Bridge passes text between Claude Code sessions that can edit files and run commands, so we treat anything that lets an outsider put words into a session as a security issue.
Please don't open a public issue. Report it privately through GitHub instead: Security → Report a vulnerability on this repository.
Include your Bridge commit, your operating system, what you did and how to reproduce it.
We aim to reply within a few days and to fix confirmed issues promptly.
- Nothing leaves your machine. Messages live in a SQLite database at
~/.claude-bridge. No network service, no telemetry, no account. - The GUI is local only.
bridge.py guilistens on127.0.0.1, rejects requests whoseHostheader isn't localhost (blocks DNS rebinding), and requires a per-run token on every API call, so other web pages open in your browser can't read or send messages. - Sessions only act inside their own project. Each session is told to change only its own project and to ask other sessions rather than edit their files.
- Messages are instructions. A message from another session or from you is handled like a prompt. Only connect projects you'd be comfortable having one session ask another to work on.
- Local processes are trusted. Any program running as your user can write to
~/.claude-bridge/bridge.dband so send messages. Bridge doesn't defend against malware already on your machine.