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Two related fixes: - WIKI_AUTH_MODE previously only protected DELETE /api/wiki_cache; every other sensitive/costly route (wiki generation, repo indexing, chat, codemap, cache reads) performed no authorization check at all, so an operator who enabled the one documented protection mechanism got no actual protection anywhere but that single endpoint. Adds a shared check_wiki_auth_code() dependency (api/routers/auth.py) and an authorization_code field on RepoRequestBase, applied to every route that generates, indexes, chats, or reads cached wiki content. - Wiki task submission (POST /wiki/tasks) and repo indexing (POST /repo/prepare) each admitted a new asyncio task into their respective tracking state unconditionally, before any concurrency limit applied. A caller varying repo_url could queue an unbounded number of pending clone/embedding jobs. Adds an admission cap on distinct non-terminal tasks (TaskRegistry.max_pending, default 10x the execution semaphore) and a parallel cap on /repo/prepare's own in-flight job set, both returning 429 once full. Adds regression tests in tests/backend/routers/test_wiki_auth_enforcement.py (new) and tests/backend/services/test_wiki_task.py, including fail-before coverage run against the unpatched code.
This was referenced Oct 5, 2026
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Two related fixes:
WIKI_AUTH_MODEpreviously only protectedDELETE /api/wiki_cache; every other sensitive/costly route (wiki generation, repo indexing, chat, codemap, cache reads) performed no authorization check at all, so an operator who enabled the one documented protection mechanism got no actual protection anywhere but that single endpoint. Adds a sharedcheck_wiki_auth_code()dependency (api/routers/auth.py) and anauthorization_codefield onRepoRequestBase, applied to every route that generates, indexes, chats, or reads cached wiki content.POST /wiki/tasks) and repo indexing (POST /repo/prepare) each admitted a new asyncio task into their respective tracking state unconditionally, before any concurrency limit applied. A caller varyingrepo_urlcould queue an unbounded number of pending clone/embedding jobs. Adds an admission cap on distinct non-terminal tasks (TaskRegistry.max_pending, default 10x the execution semaphore) and a parallel cap on/repo/prepare's own in-flight job set, both returning 429 once full.Test plan
pytest tests/backend/routers/test_wiki_auth_enforcement.py tests/backend/services/test_wiki_task.py: new regression tests pass.pytest tests/: full suite passes with no regressions.TaskQueueFullErrordidn't exist).