[raymondginger2018-sudo]

What

Two targeted hardenings in core/harness/permissions.py, both about the path-matching layer:

1. Protect MCP/hook process-source configs. Adds 5 names to SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS:
   .mcp.json, mcp_servers_canonical.json, .deepcode/settings.json, .claude/settings.json,
   .deepcode-plus/settings.json.

   These files decide which external processes the next session spawns (MCP stdio servers,
   workspace hooks), so a written-in server definition is delayed code execution; the generated
   sync copies also carry plaintext env-derived keys. They belong in the same protected class
   as .env / .netrc already on the list, and they are script-maintained outside the agent
   tool path, so denying tool-path access breaks no legitimate in-session workflow.

2. Match through trailing dots/spaces (CVE-2026-103572-class bypass). Windows drops
   trailing dots and spaces from path components at open time while os.path.normpath keeps
   them — the literal name .mcp.json. opens .mcp.json, yet a literal compare misses it.
   is_sensitive_path now also probes per-component rstrip(" .") variants (with . / ..
   components protected). The strip is match-only: the reported path stays as written.

Why

• Delayed-RCE surface + plaintext key material should not be readable/editable through the
  file tools under any permission mode.
• The denylist was bypassable by a known OS-vs-normalizer mismatch class; matching only the
  as-written form is what CVE-2026-103572 exploited upstream of this pattern family.

Tests

3 new regression tests (red → green):

• MCP configs denied across permission modes, and allow rules cannot override the deny.
• Trailing dot/space variant bypass blocked.
• No false positive on .vscode/settings.json or plain JSON files.

Local run on Windows git-bash: tests/test_harness_permissions.py 38 passed. The
pre-existing test_denylist_follows_symlinks fails locally with WinError 1314 (symlink
privilege) — that test exists unchanged on main and is environmental, not introduced here.

Security Considerations

• Deny surface is limited to tool-path enforcement (is_sensitive_path) for 5 explicit config
  names; no exec/sandbox control-flow change, patterns are data-only additions.
• The normalization probe only affects matching; the reported path is never rewritten, so
  logs and error messages keep the user-visible name.
• Intentional behavior change: scripts that edit these configs must run outside the agent
  tool path (that is the point for generated plaintext-key-bearing copies).

[raymondginger2018-sudo]

@Zongwei9888 — this PR touches the sensitive-path denylist and a CVE-2026-103572-class normalization bypass, so it needs a security review. A fork can't set the security label or request reviewers, flagging it here for triage.

Summary for the reviewer:

• Data-only additions to SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS (5 MCP/hook config names) + a per-component rstrip(" .") match-only probe in is_sensitive_path.
• No exec/sandbox control-flow change; reported paths are never rewritten.
• 3 new regression tests (MCP configs denied across modes; trailing-dot/space bypass blocked; no false positives), plus full local preflight with a KNOWN-RED verdict (new=0; the known red is the pre-qualified Windows symlink-privilege case, unrelated).

[Zongwei9888]

Thank you, @raymondginger2018-sudo. The trailing-dot part is right: Windows drops trailing dots and spaces from path components when it opens a file, so secret.key. opens secret.key while the pattern check misses it. Please keep that probe and its tests.

The new patterns need to change before we can merge:

1. They protect the wrong files. DeepCode loads hooks from ~/.deepcode/hooks.json, <workspace>/.deepcode/hooks.json and <workspace>/.claude/settings.json (core/harness/hooks/discovery.py:70-74). hooks.json isn't covered, while .mcp.json, mcp_servers_canonical.json, .deepcode/settings.json and .deepcode-plus/settings.json aren't files DeepCode reads.
2. They use the wrong kind of protection. SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS is the credential denylist: every tool is denied, reads included, and Grep/Glob skip the files (core/harness/tools/search.py:128,144,233). Hook files aren't secrets, and the agent should still be able to read .claude/settings.json; the risk is in writing them. (The sandbox already blocks sandboxed commands from writing these paths, core/harness/sandbox.py:258-264.)
3. Please drop references readers here can't follow (the CVE id, the "2026-10-07 scan §9.4", the sync script) from the comments.

A version we'd merge: the trailing-dot probe as it is, plus a check that turns a file-tool write to one of the three hook files into an ask (never a deny for reads), with tests for both.

[raymondginger2018-sudo]

@Zongwei9888 — rewritten as the version you described, pushed as b25569fc (based on the current main tip):

• The five denylist patterns are gone. The PR no longer touches SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS; hook files are not secrets.
• Writes to the discovery files now ask. A new is_hook_config_path matches the three files discovery.py reads from by two suffixes — /.deepcode/hooks.json (covers both the user-level and workspace-level file) and /.claude/settings.json. In PermissionEngine._evaluate, any write that would otherwise be allowed (rule allow, full_auto) is downgraded to ask with a message that hook handlers run commands in a later session. Reads are never gated here, and a stricter decision keeps its strength — deny rules, plan mode and the read-only preset still deny.
• The trailing-dot probe is kept as-is, and the new ask check uses the same probe, so .claude/settings.json. (Windows drops the trailing dot at open time) still asks.
• Unfollowable references removed from comments; the only external pointer is the in-repo core.harness.hooks.discovery module.

Tests cover both directions: writes ask even in full_auto, reads stay allowed (file tools and search), plan/read-only never relax into an ask, and the trailing-dot denylist cases still hold.

Local preflight of this exact head (Windows, Python 3.12/3.13/3.14): no new failures; only the already-tracked Windows-only lifecycle/desktop flakes.

[Zongwei9888]

Thank you for the quick rewrite, @raymondginger2018-sudo. This is the shape we asked for: reads stay free, the trailing-dot probe is kept, and stricter decisions keep their strength. One change before merge.

Full Access. Full Access resolves to full_auto with approval_policy=never (core/domain/execution_security.py:175-180), and _apply_approval_policy turns an ask into a deny under never. So with this branch, a Full Access session can't write .claude/settings.json or hooks.json at all, and nothing can approve it. I checked through build_permission_engine(None, cwd=ws, execution_security_profile=ExecutionSecurityProfile.for_preset("full_access")): write_file on .claude/settings.json returns deny ("… requires confirmation …"), while on main it is allow. Full Access also runs commands without the sandbox, so a shell command can write the same file anyway; the deny would only block a user who asked for a hook.

Please skip this check under Full Access, the same way Full Access skips the sensitive-path guard and origin approval (core/harness/policy.py:204-210). For example, have build_permission_engine pass a flag that is off when profile.access_preset is ExecutionAccessPreset.FULL_ACCESS, and add a test through build_permission_engine with the full_access profile that expects allow. The legacy full_auto path with an approver (on_request) should keep asking, as it does now.