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fix(policy): reject unknown endpoint security modes - #3187

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2000krysztof:fix/fail-closed-policy-enums
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fix(policy): reject unknown endpoint security modes#3187
2000krysztof wants to merge 2 commits into
NVIDIA:mainfrom
2000krysztof:fix/fail-closed-policy-enums

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@2000krysztof

@2000krysztof 2000krysztof commented Sep 4, 2026

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Summary

Make security-sensitive network policy values fail closed across all policy ingress paths. Replace the public TLS, enforcement, and access strings with typed protobuf enums so invalid values cannot silently weaken enforcement.

Related Issue

Closes #3046

Changes

  • Added shared validation for endpoint TLS, enforcement, and access values.
  • Rejects unknown values with actionable, field-level errors.
  • Applies validation across sandbox policies, policy updates, provider profiles, and merge operations.
  • Prevents malformed enforcement values such as enforc from falling back to audit mode.
  • Added defensive runtime rejection for invalid endpoint modes.
  • Returns gRPC INVALID_ARGUMENT before invalid policies are persisted or activated.
  • Replaced public protobuf strings for TLS, enforcement, and access with typed enums.
  • Updated generated Go bindings and SDK conversions to use the new enum types.
  • Preserved the documented YAML spellings for compatibility.
  • Added regression coverage across policy, provider-profile, gateway, SDK, and runtime paths.
  • Documented accepted values and fail-closed behavior.

Testing

  • mise run pre-commit passes
  • mise run test passes
  • Unit tests added/updated
  • E2E tests added/updated (not applicable)
  • Manually verified sandbox creation and live policy updates using the Podman gateway
  • Confirmed malformed TLS, enforcement, and access values are rejected
  • Confirmed rejected updates do not alter the active policy

Checklist

  • Follows Conventional Commits
  • Commits are signed off (DCO)
  • Architecture docs updated (if applicable)

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@johntmyers
johntmyers marked this pull request as draft September 4, 2026 18:41
@2000krysztof
2000krysztof marked this pull request as ready for review September 7, 2026 11:03
Closes NVIDIA#3046

Validate TLS, enforcement, and access values across policy and provider profile ingress, and prevent runtime parsing from falling back to audit for unknown enforcement values.

Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Malczuk <kmalczuk@redhat.com>
Replace the public TLS, enforcement, and access strings with protobuf enums and carry the typed values through policy composition, provider profiles, drivers, and runtime conversion.

Preserve the documented YAML spellings, reject unknown and invalid numeric enum values consistently, and update generated Go bindings, SDK conversions, tests, and policy documentation.

Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Malczuk <kmalczuk@redhat.com>
@2000krysztof
2000krysztof force-pushed the fix/fail-closed-policy-enums branch from 267b665 to c1c3bdd Compare September 7, 2026 11:43

@gmenher gmenher left a comment

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Great work on this!! @2000krysztof , the centralization in l7_validate.rs is a clean design and the test coverage there is thorough.

One question: I noticed that sandbox policies are persisted as binary protobuf blobs (encode_to_vec / decode in policy_store.rs). Changing NetworkEndpoint.tls, .enforcement, and .access from string (wire type 2) to enum (wire type 0) means that existing stored blobs with non-empty values for those fields will have those fields silently dropped to 0 (Unspecified) when decoded by the new code, since prost skips fields with a wire type mismatch rather than erroring.

The most sensitive case seems to be tls: skip, which would silently become tls: Unspecified (auto-detect) on upgrade. How is this currently handled for existing deployments?

Comment thread proto/sandbox.proto
// Deprecated compatibility spelling; behaves like automatic handling.
NETWORK_TLS_MODE_TERMINATE = 2 [deprecated = true];
// Deprecated compatibility spelling; behaves like automatic handling.
NETWORK_TLS_MODE_PASSTHROUGH = 3 [deprecated = true];

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These two values are marked deprecated, but there's no inline note pointing to the recommended replacement. Is the expectation that callers migrate to the new enum variants directly, or is there a planned alias or migration note somewhere? Just want to make sure it's easy to find for anyone reading the proto in isolation.

}
}

pub fn network_access_preset_from_str(value: &str) -> Option<NetworkAccessPreset> {

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With the proto fields now typed as enums on the wire, I'm curious whether these string-to-enum conversion functions are still needed for an active code path, for example YAML/Helm config that arrives as strings before being mapped to proto, or whether they're now primarily used for legacy input validation. Just trying to understand if there's an external config surface that still uses the string form.

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fix(policy)!: make security-sensitive policy values fail closed

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