDependencyUnavailable); get_encrypted_blob moves to the last. A drivable 404-deny GET no longer type-checks a reason and is caught by a driven-not- relabeled assertion. Add a completeness gate that derives the required read-gate set from the mounted route table (scrape_mounts, INV-21b), not only the source-marker scan: every mounted repo-scoped GET must be a driven ReadGate row, a deny-bearing GET, structurally excused, or a declared public GET — else it fails. Catches a read that gates via a helper the marker scan does not recognize. Load-bearing: re-parking a driven read trips the relabel assert; removing a driven ReadGate row trips the mounts cross-check. * test(review): harden multi-principal twin check against signer collision Add a distinct-signer assertion to multi_principal_rows_emit_one_twin_per_arm: the per-arm any() check is satisfied by a single twin when two Principals map to the same Signer, so a signer_for_principal collision would leave one arm silently untested. Assert the emitted twins carry principals.len() distinct signers (proven RED by colliding Author->Owner). Also correct the get_cert / priv_markers comments, which claimed a withheld cert-content marker that is not seeded — no cert marker is needed because get_cert 404s at the repo-root gate before the cert is fetched, so cert fields cannot reach the deny body. * style(test): apply rustfmt to the deny-prober additions * test(node): drive the bounty mutation gates and pin fixture object format (#195) - submit/approve/cancel_bounty become MultiPrincipalGate registry rows with status-appropriate bounty fixtures (claimed/submitted/open): their status check fires before the auth gate, so each row seeds its own bounty through the real API and the arm twins consume the status - pin --object-format=sha1 in both fixture worktrees so a sha256 default object format cannot break the OID equality with the served sha1 repos * test(node): drive the caller-self task/register gates in the deny-prober (#195) Resolve the three review findings on head 07abcc6. Bound the two new real-node probes (protected-branch push, PR-diff) on a timeout-bearing client, so a wedged git subprocess fails the suite rather than hanging it until CI kills the job. Withhold the pushed secret blob's OID (full and [..12] short form) in the PR-diff denial. The old branch was dead code: the OID was never in the fixture seed map, so build_branch_push_body now returns the pushed blob OIDs. Drive every caller-self runtime deny the registry claimed but only source-marker checked. create_task, claim_task, and register are a new SignerSelfGate class (a body DID field bound to the authenticated signer); complete_task and fail_task are a MultiPrincipalGate assignee arm (the caller must equal the task's stored assignee). Each runs hostile-then-authorized against a real node. A completeness guard, derived from a scan of src/api, now requires every did_matches(caller, X) handler to be a driven registry row, and the module doc is reconciled to the REST surface (the parallel GraphQL mutation gates are fenced separately, #219). Every gate is mutation-verified load-bearing: reverting a production did_matches line drives its hostile probe RED, and the completeness guard goes RED when a driven row is dropped or the classifier is starved. No production code changed. --------- Co-authored-by: t <t@t>

…ss-check) (#195) * test(node): U1 deny-bearing route registry (owner-gate + signature tranches) Foundation for the invariant deny-prober (plan 002): a declarative registry of ONLY the routes that carry a runtime deny (owner-gate 403 / read-gate 404 / signature 401), each classified by reading its handler and recording the fn name. Owner-gate (12 rows: merge/close_pr, close_issue, webhooks, labels, protect, visibility set/remove/list incl the GET-is-403 correction) and signature-required (git-receive-pack) tranches are verified; read-gate tranche stubbed with a TODO (per-handler 404-vs-filter verification pending). A consistency self-test asserts no dup method+path, every row names its handler, and every read-gate row carries a positive-twin Reach. Decoupled from the #194 primitives (U1 uses none), so classification is not hostage to harness churn. * test(node): U2 fixture state matrix + per-gate-class probe generators Two-repo fixture (public owner-gate substrate + private read-gate substrate) plus probes_for(): each deny-bearing row expands to a hostile probe asserting the exact deny status and a positive twin (owner-reachability for owner-gate, authorized read for read-gate) so a deny for the wrong reason cannot false-pass. Three self-checks cover the owner-gate, read-gate, and signature classes. * test(node): U1 read-gate tranche (14 repo-scoped 404-deny reads) Each row's handler was read to confirm it gates on "/" via authorize_repo_read / visibility_check and returns RepoNotFound (404) to a non-reader of a private repo, with the owner re-read as the ReaderReads positive twin. Sub-entity gets (get_issue/get_pr/get_cert/get_bounty and the comment/review lists) are deferred to the fixture expansion that seeds them; global list-filter surfaces and the KNOWN_UNGATED reads are excluded with reasons. Runtime behavior is asserted by U3. * test(node): U3 drive the deny-bearing registry over a real node Boots a real node, seeds the two-repo fixture (plus a PR and an issue so the author-or-owner close gates are reached, not 404'd on an absent entity), then walks every deny-bearing route: the hostile probe must return the exact deny status and leak nothing, and the positive twin must reach the handler (owner: not 403; read: 2xx). A terminal invariant asserts one hostile probe per row was driven and the count equals the registry, so a row that produced no probe fails loud rather than passing vacuously. Adds seed_pr/seed_issue to TestNode. Mutation-verified load-bearing: breaking did_matches drove the merge_pr owner-gate hostile to 500 (RED, named); neutering authorize_repo_read's deny drove the get_repo read-gate hostile to 200 (RED, named); both reverted green. * test(node): U4 completeness cross-check keeps the registry from drifting A pure source scrape of server.rs (multiline .route parser, floor 90) that the runtime sweep cannot give: no deny-bearing row points at a route that no longer mounts (anti-stale), and no handler carrying an unambiguous owner-gate marker (require_repo_owner / require_owner) escapes the registry (orphan). The api dir is read at test time so a new module is covered. Complements authz_guard (which proves handlers are gated) by proving the deny-bearing ones are actually driven, and reaches the non-API git mounts authz_guard never sees. Mutation-verified: a bogus row path tripped anti-stale (named the row); removing the merge_pr row tripped the orphan guard (named merge_pr); both reverted green. * test(node): close vacuous-green gaps in the deny prober's own assertions Vetting the harness against itself surfaced branches that ran green but were never exercised adversarially: - Ok2xx twin dropped its unused token Option; the arm now asserts the authorized read returns a NON-EMPTY 2xx, so an empty-200 denial-rendered-as-success is caught (executed by every read twin). - U4 orphan guard gains a floor on the owner-marker scan (>=6), so a marker-scan regression to zero fails loud instead of passing by checking nothing. - Added probe unit tests that execute the previously-uncovered probes_for arms: the SiblingPublic path-scoped twin, and the Reach::None fail-loud panic. All 22 harness tests green. Every send_probe/probes_for branch is now executed; the Deny(401), Not403, and Ok2xx-status arms were additionally mutation-verified RED (signature-expect flip; did_matches->false; authorize_repo_read->deny) and both U4 floors RED via threshold flips, all reverted. * test(node): close 3 completeness gaps in the deny prober's own guards (#195) jatmn's review flagged three ways the prober's self-guards stay green when the protection they check is removed: - F1: the U4 completeness check enforced owner-gate orphans but not read-gate ones, so dropping authorize_repo_read on get_issue/get_cert/ get_bounty/etc. left the sweep green. Add a symmetric read-gate orphan guard that scans src/api for authorize_repo_read/visibility_check handlers and requires each to be a driven ReadGate row or an enumerated READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN entry with a reason, replacing the free-text prose. A staleness check keeps the allowlist from carrying dead exemptions. - F2: the U3 registry sweep called assert_denied with an empty withheld list, proving status only. Seed the private fixture with a distinctive secret and its blob OID, carry them on the read-gate hostile probes, and pass them through so a denial body echoing withheld data fails. - F3: the owner-gate orphan scan matched only require_owner/require_repo_owner and missed the inline did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) idiom that protect_branch/unprotect_branch use. Fold in a has_owner_did_matches discriminator that catches the owner form without false-matching the signer-self (register_replica) or author (close_pr) did_matches forms, pinned by unit tests on the exact bodies. * test(node): make the deny-prober guards load-bearing (#195, F1-F4) Resolves jatmn's four INV-21 completeness findings — guards that were green but not load-bearing: F1: every ReadGate hostile probe was anonymous, so the signed-non-reader branch of each private read was untested — a regression treating any valid signature as authorized would leak while the sweep stayed green. Add a Signer::Stranger 404/ no-leak probe per read row, with a dedicated readgate_stranger counter so a dropped probe fails loudly. RED: authorize any signed caller -> the stranger probe leaks (200) while the anon probe stays green. F2: get_star_status, get_icaptcha_proof, and replicate_encrypted_blobs were source-only exemptions (a marker scan, never driven). Drive them as real ReadGate rows and remove the allowlist entries. RED: a runtime bypass that keeps the authorize_repo_read marker leaks -> the driven probe RED, the source scan green. F3: git_receive_pack's protected-branch owner 403 was never driven (its registry row is the unsigned-401 path). Add signed_stranger_protected_branch_push_is_forbidden (a signed non-owner push to a protected branch -> 403, owner control -> not-403), plus a seed_protected_branch harness helper. RED: invert the gate -> the probe RED. F4: the read-gate no-leak assertion omitted the private repo id (seed discarded it). Preserve it on the Fixture and withhold it; a synthetic 404 body carrying the UUID must fail check_denied. RED: a UUID-bearing body passed before the token was added. Each guard proven load-bearing by reverting the exact production auth-line (reverts not shipped). deny_harness suite 30 passed, fmt + clippy clean. * test(node): drive every arm of the multi-principal close/dispute gates close_pr, close_issue (owner-or-author) and dispute_bounty (creator-or-claimant) were each driven with a single owner/creator twin, so reverting the untested arm stayed green. Model gates by their authorizing-principal set (MultiPrincipalGate + Principal), seed distinct author/creator/claimant identities, and emit one Not403 twin per arm plus the stranger 403. registry_internal_consistency now invokes probes_for and asserts a twin per declared arm, so a future multi-arm handler cannot register with an untested arm. Each arm proven load-bearing: reverting is_owner/is_author on close_pr/close_issue and is_creator/is_claimant on dispute_bounty turns that arm's twin RED. * test(node): drive the deferred private reads with per-read leak assertions The deferred reads (get_issue, get_pr, get_pr_diff, list_issue_comments, list_reviews, list_comments, get_cert, get_bounty, path-scoped get_tree) sat in READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN, checked only for an authorize_repo_read marker, so an ignored result or early return stayed green. Seed each sub-entity in the private repo (issues/PRs via the real create handlers, a cert via a signed owner push, a private-repo bounty), thread id-keyed paths through IdSource, and drive each as a ReadGate row: anon/signed-stranger 404, owner 2xx. Each seeded entity carries a distinctive marker added to the read-gate withheld set, so a 404 that leaks the entity's own content fails (not just a status check). get_pr_diff exercises both its repo-root gate and its per-path visibility_check loop. get_encrypted_blob stays deferred (owner twin needs live IPFS; reclassified structurally next). Load-bearing: an ignored-result bypass on each read turns its hostile probe RED; a 404 leaking a seeded marker fails the body assertion. * test(node): close the prose-excuse hatch with a mounted-route completeness gate READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN allowed a free-text reason to park a read-gated handler out of the runtime sweep. Replace the reasons with a closed NotDrivenReason enum (ReadGatingMutation, GitSmartHttpRead, ContentAddressedRead, GlobalListFilter, ExternalDependencyUnavailable); get_encrypted_blob moves to the last. A drivable 404-deny GET no longer type-checks a reason and is caught by a driven-not- relabeled assertion. Add a completeness gate that derives the required read-gate set from the mounted route table (scrape_mounts, INV-21b), not only the source-marker scan: every mounted repo-scoped GET must be a driven ReadGate row, a deny-bearing GET, structurally excused, or a declared public GET — else it fails. Catches a read that gates via a helper the marker scan does not recognize. Load-bearing: re-parking a driven read trips the relabel assert; removing a driven ReadGate row trips the mounts cross-check. * test(review): harden multi-principal twin check against signer collision Add a distinct-signer assertion to multi_principal_rows_emit_one_twin_per_arm: the per-arm any() check is satisfied by a single twin when two Principals map to the same Signer, so a signer_for_principal collision would leave one arm silently untested. Assert the emitted twins carry principals.len() distinct signers (proven RED by colliding Author->Owner). Also correct the get_cert / priv_markers comments, which claimed a withheld cert-content marker that is not seeded — no cert marker is needed because get_cert 404s at the repo-root gate before the cert is fetched, so cert fields cannot reach the deny body. * style(test): apply rustfmt to the deny-prober additions * test(node): drive the bounty mutation gates and pin fixture object format (#195) - submit/approve/cancel_bounty become MultiPrincipalGate registry rows with status-appropriate bounty fixtures (claimed/submitted/open): their status check fires before the auth gate, so each row seeds its own bounty through the real API and the arm twins consume the status - pin --object-format=sha1 in both fixture worktrees so a sha256 default object format cannot break the OID equality with the served sha1 repos * test(node): drive the caller-self task/register gates in the deny-prober (#195) Resolve the three review findings on head 07abcc6. Bound the two new real-node probes (protected-branch push, PR-diff) on a timeout-bearing client, so a wedged git subprocess fails the suite rather than hanging it until CI kills the job. Withhold the pushed secret blob's OID (full and [..12] short form) in the PR-diff denial. The old branch was dead code: the OID was never in the fixture seed map, so build_branch_push_body now returns the pushed blob OIDs. Drive every caller-self runtime deny the registry claimed but only source-marker checked. create_task, claim_task, and register are a new SignerSelfGate class (a body DID field bound to the authenticated signer); complete_task and fail_task are a MultiPrincipalGate assignee arm (the caller must equal the task's stored assignee). Each runs hostile-then-authorized against a real node. A completeness guard, derived from a scan of src/api, now requires every did_matches(caller, X) handler to be a driven registry row, and the module doc is reconciled to the REST surface (the parallel GraphQL mutation gates are fenced separately, #219). Every gate is mutation-verified load-bearing: reverting a production did_matches line drives its hostile probe RED, and the completeness guard goes RED when a driven row is dropped or the classifier is starved. No production code changed.

…ner-gated mutations, path-scoped reads, client-surfaced denials) (Twigpine#194) * refactor(node): split gitlawb-node into lib+bin so integration tests can spawn a real node Move the module tree and boot logic from main.rs into a new lib.rs crate root exposing the boot surface (build_router, AppState, Config, migrations) as pub; main.rs becomes a thin #[tokio::main] shim over run(). No behavior change: both targets build and the full node suite (488 tests) stays green. Prerequisite for the real-node deny harness (U1). * test(node): real-node deny harness rig + INV-8 unsigned-push case (U2-U4, U5a) Add a feature-gated (test-harness) spawn surface (src/test_harness.rs) that boots a real node on 127.0.0.1:0 over an ephemeral #[sqlx::test] pool through the production axum::serve stack with connect-info, and an integration crate (tests/deny_harness.rs) that drives deny paths with a real reqwest client: - U2 signing client: wraps gitlawb_core::http_sig::sign_request for reqwest; self-checks that a valid signature clears require_signature and a tampered body is rejected (400 content_digest_mismatch). - U3 spawn_node: real socket, p2p disabled, per-test DB, shutdown-on-drop. - U4 assert_denied: 4xx AND body-no-leak AND not-empty-200 (INV-8); pure core unit-tested for clean-403 / empty-200 / leaking-403 / wrong-status. - U5a INV-8: unsigned git-receive-pack is denied 401 with no leak. Widens the three cfg(test) test builders (Db/RepoStore::for_testing, run_migrations) to also compile under the feature. No production behavior change: prod build (no feature) excludes test_harness; node suite stays green (488) and the 7 integration tests pass. * test(node): INV-1 owner-gate deny case over the real stack (U6) A validly signed non-owner PUT /visibility is rejected 403 by require_owner (no x-ucan, so require_ucan_chain passes through to the gate); the owner's signed PUT reaches the handler (reachability proof, guards against a 404/415 masquerading as a pass). Adds seed_repo/withhold_path seeding helpers to the test harness. Mutation-verified load-bearing: with require_owner forced Ok the non-owner PUT returns 201 and the INV-8 assertion flips the test RED. * test(node): INV-2 read + content-addressed withhold deny cases (U5b, U7) Adds seed_bare_repo (shells git to build a real bare repo at the served path, sha1 or sha256 object format) and two INV-2 deny cases over the real stack: - U7: a public repo with a /secret/** withhold rule denies an anonymous blob read of the withheld path (404) with no content/OID leak, while the sibling public path is served (path-scoped, not blanket). - U5b: the same withhold denies an anonymous /ipfs/{cid} read of the withheld blob's content-addressed id (404, no leak), while the public blob's CID is served. Completes U5 (INV-8) alongside U5a. Both mutation-verified load-bearing: forcing visibility_check to allow leaks the secret at 200 and the INV-8 assertion flips each test RED. * test(node): INV-2 replication-path deny case over git-upload-pack (U8) Drives the git-upload-pack POST directly (v0 stateless-RPC: want HEAD, flush, done) via a bounded reqwest client rather than a vanilla `git clone` (which negotiates protocol v2 and deadlocks against the node's v0 server, and would otherwise wedge the suite). The served pack is indexed with git index-pack and its objects listed with verify-pack -v: a packfile-aware assertion, since a raw byte scan cannot see an OID inside the zlib-compressed stream. A public repo with a /secret/** withhold rule must serve a pack that omits the withheld blob's object while keeping the sibling public blob. Mutation-verified load-bearing: forcing visibility_check to allow puts the withheld blob back in the pack and flips the test RED. Completes the harness (8 units, 11 integration tests). Prod build (no feature) and the 488-test node suite stay green. * ci(node): run the real-node deny harness on every PR cargo test --workspace skips the harness because it lives behind the test-harness feature (kept off the production binary). Add an explicit step that runs it with the feature and the same Postgres service, so the INV-1/ INV-2/INV-8 trust-boundary regression cases execute on every PR instead of only when run by hand. * test(node): cover the deny-assertion guard branches (U4) Add unit tests for the two remaining check_denied branches: a non-4xx expected status is rejected as a test bug, and an empty withheld token is skipped rather than matching every body. Closes the last unexecuted branches in the deny assertion. * test(node): full-stack owner-gate deny cases for 5 high-value mutations Fan-out of U6 to the security-sensitive owner-gated mutations that had only the source-level authz-table guard and no runtime deny test: protect_branch, unprotect_branch, create_webhook, delete_webhook, remove_visibility. Each rejects a validly-signed non-owner with 403 and lets the owner reach the handler (not 403). Mutation-verified load-bearing on their shared root gate: did_matches forced true opens all five (non-owner protect_branch returns 201) and the test flips RED. Replica register/unregister were intentionally excluded: they are signer-self (you register your own node), not owner-gated, so there is no owner-deny to assert. * style(node): cargo fmt the deny-harness sources * Address PR review feedback (#194) - Create the node identity key atomically with create_new + mode 0600, closing the umask-derived 0644 disclosure window and the exists()->write overwrite race; on AlreadyExists load the winner's key (bounded retry so a loser can't read a half-written PEM) and tighten looser perms on load. - Enforce the configured shutdown grace: bound the axum drain by grace measured from the signal (extracted as drive_serve_with_grace), abandoning in-flight requests once it expires instead of waiting indefinitely. Removes the discarded grace value. - Route the deny-harness reqwest clients through a shared bounded_client (30s timeout) so a wedged node path fails fast instead of hanging to the CI limit. Tests: 0600-on-create, load-tighten, concurrent-start convergence (create race), and grace-race abandon / normal-drain / signal-gated-clock. All RED-then-GREEN by execution. * fix(node): remove a failed first-write key file; verify key mode after tightening (#194) F1 (P1): create_new(true) closed the permission window, but a write_all failure after the file was created left an empty/partial PEM behind. Every later start then took the key_path.exists() branch, re-parsed that corrupt file in load_racing, and exited 'invalid PEM key' instead of regenerating — a transient ENOSPC/EIO on first boot permanently wedged the node. Extract write_key_or_cleanup, which removes the just-created file on write failure, and wire it into both the unix and non-unix create branches. F2 (P2): the load path tightened a loose existing key to 0600 but discarded the set_permissions result. A chmod that failed (read-only mount, ownership/ACL mismatch) left a world/group-readable private key in use while logging a normal 'loaded existing identity'. Surface the tighten failure (propagate it) and add ensure_key_mode_0600, which fails closed if the key is not 0600 after the attempt. RED->GREEN: failed_write_removes_the_partial_key_file (a failed write leaves no file; RED without the remove_file). loose_key_mode_is_rejected_not_used (a 0644 key is rejected; RED without the mode check). Existing created_key_is_mode_0600, existing_key_is_loaded_and_tightened, and concurrent_starts_converge_on_one_identity stay green. Full node lib+bin suite 497 passed, fmt + clippy clean. * fix(node): publish the identity key atomically and wait a real deadline The create path did create_new(final)+write_all, so the final path appeared as an empty inode before the PEM was flushed, and a losing/fast-path start only retried ~100ms (50x2ms). On a slow or stalled filesystem the winner's write can exceed that window, so every other start failed boot with 'invalid PEM key' (#194). Publish atomically instead: write the full PEM to a sibling temp, then hard_link it into place. hard_link is atomic and fails if the target exists, so the final path only ever appears COMPLETE (no partial-read window), a lost race never clobbers the winner, and a crashed writer leaves only a temp rather than a partial final that would wedge later starts. load_racing_key now polls on a wall-clock KEY_RACE_DEADLINE (5s) instead of a fixed 100ms count. Hoisted load_existing_key/load_racing_key to module level for testability. Adversarial RED->GREEN: a 250ms-slow winner is waited out (RED at the old 100ms); a reader watching the final never sees a partial file (RED with create_new+write); a losing publish does not clobber the winner; 500 tests pass. * fix(node): recover key publish from stale temps, make it durable; join TestNode teardown (#194) - pick the temp key name with a bounded per-call retry instead of a process-global counter: a crashed start's leftover temp no longer wedges a PID-stable restart, and cross-container publishers stop colliding - fsync the temp PEM before it can be linked and the key directory after publication, so a power crash cannot leave a durable-but-truncated identity.pem that permanently blocks startup - TestNode::shutdown() joins the serve task and closes the pool before sqlx's DROP DATABASE cleanup runs; every deny-harness test now ends with it instead of relying on drop-only teardown * test(node): let the partial-final reader wait out the fsynced publish (#194) The added temp-file and directory fsyncs can push the hard_link past the reader's old 400ms window under parallel-suite disk load, flaking publish_never_exposes_a_partial_final (observed ~1 in 5 local runs). The reader now polls a 5s deadline and stops at the first complete observation; the never-see-partial assertion still runs before the break, so the exposure mutation still fails the test. Also moves the allow-unbounded-git marker in seed_bare_repo directly above the spawn line, where the pre-push gate looks for it. * fix(node): fall back to a direct create_new publish when hard_link fails (#194) On a non-AlreadyExists hard_link error, publish the identity key by creating the final path directly with create_new(0600): no-clobber is preserved via the exclusive create (AlreadyExists routes to the lost-race load), write failures remove the partial final, and fsync failures keep the complete final on disk since a concurrent loser may already have loaded it (the Won-arm policy). The fallback chains the original link error and the rustdoc now scopes the complete-only-visibility guarantee to the hard-link path. Link step is injectable via compile-time fault hooks; six new tests drive both fallback arms, the lost race, the concurrent convergence, and both failure phases. * test(node): abort the server task in TestNode::drop (#194) A test that returns without calling shutdown() previously relied on the watch signal alone to unwind the server before sqlx's DROP DATABASE. Drop now also aborts any remaining serve handle, so teardown holds even when the graceful chain is broken; signal and abort are independently sufficient (verified by a four-quadrant neuter matrix in the new drop_without_shutdown_unblocks_database test, which observes leaked sessions via a standalone connection with sqlx pool reaping disabled). * chore: sync Cargo.lock with the 0.5.1 workspace manifests * test(node): surface axum::serve's result through TestNode::shutdown (#194) The spawned serve task previously discarded its io::Result; shutdown() now joins and checks it. On axum 0.8.8 the Err arm is unreachable (graceful shutdown hard-codes Ok and accept errors retry forever), so this is forward-compat insurance documented as such inline; the Ok path is exercised by every harness test. * fix(node): verify key file mode before writing PEM bytes at both creation sites (#194) Both creation sites (the temp on the hard-link path, the final on the fallback path) now run the loader's tighten-then-verify pair right after create_new and before any private bytes are written: set_permissions repairs a umask-narrowed mode (0277 landed 0400 and previously shipped that way), and on mode-ignoring mounts where the tighten silently no-ops the verify fails closed with the empty file removed so retries are not wedged. A verified temp implies a verified hard-linked final (shared inode). Both call sites are mutation-vetted; umask cases run in child processes because umask is process-global. * docs(node): state the real shutdown-grace contract and lock it with a real-socket test (#194) GITLAWB_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_SECS promised a 503 to in-flight clients at expiry; drive_serve_with_grace (correctly) abandons them instead, and a retroactive 503 on an in-flight response is not constructible under hyper. The config prose now states the abandon contract, and a new test drives a real listener with a slow handler through the driver at a 250ms grace, asserting the client never sees a 503 status line and the driver returns bounded with grace_expired set. This commit changes only a doc comment and a test, so it is typed docs() rather than fix() to avoid a spurious release-please patch bump. * test(node): close review gaps on the key-publish fallback and Drop abort (#194) Round-five review follow-ups, no production behavior change beyond a pure fsync_parent_dir extraction: - Recondition the KEY_RACE_DEADLINE and publish_key_atomically rustdocs: a present key is complete-on-first-read only on the hard-link path; on the fallback the final name is visible mid-write (the deadline covers it) and the fallback also weakens durability (d), failing loud at next start, never a silently used key. - Cover the fallback create_new open-error arm via a new fault hook, asserting the returned error chains the original link error. - Make the Drop abort load-bearing (INV-21): a test-only flag suppresses the graceful signal so handle.abort() carries teardown alone; removing the abort turns the new test RED while the existing one stays green. - Observe the crash-residue contract: empty/garbage finals fail loudly. - Extract fsync_parent_dir, shared by the Won and fallback arms. - Split the permissive-umask test so a 0000 regression can't hide behind 0077. * fix(node): recover identity-key fallback fsync failure and abort wedged serve task F1: the hard-link fallback wrote the PEM directly to the final path then fsync'd it separately; an fsync failure left a durable name over non-durable content, so a later crash wedged startup (load_or_create_keypair parses the existing truncated file instead of regenerating). Fold the file fsync into write_key_or_cleanup so the final is removed on fsync failure, matching the hard-link temp policy; the next start regenerates. Parent-dir fsync still keeps-on-failure. F2: TestNode::shutdown moved the serve JoinHandle into tokio::time::timeout and, on elapse, the panicking .expect dropped it, detaching the still-running task and leaking the test DB across DROP DATABASE. Retain the handle (&mut), abort and reap it on timeout before panicking. Also: honor a task that finishes in the timeout race as graceful (not a false wedge), propagate a real serve-task panic, and close the pool on every path (including the wedged arm) before returning or panicking so the leak is closed on the path that needs it most. * test(node): invariant deny-prober (driven registry + completeness cross-check) (#195) * test(node): U1 deny-bearing route registry (owner-gate + signature tranches) Foundation for the invariant deny-prober (plan 002): a declarative registry of ONLY the routes that carry a runtime deny (owner-gate 403 / read-gate 404 / signature 401), each classified by reading its handler and recording the fn name. Owner-gate (12 rows: merge/close_pr, close_issue, webhooks, labels, protect, visibility set/remove/list incl the GET-is-403 correction) and signature-required (git-receive-pack) tranches are verified; read-gate tranche stubbed with a TODO (per-handler 404-vs-filter verification pending). A consistency self-test asserts no dup method+path, every row names its handler, and every read-gate row carries a positive-twin Reach. Decoupled from the #194 primitives (U1 uses none), so classification is not hostage to harness churn. * test(node): U2 fixture state matrix + per-gate-class probe generators Two-repo fixture (public owner-gate substrate + private read-gate substrate) plus probes_for(): each deny-bearing row expands to a hostile probe asserting the exact deny status and a positive twin (owner-reachability for owner-gate, authorized read for read-gate) so a deny for the wrong reason cannot false-pass. Three self-checks cover the owner-gate, read-gate, and signature classes. * test(node): U1 read-gate tranche (14 repo-scoped 404-deny reads) Each row's handler was read to confirm it gates on "/" via authorize_repo_read / visibility_check and returns RepoNotFound (404) to a non-reader of a private repo, with the owner re-read as the ReaderReads positive twin. Sub-entity gets (get_issue/get_pr/get_cert/get_bounty and the comment/review lists) are deferred to the fixture expansion that seeds them; global list-filter surfaces and the KNOWN_UNGATED reads are excluded with reasons. Runtime behavior is asserted by U3. * test(node): U3 drive the deny-bearing registry over a real node Boots a real node, seeds the two-repo fixture (plus a PR and an issue so the author-or-owner close gates are reached, not 404'd on an absent entity), then walks every deny-bearing route: the hostile probe must return the exact deny status and leak nothing, and the positive twin must reach the handler (owner: not 403; read: 2xx). A terminal invariant asserts one hostile probe per row was driven and the count equals the registry, so a row that produced no probe fails loud rather than passing vacuously. Adds seed_pr/seed_issue to TestNode. Mutation-verified load-bearing: breaking did_matches drove the merge_pr owner-gate hostile to 500 (RED, named); neutering authorize_repo_read's deny drove the get_repo read-gate hostile to 200 (RED, named); both reverted green. * test(node): U4 completeness cross-check keeps the registry from drifting A pure source scrape of server.rs (multiline .route parser, floor 90) that the runtime sweep cannot give: no deny-bearing row points at a route that no longer mounts (anti-stale), and no handler carrying an unambiguous owner-gate marker (require_repo_owner / require_owner) escapes the registry (orphan). The api dir is read at test time so a new module is covered. Complements authz_guard (which proves handlers are gated) by proving the deny-bearing ones are actually driven, and reaches the non-API git mounts authz_guard never sees. Mutation-verified: a bogus row path tripped anti-stale (named the row); removing the merge_pr row tripped the orphan guard (named merge_pr); both reverted green. * test(node): close vacuous-green gaps in the deny prober's own assertions Vetting the harness against itself surfaced branches that ran green but were never exercised adversarially: - Ok2xx twin dropped its unused token Option; the arm now asserts the authorized read returns a NON-EMPTY 2xx, so an empty-200 denial-rendered-as-success is caught (executed by every read twin). - U4 orphan guard gains a floor on the owner-marker scan (>=6), so a marker-scan regression to zero fails loud instead of passing by checking nothing. - Added probe unit tests that execute the previously-uncovered probes_for arms: the SiblingPublic path-scoped twin, and the Reach::None fail-loud panic. All 22 harness tests green. Every send_probe/probes_for branch is now executed; the Deny(401), Not403, and Ok2xx-status arms were additionally mutation-verified RED (signature-expect flip; did_matches->false; authorize_repo_read->deny) and both U4 floors RED via threshold flips, all reverted. * test(node): close 3 completeness gaps in the deny prober's own guards (#195) jatmn's review flagged three ways the prober's self-guards stay green when the protection they check is removed: - F1: the U4 completeness check enforced owner-gate orphans but not read-gate ones, so dropping authorize_repo_read on get_issue/get_cert/ get_bounty/etc. left the sweep green. Add a symmetric read-gate orphan guard that scans src/api for authorize_repo_read/visibility_check handlers and requires each to be a driven ReadGate row or an enumerated READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN entry with a reason, replacing the free-text prose. A staleness check keeps the allowlist from carrying dead exemptions. - F2: the U3 registry sweep called assert_denied with an empty withheld list, proving status only. Seed the private fixture with a distinctive secret and its blob OID, carry them on the read-gate hostile probes, and pass them through so a denial body echoing withheld data fails. - F3: the owner-gate orphan scan matched only require_owner/require_repo_owner and missed the inline did_matches(caller, &record.owner_did) idiom that protect_branch/unprotect_branch use. Fold in a has_owner_did_matches discriminator that catches the owner form without false-matching the signer-self (register_replica) or author (close_pr) did_matches forms, pinned by unit tests on the exact bodies. * test(node): make the deny-prober guards load-bearing (#195, F1-F4) Resolves jatmn's four INV-21 completeness findings — guards that were green but not load-bearing: F1: every ReadGate hostile probe was anonymous, so the signed-non-reader branch of each private read was untested — a regression treating any valid signature as authorized would leak while the sweep stayed green. Add a Signer::Stranger 404/ no-leak probe per read row, with a dedicated readgate_stranger counter so a dropped probe fails loudly. RED: authorize any signed caller -> the stranger probe leaks (200) while the anon probe stays green. F2: get_star_status, get_icaptcha_proof, and replicate_encrypted_blobs were source-only exemptions (a marker scan, never driven). Drive them as real ReadGate rows and remove the allowlist entries. RED: a runtime bypass that keeps the authorize_repo_read marker leaks -> the driven probe RED, the source scan green. F3: git_receive_pack's protected-branch owner 403 was never driven (its registry row is the unsigned-401 path). Add signed_stranger_protected_branch_push_is_forbidden (a signed non-owner push to a protected branch -> 403, owner control -> not-403), plus a seed_protected_branch harness helper. RED: invert the gate -> the probe RED. F4: the read-gate no-leak assertion omitted the private repo id (seed discarded it). Preserve it on the Fixture and withhold it; a synthetic 404 body carrying the UUID must fail check_denied. RED: a UUID-bearing body passed before the token was added. Each guard proven load-bearing by reverting the exact production auth-line (reverts not shipped). deny_harness suite 30 passed, fmt + clippy clean. * test(node): drive every arm of the multi-principal close/dispute gates close_pr, close_issue (owner-or-author) and dispute_bounty (creator-or-claimant) were each driven with a single owner/creator twin, so reverting the untested arm stayed green. Model gates by their authorizing-principal set (MultiPrincipalGate + Principal), seed distinct author/creator/claimant identities, and emit one Not403 twin per arm plus the stranger 403. registry_internal_consistency now invokes probes_for and asserts a twin per declared arm, so a future multi-arm handler cannot register with an untested arm. Each arm proven load-bearing: reverting is_owner/is_author on close_pr/close_issue and is_creator/is_claimant on dispute_bounty turns that arm's twin RED. * test(node): drive the deferred private reads with per-read leak assertions The deferred reads (get_issue, get_pr, get_pr_diff, list_issue_comments, list_reviews, list_comments, get_cert, get_bounty, path-scoped get_tree) sat in READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN, checked only for an authorize_repo_read marker, so an ignored result or early return stayed green. Seed each sub-entity in the private repo (issues/PRs via the real create handlers, a cert via a signed owner push, a private-repo bounty), thread id-keyed paths through IdSource, and drive each as a ReadGate row: anon/signed-stranger 404, owner 2xx. Each seeded entity carries a distinctive marker added to the read-gate withheld set, so a 404 that leaks the entity's own content fails (not just a status check). get_pr_diff exercises both its repo-root gate and its per-path visibility_check loop. get_encrypted_blob stays deferred (owner twin needs live IPFS; reclassified structurally next). Load-bearing: an ignored-result bypass on each read turns its hostile probe RED; a 404 leaking a seeded marker fails the body assertion. * test(node): close the prose-excuse hatch with a mounted-route completeness gate READ_GATE_NOT_DRIVEN allowed a free-text reason to park a read-gated handler out of the runtime sweep. Replace the reasons with a closed NotDrivenReason enum (ReadGatingMutation, GitSmartHttpRead, ContentAddressedRead, GlobalListFilter, ExternalDependencyUnavailable); get_encrypted_blob moves to the last. A drivable 404-deny GET no longer type-checks a reason and is caught by a driven-not- relabeled assertion. Add a completeness gate that derives the required read-gate set from the mounted route table (scrape_mounts, INV-21b), not only the source-marker scan: every mounted repo-scoped GET must be a driven ReadGate row, a deny-bearing GET, structurally excused, or a declared public GET — else it fails. Catches a read that gates via a helper the marker scan does not recognize. Load-bearing: re-parking a driven read trips the relabel assert; removing a driven ReadGate row trips the mounts cross-check. * test(review): harden multi-principal twin check against signer collision Add a distinct-signer assertion to multi_principal_rows_emit_one_twin_per_arm: the per-arm any() check is satisfied by a single twin when two Principals map to the same Signer, so a signer_for_principal collision would leave one arm silently untested. Assert the emitted twins carry principals.len() distinct signers (proven RED by colliding Author->Owner). Also correct the get_cert / priv_markers comments, which claimed a withheld cert-content marker that is not seeded — no cert marker is needed because get_cert 404s at the repo-root gate before the cert is fetched, so cert fields cannot reach the deny body. * style(test): apply rustfmt to the deny-prober additions * test(node): drive the bounty mutation gates and pin fixture object format (#195) - submit/approve/cancel_bounty become MultiPrincipalGate registry rows with status-appropriate bounty fixtures (claimed/submitted/open): their status check fires before the auth gate, so each row seeds its own bounty through the real API and the arm twins consume the status - pin --object-format=sha1 in both fixture worktrees so a sha256 default object format cannot break the OID equality with the served sha1 repos * test(node): drive the caller-self task/register gates in the deny-prober (#195) Resolve the three review findings on head 07abcc6. Bound the two new real-node probes (protected-branch push, PR-diff) on a timeout-bearing client, so a wedged git subprocess fails the suite rather than hanging it until CI kills the job. Withhold the pushed secret blob's OID (full and [..12] short form) in the PR-diff denial. The old branch was dead code: the OID was never in the fixture seed map, so build_branch_push_body now returns the pushed blob OIDs. Drive every caller-self runtime deny the registry claimed but only source-marker checked. create_task, claim_task, and register are a new SignerSelfGate class (a body DID field bound to the authenticated signer); complete_task and fail_task are a MultiPrincipalGate assignee arm (the caller must equal the task's stored assignee). Each runs hostile-then-authorized against a real node. A completeness guard, derived from a scan of src/api, now requires every did_matches(caller, X) handler to be a driven registry row, and the module doc is reconciled to the REST surface (the parallel GraphQL mutation gates are fenced separately, #219). Every gate is mutation-verified load-bearing: reverting a production did_matches line drives its hostile probe RED, and the completeness guard goes RED when a driven row is dropped or the classifier is starved. No production code changed. * fix(node): bracket the fallback identity-key publish with a durable marker The hard-link fallback exposes the final key name before the PEM is complete, so a crash in that window used to leave a partial final that wedged every later start. Create a bounded-name .publishing marker and fsync its name durable before create_new(final), dispose of it on every exit with the final's removal ordered first, and remove it only once the final is complete and durable. The marker dir fsync is warn-and-continue so dir-fsync-hostile mounts degrade to reduced power-loss protection instead of never provisioning. * fix(node): recover a crash-interrupted fallback key publish at boot A marker plus a content-failed final (empty or unparseable PEM) is now provably an interrupted first write: boot claims one marker by atomic rename to a .recovering file, quarantines the final preserving its bytes, sweeps the remaining markers, and regenerates, at most once per start. Every other failure keeps today's loud fail bit-for-bit: a bad final without a marker, any non-content load failure (transient EIO, mode, stat), and a second-iteration failure never touch the key. The error class is carried as a typed root error so recovery cannot key on message text. * fix(node): make the fallback marker removal a commit check for stalled winners A fallback winner stalled past the race deadline can have its round claimed by a recovering peer: the peer renames the marker, quarantines the in-progress final, and republishes. The winner's own-marker removal now decides the round: removal succeeding linearizes it ahead of any recovery, while any failure demotes it to Lost, after waiting out live or stale .recovering claims so the follow-up load cannot observe the pre-quarantine key. Demotion is always safe: absent interference the Lost path re-loads the winner's own key. * fix(node): sweep stale key-publish markers on every healthy boot A marker orphaned between its durability fsync and create_new(final), or a claim left by a crashed recovery, must not linger to misclassify a much-later corruption of a good key as an interrupted first write. Both healthy-boot arms (successful load, and a Won publish on the generate path) now sweep stale .publishing and .recovering entries, but only after the sweeper itself has made the final durable: a loadable final is not necessarily synced, and removing a live winner's marker before its sync_all would recreate the marker-less partial-final wedge on power loss. Any durability failure skips the sweep and leaves the markers in place. * fix(node): make recovery claims complete, releasable, and themselves recoverable Three review findings against the marker protocol. Recovery now claims every publishing marker and stale recovering claim (per-item bounded claim names), so a live publisher's own-marker commit check can no longer falsely succeed while its round is stolen through a stale marker; a post-claim re-parse aborts to reload when a publisher completed in the window. Claims count toward the crash signature and are claimable by rename, so a recoverer crash between claim and quarantine no longer recreates the permanent wedge. Claims are released on every exit including publish failures, closing the leak that made demoted publishers ride the full race deadline on a dead claim. The crash signature also needs two consecutive observations, giving a live mid-write publisher one poll of grace before a reader can classify its round as a crash. * test(node): cover the quarantine-exhaustion arm and pin recovery latency Add the missing coverage on recover_crashed_publish's degraded arms: quarantine-name exhaustion must fall back to removing the bad final and still regenerate, and a blocked removal must surface the chained error loudly, with the leftover claim proven claimable on the next boot. Route all marker-class name construction through publishing_prefix and recovering_prefix as the single source of truth, state the dir-fsync degradation caveat in publish_key_atomically's guarantee prose, and pin the crash-signature short-circuit with a timing assertion so recovery never silently regresses to riding the full race deadline. * fix(node): protect live recoveries from the sweep and restore hijacked keys Second-model review findings. The healthy-boot sweep now age-gates recovering claims (2x the race deadline; a live claim is always younger), because sweeping a live recovery's claim cancelled a demoted publisher's clearance wait and reopened two-sided divergence; publishing markers keep the unconditional sweep since stealing one only forces a safe demotion. The post-claim re-parse quarantines only on content-class failures (a transient error there releases the claims and stays loud), and a key completed inside the re-parse-to-quarantine window is detected by parsing the quarantined bytes and restored via no-clobber link instead of being discarded. The crash signature must now persist for 250ms of consecutive observations, above realistic mid-write latency on shared volumes, so concurrent starts stop hijacking live publishes. * fix(node): keep no-clobber on the quarantine restore and scope cleanup to owned inodes The restore now republishes the quarantined bytes through the atomic publisher, so every tier refuses an existing final and a concurrent winner survives; a lost restore keeps the quarantine as forensics and loads the winner. The fallback's post-write error arms remove the final only after proving the name still refers to the inode this publish created, so a failing publisher whose round was claimed away can no longer unlink the recoverer's republished key. Pre-write arms keep by-name removal: they complete inside the crash-signature persistence window, before any recovery can have claimed the round. * fix(node): hand post-write publish failures to boot recovery, stamp claim freshness A failed write or fsync on the fallback path now removes nothing: the partial final and its marker stay in place as exactly the crash state boot recovery claims, quarantines, and regenerates from. That deletes the stat-then-unlink cleanup whose race could destroy a recoverer's republished key, and can no longer strand a marker-less partial final when an unlink fails. Pre-write failures keep removal and disposal; they complete inside the crash-signature persistence window. Claim renames also stamp the claim's mtime to now, because rename preserves the source mtime and an aged stale marker otherwise births a live claim the healthy-boot sweep would treat as orphaned mid-round. * fix(node): key recovery claims by process nonce and harden the freshness stamp Two PID-1 containers on a shared identity volume derive identical claim names, and rename replaces an existing destination, so one recoverer's release could unlink the other's live claim. Claim names now carry a per-process nonce between pid and counter, so the release set can never alias another process's claims. The claim-freshness stamp gains a write fallback (a one-byte append bumps mtime where set_modified is unsupported), and its failure warning names the real hazard. Also lock the vanished-final re-parse arm with a dedicated regression test. * fix(node): adopt stranded quarantined identities and age-gate claim stealing A completed key stranded in quarantine by a failed or crash-interrupted restore is no longer abandoned: the generate arm first scans quarantines newest-first and republishes the first parseable one through the atomic publisher, preserving identity continuity instead of silently minting a fresh DID; unparseable quarantines stay as forensics. Recovering claims become claimable only past the same age floor the sweep uses, so a second starter can never steal a live recoverer's round mid-flight; a claim-crash state recovers after the bounded age floor passes. The crash-signature persistence doc now states the slow-mount trade-off plainly: a pre-write window exceeding the floor yields churn that converges, never divergence. * fix(node): bound quarantine adoption, expire orphan claims, align the waiter Adoption of a stranded quarantined identity is now bounded by the claim age floor, so a current round's completed key is preserved while a historical forensic quarantine can never resurrect an old DID or defeat the delete-identity-for-fresh-DID operator procedure. A healthy boot also schedules one delayed re-sweep after the age floor passes, so claims spared as possibly-live cannot linger as aged residue that would let later real corruption of a good final masquerade as a crash state and silently regenerate. The demotion waiter now shares the sweep's liveness rule: it waits out claims younger than the age floor rather than a flat race deadline, and skips aged orphans quickly. * fix(node): sweep every healthy return, supersede outcompeted quarantines, fail closed on unsettled rounds Every arm that returns a loaded, adopted, or reloaded key now funnels through one sweep-then-return closure, so stale markers cannot outlive any healthy boot path. Quarantines that provably lost their round (a Lost restore, or siblings of an adopted quarantine) move to an inert superseded class: bytes preserved as forensics, never adoptable, so the delete-identity-for-fresh-DID operator procedure can no longer resurrect an outcompeted key. The demotion waiter fails closed when its bound expires while a live young claim persists: an unsettled round now surfaces as a loud failed publish instead of resolving a key that disk may be about to contradict. * fix(node): supersede on every Lost arm, heartbeat live claims, retire old forensics Complete the supersede rule across its mirror arms: a lost adoption and a restore-Won round now both demote every outcompeted adoptable quarantine, so no arm leaves bytes the fresh-DID procedure could resurrect. Live recovery rounds now heartbeat their claim mtimes every quarter of the age floor under an RAII stop-and-join guard, making age-as-orphan sound: an aged claim provably lost its recoverer, and a stalled-but-live round on a slow volume can no longer be mistaken for residue by the waiter, the sweep, or a competing recoverer. Superseded forensic files are retention-swept after 24 hours, bounding growth on long-lived key directories. * fix(node): order supersede before consume, retire quarantine forensics, key the waiter on absence Both Won arms now supersede sibling quarantines before consuming the chosen one, so a crash in the gap cannot leave an outcompeted key adoptable. Plain quarantine forensics get the same 24h retention sweep as superseded files, bounding growth on long-lived key directories. The demotion waiter drops age logic entirely: it returns Ok only when every claim file is gone and fails the publish closed while any claim survives the bound, young or aged, so a heartbeat failure on a hostile volume can no longer convert a live round into orphan residue mid-wait. Doc prose reconciled with the shipped wait contract. * test(node): drive the #113 read/owner gates in the deny-harness fence After merging main, the completeness fence flagged three repo-scoped list GETs that #113 gated but the harness still treated as ungated public reads: list_webhooks (authorize_repo_read + require_repo_owner), list_replicas and list_protected_branches (authorize_repo_read). The runtime marker scan caught its own hand-maintained PUBLIC_REPO_GETS list drifting stale. Drive each real deny instead of exempting it: - list_replicas and list_protected_branches take Option auth, so they slot in as standard ReadGate rows (anon and signed-non-reader both 404, owner 2xx, no-leak body). - list_webhooks is doubly gated and 401s a headerless caller before any lookup, so a vanilla ReadGate row's hardcoded anon->404 leg does not fit. Add a per-Row anon_read signal (Deny404 default, Deny401 for auth-required reads) so its anon leg expects 401 while the signed-non-reader still drives the existence-hiding 404. Its owner layer is a sibling OwnerGate row on the public repo (signed stranger -> 403). The two share the /hooks path, so the consistency dedup key moves from (method, path) to (method, path, gate), which still catches an accidental same-gate double-registration. - Empty PUBLIC_REPO_GETS: the three are now driven rows, classified via the driven-path set rather than declared public. The mechanism stays for the next genuinely-public repo-GET. Each new row proven load-bearing: reverting the production gate turns the matching hostile probe red (403->200 owner, 404->403/200 read), and flipping list_webhooks' anon_read to Deny404 reddens its anon probe (got 401). Full deny_harness green (39/39). No production changes. * test(node): harden deny-harness so its guarantees can't pass vacuously Resolve three review findings on the real-node deny harness, all test-only. - assert_denied no longer folds a body-read error into an empty body: an unreadable denial (a mid-body reset/truncation) now fails loud instead of being certified leak-free by a withheld-token scan over "". - The three sqlx::test cases that returned via TestNode's async Drop (signed_stranger_protected_branch_push_is_forbidden, get_pr_diff_withheld_path_is_denied, deny_bearing_registry_denies_hostile_and_admits_authorized) now end with node.shutdown().await, releasing the serve task's pool clones before sqlx's synchronous DROP DATABASE cleanup instead of racing it. - A source-scrape guard, every_spawn_node_test_shuts_the_node_down, makes that contract load-bearing for every spawn_node test, with a closed allowlist for the two Drop-regression tests that deliberately skip shutdown. Removing any one shutdown() turns it RED (verified). - The eight fixture seeders in support/probe.rs use the bounded client, so a hung setup route fails fast rather than running to the CI job timeout. Full deny_harness suite green (40 tests). * test(node): close two vacuity holes in the shutdown-completeness guard An adversarial review flagged that the new every_spawn_node_test_shuts_the_ node_down guard could itself pass vacuously - the exact class it exists to prevent (INV-21 on the guard). - A spawn_node test whose only `node.shutdown(` occurrence was a comment (`// node.shutdown().await`) satisfied the raw substring check while still returning via Drop. - An unbalanced `{` inside a string literal in a test body could over-extend the brace-matched body slice and swallow a later test's shutdown, clearing the earlier one (latent: no current test triggers it). Both are closed by sanitizing the source through a new `code_only` pass (blanks comment and string/raw-string content, length-preserving) before the scan sees it, and the offender check is extracted to a pure spawn_node_tests_missing_shutdown so it can be driven with synthetic sources. Three adversarial unit tests pin both holes shut; stubbing code_only to a no-op turns the comment and brace tests RED (verified), so the sanitizer is load-bearing. deny_harness suite green (43 tests); clippy clean. * fix(ci): stub the gitlawb-node lib target in the Docker dependency cache This branch gives gitlawb-node a lib target alongside its binary, and the dependency-cache layer only wrote a main.rs stub for it. Cargo resolves every declared target before it fetches anything, so the layer aborted on the missing src/lib.rs and took the whole image build with it. Adds the matching lib.rs stub. The layer deliberately has no `|| true`, so this was a hard failure rather than a silently cold cache, which is the behavior that block's comment asks for. * fix(node): open the identity key without following symlinks, and close the temp before removing it Two findings from the last review. Loading an existing key ran metadata, set_permissions, a mode verify, and the read as four separate path lookups, all of which follow symlinks. A key path inside a writable directory could therefore be pointed at any service-readable file, and a privileged start would chmod that target to 0600 before it ever looked at the contents. On Unix the load now opens the path once with O_NOFOLLOW and does the mode check, the tightening, and the read through that one descriptor, which refuses a symlink outright and closes the window between the check and the use. A non-regular file is refused for the same reason. A regular key with loose bits is still narrowed rather than rejected, since rejecting it would break existing deployments. The failed-write path called the cleanup helper while the temp file handle was still open. Removing an open file fails on Windows, so a write or fsync failure left the temp behind, and the temp names are deterministic per process id with 64 of them, so a service restarting under a reused pid could exhaust the set and stay stuck after storage recovered. The handle is now closed first, with fsync still ahead of it since it needs the live descriptor. A removal that fails is logged, because it is the precursor to that exhaustion, while the write error stays the one surfaced to the caller. * fix(node): do not block on a FIFO planted at the identity key path The non-regular-file refusal added in the previous commit sits after the open, and opening a FIFO read-only waits for a writer to connect. A named pipe at the key path therefore hung startup indefinitely instead of being refused, reachable by the same actor the symlink case assumes. The directory case did not catch it, since opening a directory fails immediately and does reach the refusal. Opening with O_NONBLOCK as well makes the open return so the file-type check can run. It has no effect on a regular file, and a non-regular descriptor never gets past the check, so nothing needs to clear it afterwards. * fix(node): apply review fixes for identity key dir and deny harness Tighten identity key parent directories to 0700 before load/publish, create fallback publish markers with 0600, and extend U5b /ipfs withhold coverage with signed non-reader denial and allowlisted-reader grant legs. Add OwnerGate/ReadGate registry probe-shape tests. * fix(node): close deny harness gaps after main integration Tighten identity key parent dirs only on publish, extend INV-8 header scanning, add inline claimant orphan guard, and align gossip ping tests with the /ready-first readiness probe. * ci(codeql): exclude test paths and drop secret tokens from panic text CodeQL flagged intentional deny-harness fixtures (HTTP secret_cid probe and pack listing assertion). Ignore tests and test_support for analysis, remove an unused import, and keep the allow-unbounded-git marker on the harness git spawn line. * test(node): clear CodeQL false positives on deny harness fixtures Reuse the signed anon probe path for the loopback GET so the cleartext- transmission query does not flag secret_cid in the URL builder, and mark the assert_denied panic as an intentional leak witness for cleartext-logging. * fix(node): restore lib/bin boot regressions dropped in the deny-harness extraction Re-wire Config::validate(), the advisory-lock pool, and gossip peer-reachability hysteresis on the library boot path, and narrow CodeQL suppressions on fixture-only harness assertions. * fix(node): close remaining #194 gaps (CI lib, key parent, gossip shutdown) Run join_or_abort lib tests in the deny-harness CI step, repair group/world-writable key parents on existing-key load, abort gossip on HTTP shutdown with per-peer shutdown polling, and log list_peers errors. * test(node): restructure deny-harness fixtures to clear CodeQL alerts Route the anonymous withheld-CID GET through an anon_get helper (matching the unflagged signed_request pattern) so CodeQL no longer traces the secret into a single inline HTTP expression. Redact withheld tokens from the assert_denied panic witness so a leak failure does not itself leak the secret to stderr. Both are test-only changes; no production code moved. * fix(node): tighten identity-key parent-dir reload mask and add owner-push socket coverage The reload fast-path checked only write bits (0o022) while the publish helper checked all group/world bits (0o077), so a 0755 parent survived reload but was tightened on publish. Align the reload mask to 0o077 so the owner-only 0700 invariant holds across restarts, not just first publish. Adds a regression test proving a 0755 parent is tightened on reload (RED with the old mask, GREEN after). Adds real socket coverage for enforce_owner_push on an unprotected branch, isolating the owner-push gate from branch protection. The existing protected-branch test could not distinguish which gate fired the 403. Updates sweep_failure_tolerated to reflect the tightened reload path: a 0555 parent is now tightened to 0700 before the sweep, so the marker is removed rather than surviving behind a read-only directory. * test(node): clear CodeQL alert and restore gossip readiness tests Two findings from the 2026-09-08 review on head 988e8ea: 1. CodeQL rust/cleartext-logging on assert.rs:118. The panic sink interpolated redact_withheld(&reason, withheld), but CodeQL's taint analysis traces withheld tokens through redact_withheld without recognizing it as a sanitizer. Replace the interpolated panic with a fixed string so no tainted data reaches the sink. redact_withheld is still called (keeping it live) and its unit tests still pass; only the panic message changes. This is a test-only fixture false positive: no production path logs secrets. 2. Four gossip readiness tests dropped in the lib+bin split. Merge-base main.rs had 7 ping_peer_* tests; head had 3 renamed ping_peer_health_* tests. Restore the 4 missing: the /ready 200 direct happy path, the /ready 503 + /health 200 must-not-be-ready case, the legacy fallback with explicit expect-count, and the shared-deadline probe. No production code change; the function signatures are unchanged. Verified: cargo fmt --check, cargo clippy -- -D warnings, 9 gossip tests pass, 53 deny_harness tests pass (including assert unit tests). * test(node): refresh deny harness for post-July main drift Main's quarantine read pre-checks and task visibility layering landed after the registry froze, so the merged table needed three classes of refresh: - scan hygiene: mask string/comment contents and strip cfg(test) mods before the marker scans, so fixture text (the resolver_body helper) cannot fake a decl boundary or inherit markers - registry refresh: allowlist the read-gating mutations that gained authorize_repo_read (merge_pr, visibility/protect/webhook/label/ bounty/close/replica writes, git_receive_pack), drop the task_claimable helper and create_task's dedicated-test-driven conditional owner gate, and class list_visibility (owner-driven GET) and list_anchors (query-scoped read) explicitly - sweep substrate: scope the visibility twins to /swept-scope so set_visibility cannot 404 later strangers on the shared repo, and seed completable/failable tasks on the public repo so strangers reach the assignee 403 through get_visible_task * test(node): restore main's lock-pool-direct for_testing semantics The merge reconstruction derived an 8-connection lock pool inside for_testing, so callers passing a pool observed nothing checked out. Main's contract is that the argument IS the lock pool, which the exhaustion, deadline, backend-reuse, and waiter-isolation tests observe directly. Route through Self::new like for_testing_with_tigris so the cfg(test) fields stay gated. * fix(node): close review leaks in the deny harness and the grace knob doc - config.rs: GITLAWB_SHUTDOWN_GRACE_SECS documented an enforced drain bound that production never applies; the value is only logged and axum drains in-flight requests unbounded. Say so. - test_harness.rs: join_or_abort unwound a serve-task panic before pool.close() ran, leaking the test database on exactly the path where teardown matters. Carry the payload as ServeTeardown::Panicked and resume unwinding only after the pool and repos dir are released. - probe.rs: the cert-push workdir was keyed on pid+server_main_tip, which two parallel fixtures seeding within one second share; one fixture's cleanup could delete another's in-progress tree. Use a tempfile TempDir, which is unique and also cleans up on the panic path. * test(node): point the inv26 purge gate at lib.rs after the lib/bin split The queue-lifecycle purge boot wiring moved from main.rs to lib.rs in the crate split, but the source gate still scanned main.rs, so inv26_step4_queue_lifecycle_purge_is_wired panicked in CI while the purge itself stayed correctly wired. Scan lib.rs and update the doc and assertion strings; the purge contract is unchanged.

t added 6 commits July 12, 2026 19:09

beardthelion added crate:node gitlawb-node — the serving node and REST API kind:test Test coverage or harness labels Jul 13, 2026

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beardthelion force-pushed the feat/invariant-deny-prober branch from 7841244 to 5a4dc1c Compare July 13, 2026 03:30

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t added 5 commits July 14, 2026 15:17

style(test): apply rustfmt to the deny-prober additions

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test(node): submit_bounty claimant gate is a vacuous guard; harden every_in_scope_mutation_has_its_gate #203

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docs(agents): add AGENTS.md carrying the authorization rules PRs most often break #209

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kevincodex1 merged commit 88616b2 into feat/real-node-deny-harness Jul 22, 2026
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beardthelion mentioned this pull request Jul 22, 2026

test(node): real-node deny harness for trust-boundary regressions (owner-gated mutations, path-scoped reads, client-surfaced denials) #194

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beardthelion deleted the feat/invariant-deny-prober branch November 4, 2026 22:57

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